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A policy that moves prices closer to free trade levels would shift
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Detailed estimates of effective subsidy coeffi-  Investment programs aimed at increasing
cients for four crops - cotton, wheat, rice, and  cotton, rice, and wheat production appear to
groundnuts - yielded the following conclusions  have high economic rates of return - higher at
about agricultural incentives in India (among  the margin than investment in industry.
others):  Andhra's cotton is a financially a'id economi-
cally profitable export even at current exchange
Wheat, rice, and especially cotton have been  rates. Investment in rice and wheat would yield
disprotected (in effect, taxed) in the 1980s.  high economic rates of return as import substi-
Groundnuts have been heavily protected, en-  tutes, particularly in -areas  where subsidies are
couraging a different allocation of resources  low.  Their financial and economic profitability
than under free trade.  as exports is, however, more doubtful.  The evi-
dence on these major crops suggests that in India
The incentive framework generates static  (as in other developing countries) agriculture as
efficiency losses and net foreign exchange  a whole is underpriced, which produces a bias
losses, particularly in areas where the crops  toward the industrial sector.
compete directly for resources. A policy that
moved prices closer to free trade levels would  Subsidies in Indian agriculture are substan-
shift resources from groundnuts into crops that  tial - about 10 percent of value added for
would eam more in foreign exchange.  This  groundnuts and cotton, 25 percent for wheat, and
increased output, particularly of cotton, could be  35 percent for rice - and should be considered
used to purchase edible oils - with a net gain in  explicitly in evaluating incentives for agricul-
foreign exchange.  tural investment and production.
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1.  Government  intervention  in  Indian  agriculture  is  pervasive. It
includes  support/procurement  price  policies,  explicit  and implicit
subsidies  on inputs  that  now  represent  a significant  fraction  (over  2.5%)
of GDP,  control  over  the  links  between  external  and  domestic  markets,
research  and  extension  programs,  and  crop  specific  programs. Assessments
of these  wide ranging  and  sometimes  contradictory  policies  have  usually
been  based  on analyses  of their  impact  on the  net  income  per  hectare  from
the  crop  in  question. Sometimes  consideration  also  is given  to the
opportunity  cost  of policy-induced  substitutions  between  one  crop  and
another. However,  almost  all  of these  analyses  rely  on  domestic  prices
for  their  evaluations.  This implicitly  autarkic  approach  neglects  the
possiblities  of gains  from  trade  and  additional  foreign  exchange  earnings.
2.  This  study  and  other  recent  World  Bank  analyses  of agriculture
(Krueger,  Schiff,  and  Valdes)  take  a  different  tack  --  explicitly
considering  the  possiblities  of international  trade  in evaluating  the
impact  of incentives.  Under  this  approach,  incentives  for  different  crops
are  measured  by the  ratios  between  domestic  and  international  prices
(appropriately  adjusted  for  input  costs,  subsidies  and  the  s^arcity  value
of foreign  exchange). ComrAodities  with  ratios  in  excess  of one  are
protected  by the  policy  regime,  commodities  with  ratios  below  one  are
disprotected  (in  effect  taxed)  by the  policy  regime,  relative  to the
situation  that  would  prevail  under  free  trade.
3.  Specifically,  this  study  estimates  three  standard  coefficients
(ratios):
a) the nominal protection coefficient (NPC) --  the ratio of domestic
to international  border  prices  (the  reference  prices)
b) the effective protection coefficient (EPC) --  the ratio of value
added  measured  at  domestic  prices  (the  domestic  price  less  the  per
unit  domestic  cost  of tradeable  inputs)  to  value  added  at
international  border  prices  (the  invernational  price  less  the  per  unit
cost  of tradeable  inputs  at international  prices)
c) the Effective Subsidy Coefficient (ESC) --  the effective
protection  coefficient  adjusted  for  the  subsidies  and  taxes  on  non-
tradeables
The  EPC  measures  the  protection  and  subsidies  accorded  to the  land,  labor,
and  capital  and  non-tradeable  inputs  used  i- che  production  of a
commodity,  while  the  NPC  measures  the  protection  accorded  to  the
commodity,  including  all  the  inputs  that  go into  its  production.  The
importance  of this  distinction  can  be seen  by noting  that  a high  NPC
provides  little  incentive  to  use  resources  in the  production  of a
commodity,  if  the  NPC  of the  inputs  is  also  high.  Hence,  the  EPC  is  a
better  measure  than  the  NPC  of the  incentive  for  resources  to  be used to
produce  a commodity. Similarly,  if  non-traded  inputs  such  as credit  and
electricity  are  subsidized,  then  there  is  greater  incentive  to  apply
inputs  of land,  labor  and  capital  than  without  subsidy. Consequently,  the
ESC is  a  better  a.aasure  of incentives  than  the  EPC.ii
4.  The  study  also  includes  estimates  of the  nominal  protection
coefficient  adjusted  for  a  premium  on foreign  exchange  (ANPC)  and  some
discussion  of  how such  a  premium  would  affect  the  EPCs  and  ESCs.
Inclusion  of a  notional  premium  on foreign  exchange  is  used to  reflect  the
necessity  of a compensatav  change  in the  exchange  rate  were the  economy
to  move  to a free ;rade  ei.!ronment,as  well as the  possiblity  that  the
current  account  deficit  is  not  sustainable  in  a given  year  and  hence  the
currency  is  overvaled  even  given  the  trade  and  exchange  control  regime
(See  for  example  Krueger,  Skiff,  and  Valdes). With  the  inclusion  of such
a premium,  the  estimated  coefficients  become  good  proxies  for  cost  benefit
indicators  such  as  Domestic  Resource  Cost (DRC)  (  See  Pursell  and  Roger
and  Scandizzo  and  Bruce). As this  estimate  is  only indicative,  the
adjustment  is formally  made  only  on the  NPC.
5.  This  study  covers  four  commodities:  wheat  and  rice,  India's  iost
important  cereals;  cotton,  an important  cash  crop  used  in the  country's
large  textile  industry;  and  groundnut  as a representative  of the  oilseeds
crop  complex. Together,  these  four  crops  account  for  roughly  45 per  cent
of gross  cropped  area  and  above  50  per  cent  of  gross  value  of crop
output. Wheat,  rice  and  cotton  experienced  technological  breakthroughs
during  late  1960s  and  1970s  in  certain  regions,  while  groundnut  yields
have  lagged  behind. Presently,  efforts  are  being  made  to  stimulate
oilseed  production  under  the  Technology  Mission  on Oilseeds  launched  by
Government  of India  in  1986  and  a  buffer  stock/price  support  scheme  was
introduced  in 1989.
6.  Table  1  summarizes  the  estimates  for  the  protecion  coefficients
for  the  four  commodities  for  the  1980s,  in addition  it  contains  estimates
of comparable  domestic  and  world  prices. These  coefficients  are  weighted
averages  of coefficients  calculated  for  the  principal  producing  states;
the  state  coefficients  differing  in  prices,  transport  costs  to  market
(which  affects  the  'border'  reference  price)  and  degree  of subsidies. The
coefficients  have  been  calculated  under  two  assumptions:  that che  crops
compete  with imports  and  that  they  are  exported  to a  particular  market.
The  difference  is  basically  that  the  international  border  or reference
price  is computed  by adding  on international  shipping  costs  to the  price
at the  foreign  market  under  the  importable  hypothesis  and  by deducting
international  shipment  costs  from  the  price  at the  point  of foreign  sale
in  the  case  under  the  exportable  hypothesis.  These  two  different
treatments  of transport  costs  allow  the  analyst  to see  whether  the  Indian
production  is  competitive  with  imports  given  the  protection  accorded  by
transport  costs  and  what  subsidy,  if  any,  would  be required  to  export  the
crop.
7.  The  major  results  can  be summarized  as follows:
a) Cotton,  and  to a lesser  extent  wheat  and  rice  have  been  disprotected  or
in effect  taxed  during  the  1980s,  relative  to  the  prices  that  would  have
prevailed  with  free  imports  (the  importable  hypothesis).  This is  shown  by
protection  coefficients  that  generally  are  less  than  one.
b) Groundnuts  have  received  substantial  protection  --  their  protection
coefficients  exceed  one  and  on average,  are  1.8  to  2.6  times  those  for  the
other  crops. In fact  the  average  EPC,  1.56,  is  above  the  average
effective  protection  coefficient  for  industry  of 1.4  (World  Bank  1987).tii
Sabic  le  1:  SooraI  Behaviour  of  Crom-SoeofA  Eet  rngentives  nd  Prices  in  indian  Arioulture
Hypothesis  /Crop/ProtectLori
Coefficient  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Averase
-------------------------------------------------------- _----__--------------__-----------------------
nmsortcblL  ieothes  is
WIEAT
NPCs  0.72  0.73  0.84  0.84  0.76  0.76  0.91  0.80
EPC  0.67  0.68  0.80  0.80  0.72  0.72  0.89  0.75
ESCs  0.76  0.85  0.99  0.99  0.90  0.90  1.12  0.93
ANPCs  0.57  0.58  0.67  0.67  0.60  0.60  0.73  0.63
Dometic  Prico/a  (RaIq)  117  130  142  151  152  1!7  162
World  Pria-lb  (Rslq)  127  148  152  159  170  173  145.
Price  Ratio  0.92  0.88  0.93  0.95  0.89  0.91  1.12  0.94
RICE
NPCs  0.45  0.51  0.75  0.70  0.72  0.78  0.80  0.67
LPC-a  0.43  0.48  0.73  0.68  0.70  0.78  0.78  0.65
ESCs  0.58  0.65  0.99  0.90  0.96  1.01  1.06  0.d8
ANPCS  0.36  0.40  0.60  0.56  0.57  0.63  0.64  0.54
Domestic  PeiceIc  (RaIq)  130  164  174  189  196  203  2C8
World  Price/d  (Rs/q)  353  353  255  291  293  274  274
Price  Ratio  0.42  0.46  0.68  0.65  0.67  0.74  0.76  0.63
COTTON
NPCs  0.77  0.94  0.82  0.68  0.73  0.86  0.83  0.80
EPCs  0.64  0.82  0.71  0.58  0.62  0.74  0.69  0.69
E8Cm  0.71  0.90  0.79  0.64  0.67  0.82  0.75  0.75
ANPCa  0.60  0.72  0.64  0.53  0.57  0.66  0.64  0.62
Domastic  Pricele (Rs/q)  895  1118  1118  1176  1206  1250  1264
WorLd  Pricalf  (RsIq)  1629  1415  1594  1949  1-'7  1333  1734
Price  Ratio  0.55  0.79  0.70  0.60  0.70  0.94  0.73  0.72
GROUtNDNUS
NPCs  1.06  1.37  1.66  1.41  1.40  1.53  2.05  1.50
EPCs  1.09  1.44  1.74  1.47  1.47  1.58  2.13  1.56
ESCS  1.20  1.55  1.93  1.58  1.60  1.76  2.32  1.71
ANPCs  0.84  1.08  1.31  1.11  1.11  1.21  1.63  1.18
Domstic  Prlels  (RaIq)  294  386  421  450  486  500  528
World  Price/h  (RsIq)  382  S39  389  396  497  445  409
Price Ratio  0.77  0.72  1.0W  1.14  0.98  1.12  1.29  1.01ivr
(contd.)
TabLe  1.2:  Tpmnorsl  Behaviour  of  Croy-Soacifto  Effectlve  rncentives  and  Prices  In  Indian  AtgMcultury
Hypothesis/Crop/Protection
CoeffLeient  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Averasge
EhoortabLe  Hypothesis
WHEAT
NPCs  1.15  1.09  1.24  1.29  1.27  1.33  1.99  1.34
EPCs  1.29  1.16  1.35  1.47  13Ss  1.71  3.44  1.71
ESCs  1.57  1.35  1.57  1.73  1.81  2.00  4.07  2.01
ANPCs  0.87  0.83  0.93  0.96  0.93  0.97  1.38  0.98
RICE
NPCs  0.50  0.60  0.94  0.89  0.94  1.09  1.16  0.87
EPC&  0.47  0.57  0.93  0.88  0.95  1.13  1.19  0.87
ESCs  0.65  0.77  1.26  1.21  1.30  1.60  1.68  1.21
ANPCs  0.39  0.46  0.70  0.68  0.72  0.83  0.87  0.66
cOTTON
NMPC  0.89  1.13  0.92  0.74  0.83  1.01  0.93  0.92
EPCs  0.78  1.04  0.80  0.62  0.71  0.89  0.79  0.80
ESCs  0.84  1.13  0.88  0.69  0.78  0.99  0.86  0.88
ANPCs  0.70  0.87  0.72  0.58  0.64  0.76  0.72  0.71
GROUNDNUT
NPCs  1.25  1.72  2.03  1.69  1.76  2.03  2.87  1.91
EPCs  1.44  2.09  2.44  1.90  2.07  2.36  3.45  2.26
ESCs  1.57  2.24  2.69  2.04  2.31  2.63  3.76  2.47
ANPCe  0.99  1.34  1.57  1.32  1.37  1.56  2.20  1.48
Notes:  la  Domestic  price  of  wheat  is approximated by Its  procurement price for FAQ.
lb  World  price  ls  of US Hard Red  WLnter  No.  2  with  ordlnary protein, fob US gulf (at
official exchanse  rate)  for ApriL to June  quarter.
/c  Domestic prlce of rice  is  estLmted  as procurement price  of paddy dlvided by
0.7, whlch Is  paddy-rLce  conversion factor for Indian 'Common'  rice.
id  World  -rice  of rice Is  of Thai vhite (Miled)  51 Broken, fob Bangkok (at  official
rate)  for  October  to  January.
/a  Domestic  price  of  cotton  Is  approximated  by  procurement  price  of  kapa.  (J-34/
414F/H-777  variety)  divided  by  0.34. whlch Is kapas-llnt conversion ratlo.
If  World  Price  of  cotton  is  that  of  cotton  outlook  index  'A'.  cif  Liverpool.
Ig  Domestic  prlce  of  groundnut  is  its  procurement  price  (Ln cermw  of  earnels).
/h  World  price  of  groundnut  Is  of  KerneLs  of  sny  origLa,  cLf Europe  (Rorterdam).v
c) EPCs  for  cotton,wheat  and  rice  are  below  the  corresponding  NPCs (under
the  importable  hypothesis).  This  reflects  the  disprotection  of these
crops  (NPCs  less  than  one)  combined  with the  protection  of the  industrial
inputs  (pesticides,  machinery,  fertilizer)  used  in  their  production.  On
the  other  hand  groundnuts  have  a higher  EPC  than  NPC,  because  the
protection  of groundnuts  exceeds  the  protection  of its  inputs.
d) Estimated  net  subsidies  are  large,  about  10%  of  value  added  in  the  case
of groundnuts  and  cotton,  about  25%  in  the  case  of  wheat  and  about  35%  in
the  case  of rice. AssuAming  these  large  subsidies  are  distributed  evenly
across  all  producers  would  imply  that  they  offset  some  of the
disprotection  -- this  is  shown  by the  EPSs  that  are  greater  than  th-e  EPCs
and  quite  close  to  one (e.g.  wheat  93,  rice  .88,  cotton  .75  under
importable  hypothesis).  However,  'If  this  assumption  is  not  corret  .hen,
as  discussed  below,  some  producers  of these  crops  are  in  effect  bea.rh
taxed  (as  shown  by the  EPCs)  while  others  are  receiving  large  benefits.
e)  Cotton  appears  to  be an efficient  export  (protection  coefficients  less
than  one  under  te  exportable  hypothesis.)  Rice  and,  to  a much  lesser
extent  wheat,  would  be efficient  exports  provided  a 25%  premium  were
accorded  foreign  exchange,  *1s  shown  by the  ANPCS. Groundnut,  on the  other
hand,  would  need  a foreigr.  exchange  premium  of 40%  or  more  to  be aii
efficient  export.
f)  The  degree  of disprotection  for  cotton,  wheat  and  rice  has  been reduced
over  the  l980s. This  largely  reflects  falling  world  prices,  that  have  not
been  offset  even  by the  depreciations  of the  rupee  against  the  dollar,  and
not  any  major  rise  in  domestic  prices. In fact,  domestic  prices  rose  5-6%
p.a.  over  the  period  in  question,  about  the  same  as the  wholesale  price
index  in  general. Protection  on groundnut  also  has risen  over  the  period,
but  this  results  both from  falling  world  prices  and  domestic  policies  that
have increased  domestic  prices  about  11%  p,.a.  during  the  period.
g)  The  calculations  of  protection  coefficients  across  states  (not  shown)
indicate  at least  two  significant  spatial  variations: 1)  Punjab  rice  has
a much  higher  NPC,  EPC,  and  ESC  than  the  other  states,  reflecting  higher
prices  and,  to  a lesser  extent,  the  irrigation  subsidy;  2)  Maharashtra
cotton  (and  to  a lesser  extent  Punjab  cotton)  received  much  higher
protection  and  Andhra  cotton  much  lower  protection  than  the  average  for
cotton,  reflecting  differences  in  procurement  price  policy  during  the
period  and,  to  a lesser  extent,  irrigation  subsidies.
h) Of the  two  main  crops,  rice  is  _omewhat  more  disprotected  (taxed  more
heavily)  than  wheat,  compared  1^  the  prices  that  would  prevail  under  free
trade. Moreover,  the  .iverage  .i-antive  to rice  is  brought  up by the  high
protection  accorded  Punjab  rice. Hence,  rice  and  wheat  producers  in  the
Punjab  and  Haryana,  and  wheat  producers  elsewhere,  receive  more incentives
than  rice  producers  in the  rest  of the  country.vi
8.  These  results  have a  number  of implications:
a)  The  disprotection  accorded  cotton,  rice  and  wheat  and  the  high
protection  accorded  groundnuts  suggests  that  the  incentive  framework  for
agriculture  hi.  stimulated  the  allocation  of resources  to groundnuts  and
discouraged  resource  use in  the  other  three  crors 0, compared  to the
allocation  of  resources  that  would  prevail  under  a free  trade  regime.
b) The  difLerence  in  effective  incentives  also  suggests  the  possibility
that  the  incentive  framework  has  generated  static  efficiency  losses  &nd
ret  foreign  excharRe  lusses,  particalarly  in  areas  like  Gujarat  and  Andhra
Pradesh,  where  thu  crops  compete  directly  for  resources.  A price  policy
that  moved  relative  prices  closer  to  the  free  trade  levels  would  shift
resources  from  groundnuts  into  the  other  crops,  with  a net Increase  in
value  product  measured  at international  prices. This increased  oucput,
particularly  if it  were  cotton,  could  be sold  in  international  markets  in
order  to  buy edible  oils,  with  a  net  gain  in  foreign  exchange. On the
other  hand,  higher  prices  for  edible  oils  would  tend  to  reduce  the  acreage
and  production  of internationally  competitive  crops. Hence,  programs
stimulating  groundnut  production  through  higher  prices  would  have to  have
accord  a  high implicit  benefit  for  self-sufficiency  in  order  to  be
justifiable.
c) Investment  programs  aimed  e- increasing  cotton,  rice,  and  wheat
production  appear  to  have  high  economic  rates  of return. All three  of
these  crops  have  protection  coefficients  which,  adjusted  for  an exchange
rate  premium,  are  below  unity  and,  as mentioned  above,  such  coefficients
are  good  proxies  for  cost-benefit  indicators  such  as  domestic  resource
costs  (DRCs). By  comparison,  for  example,  the  average  effective
protection  coefficent  for  industry  is  about  1.4. Hence,  these  estimates
suggest  that  at the  margin  investment  in  the  three  crops  would  yield  a
higher  economic  rate  of return  than  investment  in  industry. Andhra  cotton
in  particular  appears  to  be exportable  even  at current  exchange  tates.
The  results  suggest  that  investment  in  rice  and  wheat  would  yield  high
economic  rates  of return  up to  the  point  where  they  become  exports  --  i.e.
they  are  efficient  import  substitutes.  This  is  particularly  true  in  areas
where  the  subsidies  are  currently  low;  in  the  Punjab  and  Haryana,  where
effective  subsidies  to  rice  are  high,  the  economic  returns  to further
investments  in rice  production  would  be lower  than  elsewhere  (See  e
below). An exchange  rate  premium  of  about  25%  would  mean  investments  in
rice  for  export  markets  would  also  yield  a satisfactory  economic  rate  of
return,  provided  world  prices  rise  somiewhat  and  provided  the  expansion
takes  place  in areas  where  subsidies  to  rice  are  low. Also,  the  absolute
size  of rice  exports  might  be limited  by the  narrowness  of the
international  rice  market.
d) Investment  programs  aimed  at increasing  groundnut  production  are likely
to  yield  lower  rates  of return  than  cotton,  rice,  and  wheat. Protection
coefficients  exceed  those  in Indian  industry,  suggesting  that  fairly  high
protection  has  been  needed  to  make  the  present  level  of resouce  allocation
to groundnut  profitable.
e) Subsidies  in agriculture  are  fairly  large  and  need to  be considered
explicitly  in evaluating  the  incentives  accorded  to  production  of the
various  crops  and  the  feasiblity  of investment  programs. The  subsidy  on
canal  irrigation  --  basically  the  difference  between  the  sum  of  annualized
capital  costs  and  operating  costs  less  actual  revenues  --  accounts  forvii
about  70%  of total  subsidies  estimated  here.  (The  fertilizer  subsidy
looms  large  in the  government  accounts,  but  much  of it goes  to the
producers  of fertilizers,  to  ensure  that  their  production  is  profitable  at
current  prices,  rather  than  substantially  lowering  the  domestic  farmgate
price  of fertilizer  below  world  prices. Hence  the  fertilizer  subsidy  is
less  important  to  agriculture  than  one  would  expect  from  looking  solely  at
the  budget. It also  should  be noted  that  the  fertilizer  subsidy  is
included  in the  EPC,  as it  is  a subsidy  on traded  inputs,  as well  as in
the  ESC  --  the  other  subsidies  appear  only  in the  ESC.) The  small  size  of
the  other  subsidies  suggests  that  they  could  be reduced  substantially
without  requiring  much  of an offsetting  increase  in  procurement  prices
(See  also  below  para  9 b ).  On the  other  hand,  the  large  subsidy  on
irrigated  crops  suggests  that  further  expansion  in  already  irrigated  areas
may  not  be as efficient  as  w3uld  seem  from  simply  looking  at net incomes
per  hectare,  or even  prices,  and  shifting  to less  water  intensive  crops
would  be warranted  on efficiency  grounds. There  also  would  appear  to  be
room  for  increasing  water  charges,  which  would  provide  an incentive  for
this  shift  to  less  water  intensive  crops.
f) The  prevalence  of  protection  coefficients  below  unity  (under  the
importable  hypothesis)  supports  Schultz's  thesis  that  agriculture  in
developing  countries  is  underpriced  and  that  there  is  a  bias toward  the
industrial  sector,  which  in  India  has  an average  effective  proteciton
coefficient  of about  1.4. The  results  are  also  similar  to those  reported
by Krueger,  Schiff  and  Valdes,  particularly  in  cotton  where  the  controls
on exports  have  delinked  the  domestic  from  the  international  market  and
depressed  the  price  below  international  levels. At the  same  time,
imported  food  products  (edible  oils  of  which  groundnut  is  a major
component)  receive  substantial  direct  protection.
9.  The  study  also  raise:s  a number  of important  issues  that  deserve
further  study:
a)  Why  are  certain  agricultural  nroducts  competitive  and  others
uncompetitive?  On one  level,  the  answer  is  that  it is  not  products,  but
marginal  production  that  is  competitive  or uncompetitive.  The  delinking
of the  domestic  and  international  market  has  allowed  domestic  and
international  prices  to  diverge  and  tended  to encourage  (discourage)
additional  resource  use  in  crops  where  prices  have  risen  above  (fallen
below)  international  levels. If  domestic  and  foreign  markets  were  to  be
linked,  then  domestic  and  foreign  prices  would  become  equal,  and  producers
of all  crops  would  be competitive  internationally.  However,  the  current
resource  allocation  pattern  would  change,  with  resources  being  drawn  out
of the  currently  protected  sectors  and  into  the  currently  disprotected
sectors. On another  level,  one  can  ask  what  policiies  and  investments
would  lead  to  a more  internationally  competitive  agricultural  sector. As
just  noted,  closer  linking  of prices  to international  levels  is  one  way to
make  the  sector  more  efficient  in  a static  sense. In  terms  of growth  and
investment,  the  protection  coefficients,  adjusted  for  an exchange  rate
premium,  are  good  proxies  for  cost  benefit  indicators,  such  as domestic
resource  costs. Hence  they  are  indicators  fo relative  investment
productivities  (measured  at international  prices). It  also  should  be
noted  that  argument  for  high farmgate  prices  stimulating  development  ofviii
high  yield  varieties  (a  variant  of the  infant  industry  argument  for
protection),  is  probably  invalid  in  the  Indian  context,  given  the  limited
impact  of  market  signals  on India's  research  bureauacrac. Finally,  more
investigation  is  warranted  on the  role  of  transport,  marketing  and
processing  costs  in  limiting  India's  agricultural  export  potential  --  for
example,  not  only  are  transport,  processing  an  marketing  costs  high for
Indian  groundnuts,  the  procedures  contribute  to the  high  moisture  content
of the  kernels,  which  in  turn  increases  the  risk  of aflatoxin  that  limits
Indian  groundnuts  and  groundnut  cake  exports  to the  EEC.
b)  The impact  of subsidies:  Estimated  subsidies  are  equivalent  to  a
large  percentage  of agricultural  GDP (16-17%  see  Gulati  1988a)  but their
influence  on agricultural  prices  may  not  be as large  as generally
thought. Subsidies  on irrigation,  electricity,  and  credit  lower  the  costs
only  of those  farmers  who  have  access  to  canal  water,  power  lines  and  bank
loans. If farmers  that  do  not  have  such  access  account  for  a large
fraction  of the  supply,  then  their  costs  determine  agricultural  prices.
In this  case,  the  main impact  of the  subsidies  will  be on income
distribution  --  through  the  high  profits  they  generate  for  the  recipients
- rather  than  on  prices. This  suggests  that  further  investigation  is
necessary  to  determine  the  impact  of subsidies  on prices  and  incentives
and  on income  distribution.
c)  The  potential  impact  of increased  Indian  trade  on  world  prices  and
incentives:  Large  increases  in  Indian  agricultural  exports  or imports
might  affect  international  prices,  owing  to the  narrowness  of some
agricultural  markets. This  is  not  an argumert  for  ignoring  the  potential
exports,  even  if the  international  price  falls  somewhat  the  foreign
exchange  income  earned  from  additoional  exports  would  certainly  be
positive. However,  additional  analysis  is  necessary  to see  what  markets,
if any,  might  be subject  to this  limitation  and  how  this  might  affect  the
protection  coefficients  and  what  are  the  appropriate  Indian  policies.CHAPTER  1
AN OVERVIEW  OF  THE  INCENTIVE  STRUCTURE  IN INDIAN  AGRICULTURE
A.  Obiectives  and  Methodology
1.01  Government  intervention  in  Indian  agriculture  is  pervasive.  The
Government  tinkers  with  the  market  mechanism  through  its  price  support/
procurement  policy  on the  one  hand,  and  its  subsidization  of the  major
agricultural  inputs  on the  other. The  Government's  price  policy  played  a
role  in  speeding  the  adoption  of  high  yielding  varieties  (HYVs)  of  wheat
and  rice  in  the  so-called  Green  Revolution  and it  has  helped  to  provide
greater  certainty  for  farmers  in  terms  of the  prices  they  can  expect  to
receive. Subsidies  have  encouraged  the  use  of modern  inputs. Estimated
subsidies,  including  irrigation  charges  that  do  not  cover  fully  costs  and
non-payment  of  water  charges,  low  interest  rates  and  non-payment  of
credits,  low  electricity  rates  and  non-payment  of electricity  charges,  and
the  difference  between  international  and  domestic  prices  of fertilizers,
are  now  equal  to about  16% - 17%  of the  agricultural  GDP (higher  in the
case  of wheat  and  rice)  and,  correspondingly,  about  2.5%  of total  GDP.
Other  Government  policies  have  delinked  internal  and  external  markets  by
imposing  quantity  and/or  price  con_rols  over  exports/imports  of
agricultural  commodities  and  by "canalizing"  the  sale  of agricultural
exports  and imports  through  public  corporations.  The  Government  also
extends  support  to  agriculture  through  research  and  extension  programs.
Besides  such  broad  interventions,  the  Government  has  frequently  launched
crop-specific  programs  with  more  limited  objectives.
1.02  The  simultaneous  implementation  of such  wide  ranging,  and
sometimes  divergent,  policies  impinges  upon  farmers'  incentives  in  many
complicated  and  sometimes  conflicting  ways.  Analysts  of the  impact  of
Government  policies  typically  have  examined  their  effect  on a summary
variable  --  net income per hectare in a given crop --  in assessing whether
the  policies  in  question  have  stimulated  additional  output. More
sophisticated  analyses  also  consider  the  opportunity  cost  of the  policy,
in  terms  of the  policy-induced  substitution  between  one  crop  and  another.
The  inclusion  of opportunity  costs  clearly  represents  an improvement  over
the  simple  calculation  of  net income  per  hectare. However,  both
approaches  rely  on  domestic  prices  in  their  evaluations.  ThuL,  they
implicitly  adopt  an  autarkic  view  of the  agricultural  sector  and  thereby
neglect  the  possiblities  of gains  from  international  trade  and  chlaiges  in
net  foreign  exchange  earnings.
1.03  Another  approach,  taken  in this  study  and  in recent  World  Bank
work, (Krueger,  Schiff  and  Valdes)  is  to analyze  how  agricultural  policies
affect  the  differential  between  domestic  prices  (adjusted  for  subsidies
and  input  costs)  and  international  prices. In  other  words,  are  certain
crops,  and  agriculture  in  general,  being  protected  or disprotected  (in
effect  taxed)  by the  maintenance  of prices  that  diverge  from  those  that
would  prevail  under  free  international  trade? To see  the  importance  of
this  question,  suppose  that  policies  combine  to keep  the  domestic  price  ofone  commodity  above  the  world  price  (protecting  that  crop)  and  prices  of  a  second
commodity that could be  produced on  the  samoe  land, below world prices
(disprotecting  or in effect taxing  that crop).  Then, from an efficiency
standpoint,  too  much  land,  labor  and  capital  are  being  used  to  produce  the  first
commodity  and  too  little  are  being  used  to produce  the  second. Resources  and
foreign  exchange  could  be saved  by adjusting  prices  to stimulate  a shift  of
resources  from  production  of the  first  commodity  to the  second. Demand  could
be satisfied  and  foreign  exchange  earned  on  balance  by  exchanging  the  increased
production  of  the  second  crop  for  imports  of the  first  in  international  markets.
1.04  The  differentials  between  domestic  and  international  reference  prices  are
measured  in this study  by three  standard  ratios,  referring  to comparisons  at
three  levels  of increasing  complexity  --  nominal  protection  coefficients  (NPCs),
effective  protection  coefficients  (EPCs),  and effective  subsidy  coefficients
(ESCs). These  coefficients  are  defined  below  but  basically  the  NPC indicates
the  incentive  to  pruduce  a  commodity,  the  EPC  indicates  the  incentive  to  the  use
of  resources  (land,  labor  and  capita'.)  in  producing  the  commodity  after  deducting
the  cost  of tradeable  intermediate  inputs,  and  the  ESC  adjusts  the  EPC  to take
into account taxes and subsidies  on non  traded inputs (e.g. irrigation,
electricity);  all  relative  to  what  would  exist  under  free  trade  wi.hout  taxes
and  subsidies.
1.05  In  calculating  the  international  competiveness  of  a  commodity,  transport
costs  can  make a potentially  enormous  difference. In terms  of competing  with
imports,  international  transport  costs provide a degree of protection  for
domestic  producers. In  contrast,  exporting  means  that  the  domestic  producer's
price  must be low enough  to make the product  competitive  in foreign  markets,
including  transport  costs  to the  market. A simple  example  will  make  clear  how
important  this  difference  is:  If international  transport  costs  are  $10  per  ton
and  the  international  price  of  a  good  at  the  foreign  point  of  sale  was  $100,  then
domestic  producers could compete effectively  with imports  at the border,
providing  they produce  profitably  at a price  of $110.  However,  in order  to
export,  domestic  producers  would  need  to  be  able  to  produce  profitably  at  a  price
of $90.  Thus, the competitive  border  price is about 22% higher than the
competitive  export  price.  This  means  that  investments  in  production  could  easily
earn a  high economic rate of return as long as domestic production  is
substituting  for  imports,  but  might  become  unprofitable  once  it  became  necessary
to capture  an export  market. Moreover,  domestic  transport  costs  can provide
additional  "natural  protection"  to  production  in inland  areas.
1.06  To cover  this  issue  of transport  costs,  the  NPCs,  EPCs,  and EPSs  have
been  calculated  under  two  hypotheses:  a) the  crop in question  is imported  and
thus  competes  at the  domestic  port  with imports  including  their  transport  cost
(the  importable  hypothesis)  and b) the  crop in question  is exported  and thus
competes  at  a  foreign  port  including  transport  costs  (the  exportable  hypothesis).
Thus  the two  different  treatments  of transport  costs  allow  the  analyst  to see
whether  the Indian  producer  is competitive  with imports  given  the protection
accorded  by  transport  costs  and  what,  if  any,  subsidy  would  be  required  to  export
the  crop.  Adjustments  are  also  made for  domestic  transport  costs,  as explained
in the  detailed  crop  studies.-3-
1.07  In additicn  to  NPCs.  EPCs,  and  EPSs,  this  study  also  comments  on
the  size  of the  price  differentials  under  the  Assumption  that  foreign
exchange  is  accorded  a notional  premium  of 25%  over  the  going  exchange
rate.  The  inclusion  of such  a premium  is  assumed  to cover  not  only  the
possibility  of currency  overvaluation  under  the  current  trade  and  payments
regime,  but  also  the  compensatory  change  in  the  exchange  rate  that  would
be necessary  if all  protection  were  to  be eliminated.  With the  inclusion
of such  a premium,  the  coefficients  become  good  ?roxies  for  cost  benefit
indicators  such  as  Domestic  Resource  Cosc (DRC).  Finally,  the
coefficients  also  are  estimated  for  specific  regions  and  crop  varieties  to
provide  some  idea  of the  differences  in incentives  between  regions.
1.08  The  Nominal  Protection  Coefficient  (NPC)  is  defined  as the  ratio
of the  domestic  price  to  the  world  reference  price  of the  commodity  under
consideration.  Symbolically,
(1)  NPC - p /P
where,
NPC  - Nominal  Protection  Coefficient
PD  - Domestic  Price  of the  commodity  in  question  at the  farmgate
P  - Reference  Price  of the  commodity  in  question,  i.e.  what  the
farmer  would  have  received  in the  case  of free  trade.
1.09  In this  study,  the  domestic  price  is  approximated  either  by what
the  cultivators  of the  relevant  commodity  receive-  or  what  the  Government
announces  as its  support/procurement  price;  the  world  reference  price  is
derived  from  the  international  price,  adjusted  for  transport  cost  (both
foreign  and  domestic),  and  marketing  and  trading  margins,  including  any
processing  necessary  to  make  the  domestic  commodity  equivalent  to  the
internationally  tvaded  commodity.
1.10  If the  NPC  is greater  (less)  than  one,  then  the  commodity  is
protected  (disprotected  or in  effect  taxed),  compared  to  the  situation
what  would  prevail  under  free  trade. Of course,  one  needs  to  compare  NPCs
across  crops  and industries  and  make  an adjustment  for  the  premium  on
foreign  exchange  to get  a better  idea  of  whether  the  policy  regime
provides  more  or less  incentives  for  production  of a  given  crop  than  under
free  trade. For  example,  if  the  average  NPC  was  1.4%,  then  crops  with
NPCs  of 1.4%  or more  would  be receiving  an incentive  vis  a  vis  other
import  substitutes;  crops  with  lower  NPCs  would  be receiving  an incentive
vis-a-vis  exportables  and,  perhaps,  non-tradeables.
1See  Garry  Pursell  and  Neil  Roger  and  Pasquale  L. Scandizzo  and  Colin
Bruce,  for  further  details.-4-
1.11  The  Effective  Protection  Coefficient  (EPC)  is defined  as the ratio  of
value added at domestic  prices to value added 2 at world reference  prices.
Symbolically,
(2)  EPC  =  VADIVAR
=  (pD_SUm(aij  PDj))/(PR_Sum(aij  pRj)
=  (PD_TID)/  ((PD/NPC)_(TIDNPCi)
where
VAD  =  Value  Added  in  Domestic  Prices
VAR =  Value  Added  measured  at International  Reference  Prices
pD  = Domestic  Price  of the  good  in  question  (the  ith  good)
pR  * International  reference  price  of the  good  in  question.
aij  =  Quantity  of the  jth  input  used  to  produce  the  ith  good
pDj  =  Domestic  Price  of the  jth  good
pR.  =  international  Price  of the  jth  good.
TID  = Sum (aij  PD.)
NPC  =  Nominal  Pro  ection  coefficient  of the  good  in  question
NPCi=  Weighted  average  of the  Nominal  Protection  coefficients
of the  tradeable  inputs  into  good  i,  with the  weights
equal  to the  value  shares  of the  inputs  in  the
reference  price.
Thus,  a prerequisite  for  estimating  EPCs is a detailed  knowledge  of the input
structure  of the  commodity  under  consideration  and  the  nominal  protection  not
only  on the  output  but  also  on its  traded  (tradeable)  inputs.
1.12  Again,  a coefficient  greater  than (less  than)  one indicates  protection
(disprotection  or,  in  effect,  taxation)  compared  to the  free  trade. Effective
protection  (EPC)  will  be greater  than  (less  than)  the  nominal  protection  (NPC)
to the  extent  that  tradeable  inputs  into  the production  process  have a lower
(higher)  NPC  than  the  product. Thus  the  EPC refers  to  the  protection  accorded
to the  land,  labor  and  capital  (the  value  added)  used in  the  production  of the
commodity  in question,  while the NPC reiers  to the protection  accorded  a
commodity,  including  all the inputs  that go into its production.  The NPC
overstates  (understates)  the  incentive  to  apply  resources  to  production  if the
inputs  have  higher  (lower)  NPCs than  the final  product. Hence,  the  EPC is a
better  measure  of the  incentives  to produce  a commodity  than  the  NPC.
1.13  Finaily,  the  Effective  Subsidy  Coefficient  (ESC)  essentially  adds  net
subsidies  (subsidies  minus  taxes)  on non-traded  (non-tradeable)  inputs  in the
numerator  of EPC  and  divides  by value  added  at  world  reference
2  Value  added  as  used  here  refers  to  the  difference  between  the  output  price  and
the  per  unit  value  of all  traded  (tradeable)  inputs  that  go  to  produce  one  unit
of  output. Theoretically,  the  non-traded  inputs  should  be  decomposed  into  their
tradeable  and  primary,  non-traded  components,  and  different  treatments  accorded
to  both,  but  in  practice  such  refined  treatments  are  precluded  by lack  of  data.-5-
prices.  Symbolically.
(3)  ESC  - (VAD+NS)/VAR
'here
NS  - Subsidies (net  of taxes) on non-traded inputs, and
VAD and VAR were defined  previously.
Net  subsidies  on  traded  inputs  are  already  taken  into account in their
prices  and  thus  are  already  included  in  the  EPC  calculation.  The  ESC  goes
a  step  beyond  the  EPC  in  measuring  incentives  to the use  of  resources  in  a
crop  or  a  sector,  because  it takes  into  account  not  only  protection  and
subsidies  on  traded  (tradeable)  inputs,  but  also  net  subsidies  on
non-traded  (non-tradeable)  inputs.
1.14  The  three  estimates  of  protection  coefficients  defined  above  help
(1)  to  measure  the  extent  of  divergence  (distortion)  between  domestic
and  international  prices  as  a  result  of  the  regulatory  policies  on
international  trade  and  domestic  markets;
(2)  to measure  the  level  and  differences  in  'effective  incentives'
for cultivators of different crops in different regions.  This in turn can
throw some light on issues related to equity in the distribution of
incentives  across  regions,  as  also  assist  in  identifying  the  causes  that
lead  to  faster  growth  of  some  crops  in  certain  regions  than  in  others;
(3)  to  measure  comparative  advantage  and  thus  degree  of
competetiveness  of  various  crops  in  different  regions,  considering  foreign
trade  as  a  transformation  frontier.  This  would  be  valuable  information
assisting  in  allocating  existing  and  investment  resources  more
efficiently,  and  evolving a rational/desirable  cropping pattern;
(4)  to  test  the  hypothesis  of  underpricing  of  agriculture  in
developing  countries  (Schultz,  1978)  and  to  measure  the  extent  of  bias
against  agriculture  and  in  favour  of  industry.
B.  Estimation  of  Protection  Coefficients  and  Results
115  Four  comaodities  are  covered  in  this  study:  wheat  and  rice,
India's  most  important  cereals;  cotton,  an  important  cash  crop  used  in  the
country's  large  textile  industry;  and  groundnut  as  a  representative  of  the
oilseeds  crop  complex.  Together,  these  four  crops  account  for  roughly  45
per  cent  of  gross  cropped  area  and  above  50  per  cent  of  gross  value  of
crop  output.  Wheat,  rice  and  cotton  experienced  technological
breakthroughs  during  late  1960s  and  1970s  in  certain  regions,  while
groundnut  has  lagged  behind.  Presently,  efforts  are  being  made  to
stimulate  oilseed  production  under  the  Technology  Mission  on  Oilseeds
launched  by  Government  of  India  in  1986  and  a  buffer  stock/price  support
scheme  vas introduced  in  1989.- 6 -
1.16  Tables  1.1  and  1.2  suimarize  the  estimates  of the  protection
coefficients  for  each  of these  crops  for  the  1980s  (1980-81  to 1986-87),
for  the  major  producing  states  and  c5op  varieties,  under  both the
importable  and  exportable  hypotheses  . Details  on the  individual  crops
are  found  in  Chapters  2 (wheat  and  rice),  3 (cotton)  and  4 (groundnuts)
and  the  references  cited  there.
1.17  Starting  first  with  the  incentives  for  crops  as import
substitutes  (the  importable  hypothesis),  the  crop-specific  NPCs 4 for  the
period  1980/81  to 1986/87  were lowest  in  case  of rice  (0.67)  and  highest
for  groundnut  (1.50)  (See  Table  1.1). Wheat  and  cotton  fall  in  between,
with  both  having  NPCs  of  0.80. Across  states,  the  lowest  NPC
is for  Andhra  Pradesh  cotton  (MCU-5  variety,  NPC-0.63),  followed  by rice
in  Bihar  and  Orissa  (NPC-0.65).  In  sum,  domestic  prices  of rice,  wheat,
and  cotton  were  all  well  below  comparable  world  prices,  indicating
disprotection  or effective  taxation  of these  commodities  compared  to
border  prices. In contrast,  groundnut  was  highly  protected. The  relative
incentive  provided  for  groundnuts  by the  policy  regime  and  the  delinking
from  international  markets  is  more than  123%  higher  than  for  rice.
1.18  Turning  to effective  protection  (under  the  importable
hypothesis),  the  EPCs  for  wheat,  rice,  and  cotton  all  were  less  than  the
coresponding  NPCs. This is  because  tradeable  inputs  used  in these  crops
were  protected,  while  the  crops  themselves  were  disprotected.  The
difference  between  the  EPC  and  the  NPCs  is  greatest  in  the  case  of cotton
(13.75%)  and  smallest  in the  case  of rice  (2.98%). The  large  difference
between  the  EPC  and  NPC in  cotton,  especially  that  of  Gujarat  (by  31.5%),
reflects  the  large  share  of tradeable  inputs,  primarily  pesticides,  in  the
production  of cotton,  and  the  fact  that  NPC  of  pesticides  is  much  higher
than  NPC  of cotton. On the  other  hand,  the  protection  on groundnuts  was
3  In the  case  of  wheat,  the  coefficients  are  estimated  separately  for
four  states  - Uttar  Pradesh,  Punjab,  Haryana  and  Madhya  Pradesh. Fair
Average  Quality  (FAQ)  of domestic  wheat,  as categorised  by Food
Corporation  of India,  is  compared  with  US Hard  Red  Winter  No.  2 with
ordinary  protein. In the  case  of rice,  the  coefficients  are  calculated
for  Andhra  Pradesh  from  the  south,  Bihar  and  Orissa  from  the  east,  Punjab
and  Uttar  Pradesh  from  the  north  and  Madhya  Pradesh  from  the  central
region. Indian  "Common" (FAQ)  rice  is  compared  with  Thai (Milled)  white,
5  per  cent  Broken. The  protection  coefficients  for  Cotton  are  worked  out
for  Maharashtra,  Gujarat,  Punjab  and  Andhra  Pradesh. In  case  of
Maharashtra  Hybrid-4  variety  is  compared  with its  like  Mexican  cotton;
Gujarat's  Shankar-4/6  is  compared  with  California  (SM  l 1/8"),  Punjab's
J-34/320F  is compared  with  Orleans/Texas  (1")  and  Andhra  MCU-5  with  Giza
67/69/81. In case  of groundnut,  protection  estimates  are  for  Gujarat,
Andhra  Pradesh  and  Tamil  Nadu.
4 The  crop  specific  NPCs  were  calculated  as a  weighted  average  of the
state  NPCs,  with  value  of the  crops  in  the  states  used  as the  weights.-7-
Table 1.1:  CrOD and Reienon-Soecifig  Disuersion of Effective incentives in  Indian  Agriculture  (Average 1980-81 to 1986-87)
Indeax  of ESCs  Crop Variety
(Welghted  ---------------------------




Haryana  0.8%  0.79  1.03  110.75  0.66  PAQ  Hard Red WLnter No. 2
Madhya  Pradesh  0.75  0.73  0.96  103.22  0.60  -do-  with  ordinary  protein  (USA)
Punjab  0.85  0.80  0.93  100.00  0.66  -do-  -do-
Uttar  Pradesh  0.77  0.73  0.91  97.85  0.62  -do-  -do-
Weighted  Average  0.80  0.75  0.93  100.00  0.63  -do-  -do-
RICE
Andhra  Pradesh  0.69  0.66  0.88  100.00  0.55  Common  Thai  White  (Milled)  5X Broke
Bihar  0.65  0.64  0.86  97.72  0.52  -do-  -do-
Madhya Pradesh  0.67  0.65  0.85  96.59  0.53  -do-  -do-
Orissa  0.65  0.63  0.84  95.45  0.52  -do-  -do-
Punjab  0.74  0.72  1.01  114.77  0.58  -do-  -do-
Uttar  Pradesh  0.66  0.64  0.85  96.59  0.52  -do-  -do-
Weighted  Average  0.67  0.65  0.88  100.00  0.54  -do-  -do-
COTTON
Maharashtra  0.96  0.93  0.98  103.67  0.74  H-4  Mexican
Gujarat  0.89  0.61  0.67  89.33  0.68 5-4/6  California  (SM  1  1/8-)
Punjab  0.83  0.74  0.86  114.67  0.o4  J-341320F Orleans/Texas  (1")
Andhra Pradesh  0.63  0.54  0.55  73.33  0.50 MCU-S  Giaa-67169181
Weighted Average  0.80  0.69  0.75  100.00  0.62
GROUNDNUT
Gujarat  1.47  1.59  1.70  99.41  1.17
Andhra Pradesh  1.50  1.54  1.72  100.58  1.18
Tamil  Nadu  1.53  1.55  1.73  101.17  1.21
Weighted  Average  1.50  1.56  1.71  100.00  1.18
Exportable Hypothesis
WHEAT
Punjab  1.34  1.71  2.01  0.98 FAQ  Hard Red Winter No. 2 (USA)
RICE
Punjab  0.87  0.87  1.21  0.66 Common  Thai White (Milled) 5S broke
COTTON
Maharashtra  1.13  1.12  1.17  132.95  0.86 H-4  Mexican
Gujarat  1.10  0.74  0.81  92.04  0.78  S-4/6  California  (SM  1  1/8")
Punjab  0.98  0.89  1.04  118.18  0.75  J-34/320F  Orleans/Texas  (1")
Andhra  Pradesh  0.67  0.56  0.58  65.91  0.53  MCU-5  GLza-67169/81
Weighted  Average  0.92  0.80  0.88  100.00  0.71
GROUNDNUTS
Gujarat  1.87  2.48  2.60  105.26  1.45
Andhra  Pradesh  1.91  2.15  2.42  97.97  1.48
Tamil Nadu  1.95  2.13  2.38  96.36  1.51
Weighted Average  1.91  2.26  2.47  100.00  1.48
…----------------------------------------------------------------__----------__--------------------------------------------
Source: Gulati  (1988)- 8  -
greater  than  the  Protection  on  inputs  into  groundnut  production,  making  the
effective  protectiLan  (EPC)  of  groundnut  greater  than  the  nominal  protection.
In  sum.  for  wheat.  rice.  and  cotton  the  prevalence  of  EPCW  that  are  below  one
and  below  the  corresponding  MPCs  show  that  the  cobined  effect  of  the  policy
regime.  including  the  protection  accorded  industrial  goods.  has  discouraged
resource  use  in  these  crops.  relative  to  a  free  trade  regime.  However,  the
policy  regime  has  stiiulated  the  allocation  of  resources  to  grounduuts.
1.19  Not  surprisingly,  the  adjustment  for  subsidies  on  non-tradeable  inputs
such  as  irrigation  (canal),  electricity  and  credit  and  the  low  level  of
agricultural  taxes  (ignored  here),  produce  ESC8  that  are  higher  than  the
respective  EPCs.  The  largest  increase  occurs  in  case  of  rice  (by  35. 4Z)  and
smallest  in  case of  cotton (by  8.7Z).  The adjustment for  subsidies  also  changes
the  ranking  of  incentives  to  the  various  crops.  Whereas  on  the  NPC and  EPC
scales.  rice  received  the  lowest  protection  (the  largest  rate  of  effective
taxation),  on  the  ESC scale  it  is  cotton  that  appears  with  the  lowest  protection.
with  an  ESC  of  0.75  compared  to  0.88  for  rice.  0.93  for  wheat  and  1.71  of
groundnut. The  difference  between  the  highest  and  lowest  ESCs  is  marginally
greater  (128!)  than  for  the  NPCs  (123!),  but is lower  than that  of the  EPCs
(14OZ).
1.20  The  spatial  dispersion  of  ESCs  is  maximum  in  case  of  cotton.  with
Kaharashtra's  ESC (0.98)  78Z  highea  than  that  of  Andhra  Pradesh  (0.55).  Across
all states  and  all  crops,  the  highest  ESC is  that  of Tamil  Nadu for  groundnut
(1.71)  and  the  lowest  of  Andhra  Pradesh  for  cotton  (0.55).
1.21  Adjusted  MPCs  (ANPCs)  can be estimated  for these  crops  by assuming  a
notional  preminmm  on  foreign  exchange,  in  this  case  25Z.  The  pattern  of  ANPCs
and  MPCs  is  of  course  similar,  but  ANPCs are  mach  lower  than  NMCs.  This  has
important  implications  discussed  in  section  C.
1.22  Turning  to  the  possiblity  of  exports  (the  exportable  h-ypotheses),
protection  coefficients  are  generally  mach  higher  than  under  the  importable
hypothesis.  This  reflects  the  fact  that  under  the  exportable  hypothesis  shipping
costs  are  deducted  from  world  prices  before  comparison  with  domestic  prices,
while  for  imports.  shipping  costs  are  added  to  world prices.  Obviouslv,  the
higher  the  share  o'f  transport  cost  in  the  output  price.  the  greater  the  deviation
in  protection  coefficients  between  the  exportable  and  the  importable  hypotheses.
Estimated  shipping  costs  also  reflect  the  distance  between  Indian  ports  and  the
foreign  lands  where  Indian  goods  are  assumed  to  compete.  In  case  of  wheat.  for
example.  Indian  exports  are  assumd  to  compete  with  U.S. wheat  in the
Heditteranean/Black  Sea  area.  The  deviation  in  results  under  the  importable  and
exportable  hypotheses  is  therefore  mach  greater  than  in  the  case  of  rice,  where
competition  is  assumed  to  be  near  Calcutta.  in  the  strait  of  Halacca. Similarly.
groundnut  estimates  diverge  by  more  than  cotton  estimates,  because  in  the  former
case  exports  are  assumed  to  be  delivered  to  Europe  (Rotterdam)  vhile  in  the
latter  Japan  is  assumed  to  be  the  marketplace._  9  _
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Table  1.2t  Temporal  Behaviour  of Cron-Soegific  Effectiv  !ncentives  *ru Prices  in Indiln  Aariculture
Hypothesis/Crop/Protection




NPCs  1.15  1.09  1.24  1.29  1.27  1.33  1.99  1.34
EPCs  1.29  1-.6  1.35  1.47  1.55  1.71  3.44  1.71
ESCs  1.57  1.35  1.57  1.73  1.81  2.00  4.07  2.01
ANPCs  0.87  0.83  0.93  0.96  0.93  0.97  1.3t'  0.98
RICE
NPCs  0.50  0.60  0.94  0.89  0.94  1.09  1.1  0.87
EPCs  0.47  0.57  0.93  0.88  0.95  1.13  1.1.'  0.87
ESCs  0.65  0.77  1.26  1.21  1.30  1.60  1.68  1.21
ANPCs  0.39  0.46  0.70  0.68  0.72  0.83  0.87  0.66
COTTON
;PWS  0.89  1.13  0.92  0.74  0.83  1.01  0.93  0.92
EPCs  0.78  1.04  0.80  0.62  0.71  0.89  0.79  0.80
ESCa  0.84  1.13  0.88  0.69  0.78  0.99  0.86  0.88
AMPCa  0.70  0.87  0.72  0.58  0.64  0.76  0.72  0.71
GRCUNDNUT
NPCO  1.25  1.72  2.03  1.69  1.76  2.03  2.87  1.91
sPOs  1.44  2.09  2.44  1.90  2.07  2.36  3.45  2.26
3SCS  1.57  2.24  2.69  2.04  2.31  2.63  3.76  2.47
AMPCs  0.99  1.34  1.57  1.32  1.37  1.56  2.20  1.48
Notes;  la  Domestic  price  of  wheat  is  approximated  by  its  procurement  price  for  FAQ.
lb  World  price  is  of  US Hard  Red  Wlnter  No.  2  with  ordlnary  protein,  fob  US gulf  (at
officLal  excabnge  rate)  for  April  to  June  quarter.
Ic  Dnmetic  price of  rice  Ls  estlmated  as  procurement  prlce  of  paddy  divlded  by
0.7.  whIch  is  paddy-rlce  conversion  factor  for  Indian  'Common' rlce.
Id  World  price  of  rice  is  of  ThaL  whlte  (Miled)  5S Broken,  fob  Bangkok  (at  offLcial
rate)  for  October  to  January.
/e  DomestLc  prlce  of  cotton  ls approxLmated  by  procurement  price  of  kapas  (J-34/
414F/H-777  variety) divided by 0.34, which is  kapas-Lint  conversion  ratio.
/f  World  Price  of  cotton  is  that of  cotton  outlook  index 'A'.  cif  Liverpool.
IS  Domestic  price  of  groundnut  is  its  procurement  price  (Ln terms  of  Kernels).
/h  World  prlce  of  groundaut is  of  Kernels  of  any orLgin,  clf Europe  (Rotterdam).v  11  -
1.23  Except  for  cotton,  the  ESCs  under  the  exportable  hypothesis  are
higher  than  unity  for  all  crops. Even  in  case  of cotton,  the  ESCs  are
above  unity  for  Maharashtra  and  the  Punj.ab  (Table  1.1). The  average  ESC
is  lowest  for  cotton  (0.88)  and  highest  for  groundnut  (2.47),  with  rice
(1.21)  and  wheat  (2.01)  falling  in  between. Across  all  states  and  crops
under  consideration,  Gujarat  goundnut  has the  highest  ESC (2.60)  and
Andhra  Pradesh  cotton  the  lowest  ESC  (0.58). The  percentage  difference
between  the  highest  and  lowest  ESCs  under  the  exportable  hypothesis
(348%),  is  much  higher  than  under  the  importable  hypothesis  (215%). These
results  suggest  that  cotton,  particularly  Andhra  PradestL  cotton,  is  an
efficient  export. Cotton  from  other  states  and  rice  also  would  be
efficient  exports  with  a foreign  exchange  premium  of 25%.
1.24  Crop-specific  protection  coefficients  have tended  to rise  over
the  seven  year  period  1980-81  to 1986-87  (Table  1.2),  suggesting  that  the
disprotection  of  agriculture  has  been  reduced  in  the  1980s. Under  the
importable  hypothesis,  for  example,  ESCs  of  wheat  rose  from  0.76  to 1.12;
ESCs  of rice  rose  from  0.58  to  1.06;  ESCs  of  cotton  rose  from  0.71  to  0.75
and  ESCs  of groundnut  rose  from  1.20  to  2.32. Thus,  the  maximum  increase
took  place  in  the  case  of groundnut  (by  93.33%),  followed  by rice (by
82.76%). In fact  in  all  cases  except  cotton,  ESCs  in 1986-87  were  above
unity. For  cotton,  rice  and  wheat  the  rise  is largely  explained  by the
declining  trend  in  world  prices,  not  offset  by the  devaluation  of the
rupee. Domestic  prices  (in  rupees)  rose  about  5-6%  p.a.  about  the  same  as
the  wholesale  price  index  in  general. In  the  case  of groundnut,  domestic
prices  rose  about  10%  p.a.,  owing  to the  growing  demand-supply  imbalance
in  the  domestic  edible  oil  economy;  this  contributed  to the  rising
protection  for  groundnut  along  with the  fall  in international  prices.
C.  ImDlications  and  Concluding  Remarks
1.25  The  results  of  present  study  suggest  following  implications:
1.  Efficient  Imiort  Substitutes:  Three  of the  four  agricultural
commodities-  wheat,  rice  and  cotton  - appear  to  have  been  efficient  import
substitutes.  The  protection  coefficients  of these  crops  are  below  unity
in almost  all  years  in  the  1980s. In  contrast,  for  groundnut  the
coefficients  suggest  substantial  protection.  A foreign  exchange  premium
in  excess  of 40%  would  be needed  to  make  groundnuts  an  efficient  import
substitute.  This  result  suggests  that  perhaps  too  many  resources  were
being  devoted  to  groundnut  production  in  the  1980s,  while  too  few  were
beirng  devoted  to  cotton,  wheat  and  rice. This is  particularly  true  in
areas  where  these  crops  compete  directly  for  resources,  such  as  parts  of
Gujarat  and  Andhra  Pradesh. A switch  of resources  out  of groundnuts,  into
the  other  three  crops,  brought  about  by a shift  in  relative  prices,
probably  would  have increased  efficiency  and  net  foreign  exchange
earnings.- 12 -
2.  High  Economic  Rate  of  Return  iLn  A  ciCntLure.  ParticuLarlX  Cotton.
Uheat  and  Rice  Investment  prograns  aimed  at  increasing  the  production  of
wheat,  rice  and  cotton  appear  to  have  had  hi&h  econgic rates  of  return
during  1980s.  This  is  suggested  particularly  by  the  'adjusted'  protection
coefficients  --  adjusted  for  overvaluation  of  exchange  rate  --  which  are
significantly  lower  than  che  unadjusted  coefficienus,  and  which  would  be
close  to cost-benefit  indicators  such  as Domestic  Resources  Cost (DRC),
In  particular  the  economic  rates  of return  are  likely  to  be  higher  than
those  prevailing  in  the  Lndustrial  sector,  where  protection  coefficients
generally  fall  into  a  much  higher  range  (see  World  Bank  1987,  Chapter  4).
In this  regard,  long  staple  cotton  in  Andhra  Pradesh  deserves
special  mention. It  appears  that  the  technologice'l  breakthrough  that  took
place  in  Andhra's  cotton  economy,  resulting  in  a  phenomenal  rate  of growth
in  yields,  offers  an  opportunity  to  reap  high  economic  return  on
investmenL.  Closer  linkage  with  the  world  economy  would  thus  be  desirable
from  an  efficiency  standpoint.  Of  course  the  resulting  rLse  in  cotton's
price  would  raise  domestic  prices  of  cotton textiLes.
Investment  in  long  stapLe  cotton  deserves  priority  from  another
angle.  While  in  the  case  of  other  commodities,  the  ESCs under  the
exportable  hypothesis  exceed  unity,  in  the case of cotto..  they  are  below
unity.  Rence,  cotton  production  can  be  increased  faster  than  its  domestic
demand,  the  excess  making  an  efficient  export.
In  contrast,  increases  in  wheat  and  rice  production  are  likely  to
be  efficient  up  to  the  point  that  these  crops  remain  import  substitutes,
but  the  efficiency  of  exporting  these  crops  is  less  clear. A  foreign
exchange  premium  of  at  least  25%  would  be  needed  to  make  rice  an  efficient
export.  This  implies  that  planners  should  aim  to  increase  production  of
wheat  and  rice  basically  in  line  with  their  dsomestic  demand,  with  some
scope  for  rice  exports.  In  view  of  tlis  result,  the  Special  Rice
Programm  launched  by  Government  of  India  in  eastern  states  during
mid-1980s,  seems  a  promising  investment.
Investment  in  groundnuts  appears  to  be  a  less  attractive
proposition  from  the  standpoint  of  economic  rates  of,return.  In  this
context  it  may  be  remarked  that  large  investments  under  the  the
Technologicai  Xission  on  Oilseeds  would  require  a  high  implicit  weight  for
the  objective  of  self-sufficiency,  as  their  justification  on  purely
economic  grounds  is  low.
In  calculating  ecooomic  rates  of  return,  due  consideration  must
be  given  to  subsidies.  In  particular,  rice,  which  is  a  water  intensive
crop,  has  a  much higher  economic  rate  of  return  in  high  rainfall  areas
like  Bihar  and  Orissa  (with  lov  ESCs)  than  in  the  Punjab-Haryana  belt.  In
fact,  if  one  simulated  a  scenario  where  electricity  and  water  are
appropriately  shadow  priced  in  che  low  rainfall  areas  of  north-western
India  (Ptmjab-Haryana),  the  results  might  well  suggest  di-verting  resources
away  from  rice  cultivation,  to  less  water  intensive  crops  such  as  maize.- 13 -
3.  Inter  State and Inter-Crop  Differences in Effective Incentives
The  calculations  of  protection  coefficients  across  states  (not  shown)
indicate  at  least  two  significant  spatial  variations:  1)  Punjab  rice  has  a
mch  higher  NPC, EPC,  and EPS tran  the  other  states.  reflecting  higher
prices and, the irrigation  subsidy; 2) Maharashtra cotton (and to a lesser
extent Punjab  cotton) received  much higher protection and Andhra cotton
received  much  lower protection than the average for cotton, reflecting
differences  in  procureoent price policy during the period  and,  to a  lesser
extent,  irrigation  subsidies.
4.  !n.eut  Subsidies and Effective Incentives:  In most  cases,
suebsidies  or.  non-trae.eable  inputs  are large atd adjustment for subsidies
congequently  leads to ESCs signifirantly  higher than EPCs-  For the crops
overed  here.  estnated  subsidies  on  non-  traded inputs range from 84  ia
cotton  and  13*  in  groundnuts  co 24% in  the  case  of  wneat  and  over  30%  in
chr  case  of  rice.  For  the  agricultural  sector  as  a  whole,  subsidies
amocunt  to about  6t,'-7%  of  value  added  (Gulati 1988a)  and  the  equivalent
of  over  2.5% of GDP.  Vith  subsidies  of this  magnitude,  NPCs or even EPCs
may  not  be good proxies for effective incentives.  This seems to  be
particularly  true  in  the  case of canal irrigated  crops.  The studies in
this  report  and  elsewhere  (Gulati  l988a)  suggest  that  subsidies on  canal
irrigation,  because  of  charges  that  do  not  cover  costs  and  because  of
non-payment  of  charges,  are  quite  large.  In  fact,  they  represent  roughly
70  per  cent  of  total  estimated  input  subsidies  including  electricity,
credit  and  fertilizers.  The  estimates  of  subsidies  on  other  non-traded
inputs  represent  a  much  smaller  portion  of  output  price,  though  in  termS
of  GDP or  goverrment  budgets,  they  may  be  relatively  large.
Given  the  Government's  large  fertilizer  subsidy,  this  statement
requires  some  additional  explanation.  First,  since  fertilizer  is  traded,
this  subsidy  is  already  taken  into  account  in  the  EPC,  to the  extent  the
fertilizer  subsidy  lowers  domestic  fertilizer  prices  below  international
levels.  Second,  the  Government's  fertilizer  subsidy,  which  looms  large  in
the  budget,  lowers  Indian  fertilizer  prices  only  somewhat  below  world
prices  in  the  L980s;  part  of  the  subsidy  goes  to  ensure  that  fertilizer
plants  could  operate  profitably  at  these  prices.  (See  chapter  2,  Section
B).  The  portion  of  the  subsidy  going  to  fertilizer  producers  obviously
does  not  affect  agricultural  incentives.
Althourgh  further  work  on  subsidies  is  necessary,  the  relatively
small  size  of  the  non-irrigation  subsidies  suggests  the  possibility  that
their  reduction  would  not  have  a  large  impact  on price.  This  is  even  more
so  given  the  fact  that  these  subsidies  are  generally  not  received  by  many
fareers and hence may  not  affect  the  cost  of  the  marginal  farmer.  (See
para 1.26-3).  In case of canal irrigated  crops, it appears that best
policy would involve a combination of better collection of higher charges
and evolution of a cropping  pattern that relies more on crops requiring
little  water.
5.  Export  Subsidies:  Cotton,  especially  long  staple  cotton,  can
compete  in  international  markets  effectively  without  any  export
subsidies.  What is  required  is  a  change  in  policy  environment,
particuLarly  the  quantitative  restrictions  on  exports.  Of  course,  this
would  increase  the  domestic  price  of  cotton and lead to an increase  in  the
price  of  cotton  textiles.- 14 _
Punjab  common  rice  cannot  be exported  under  the current  policy  regime
without  export  subsidies.  However,  if  foreign  exchange  is  given  a 252  premium,
then Punjab  rice could  become  an exportable,  depending  on the international
price. During  the  second  half  of 1980s,  even  after  allowing  for  this  premium,
Punjab  rice  was  not  competitive  with Thai  rice  in international  market  because
of  the  fall  in  the  price  of  Thai  rice  and  a rise  in the  domestic  price  of  common
rice. Also,  if  electricity  and  canal  water  were  appropriately  shadow-priced  in
the  Punjab  (see  para  2.52),  then  its  rice  could  well  cease  to  be an efficient
exportable.
Wheat  and  groundnut  probably  cannot  be  considered  efficient  exportables.
Both  have  ESCs  greater  than  two. Punjab  wheat  would  have  required  a substantial
export  subsidy,  especially  during  1985-86  and  1986-87,  to  compete  with  US  wheat
in  international  markets. I.t  may  be  observed  that  in  1986-87,  the  ESC  of Punjab
wheat  was  dS  high  as 4.07,  almost  eliminating  any  possibility  o£  whe3t  exports.
uroundnuts,  with  an ESC=3.76  in  1986-87  also  was  not  an efficient  export.5
6.  Unde=pricing  of  Agriculture  The  weighted  average  ESCs  (averaged  over  the
7  years  under  censideration)  for  wheat  and  rice  cultirators,  who  operate  on  more
than  one-third  of  gross  cropped  area,  are  below  unity. The  ESCs  are  even  lower
for  cotton. These  results  support  the  thesis  that  agriculture  is underpriced
in  developing  countries  due  to  their  bias  in  favour  of  newly  emerging  industrial
sector  (Schultz,  1978). The  results  are  similar  to  those  reported  in  the  recent
study  of Krueger,  Schiff,  and  Valdes. As in their  study,  exported  products
(cotton)  were in effect taxed in India by delinking  domestic sales from
international  markets,  while imported  food products  (edible  oils, of which
groundnut  is  a  major  component)  receive  substantial  direct  protection.  Factoring
in a premium for foreign  exchange 6 reduces  the protection  of edible  oils
(groundnut),  but  it  means  the  "distortion'  in the  price  of  cotton,  and  of rice
and  wheat  is  much greater  than  shown  by the  unadjusted  coefficients.
7.  Bias against Rice Cultivators:  Of the two major crops of Indian
agriculture  - wheat and  rice  - weighted  average  ESCs  are  lower  in the  case  of
rice  than  of  wheat.  This  is true  almost  for  all  years  and all  states,  except
for the  Punjab.  In case of Punjab,  and  presumably  of Haryana (not  analyzed
here),  ESCs for  rice  cultivators  are  higher  than  those  for  wheat  cultivators.
These  results,  therefore,  seem  to be in line  with  Mitra's  thesis  of a bias in
Indian  agricultural  prics policy.  Mitra,  while analyzing  domestic  terms  of
trade,  remarked  that Indian  agricultural  price  policy  had  a bias  in favour  of
5  Some  exports  of  groundnut  meal  occurred  in  the  1980s,  but  they  went  almost
wholly  to the  Soviet  Union  and  the  other  Eastern  Bloc  countries,  where  prices
of  groundnut  and  groundnut  oil  may  be  substantially  higher  than  in  world  markets.
Another  factor  in  these  exports  may  be the  accounting  rates  of coversions  used
for  the  inconvertible  currencies  in  which  this  trade  is  conducted.
6 Krueger,  Schiff,  and Valdes :all  this the indirect  protection  effect.
As discussed  above,  it  arises  from  a)  overva'uation  of the  currency  and  b) the
c-ompensating  change  in  the  exchange  rate  that  would  be necessary  to  offset  the
elimination  of protection  throughout  the  economy._ 15 -
wheat growing  cultivators  of Punjab-Haryana  belt and  against  rice  cultivators
of eastern  India  (See  Mitra,  1977). Somewhat  similar  results  emerge  out  of  our
study, through a different  methodology.  However,  there is one important
difference  in our  study:  that  rice  cultivators  of the  Punjab  (and  Haryana)  are
more  protected  than  wheat  cultivators  of the  Punjab  (and  Haryana).
1.26 This  report  raises  a  number  of issues  that  require  further  study:
1.  The source  cf the international  competitiveness  or uncompetitiveness  of
India's  agricultural  products:  Simply  put,  why  is  cotton  exportable,  with  prices
below  world levels,  and  why are groundnuts  so expensive  compared  to imports?
On one level  the ansuer  is that  it is  not  products  but  the  marginal  producers
that are competitive  or uncompetitive. The delinking  of  -international  and
domestic  markets  has  allowed  Indian  domestic  prices  to  diverge  from  international
prices.  To the extent  that  domestic  prices  have become  higher (lower)  c.han
international  prices,  then more (iess)  resouces  have been allocated  to the
rroduction  of the  products  than  would  nave  occurred  had  free  trade  prevailed  and
production  has  moved  into  areas  that  are  perhaps  not  fully  suited  to  some  crops. 7
Correspondingly,  this  has  reduced  production  of  crops  that  are  more  competitive
internationally.  Linking  domestic  markets  more  closely  to  international  markets
would  mean  that  domestic  and  international  prices  would  come  closer  together  -
in  the  limit  they  would  be  the  same. This  would  mean  that  the  domestic  producers
of all  crops  would  be  competitive.  Of course,  it  also  would  mean  a shift  from
the  current  allocation  of resources  among  crops. Resources  would  shift  out  of
the  crops  now receiving  protection,  leaving  production  only  in areas  that  can
better  compete  internationally;  Resources  would shift  into  the production  of
crops  that  had  been  disprotected.
On  another  level  the  question  is  what  can  be  done  to  make  Indian  crops  more
competitive. The foregoing  results  are indicative  of static  inefficiencies,
resulting  from  relative  price  distortions,  but  what  do  they  say  about  investment?
As noted  above,  when EPCs  and  ESCs  are  adjusted  for  the  shadow  price  of foreign
exchange  and projected  over time,  they serve  as good proxies  for such cost
benefit  indicators  as  DRCs (Domestic  Resource  Costs) 8, and  thus  are  suggestive
of the  relative  returns  from  investment  in  different  crops.
It is  also true  that  these  indicators  only  reflect  existing  technology,
and  do not indicate  what  might  happen  if the technology  changed,  for  example,
if  a  high  yielding  groundnut  variety  were  developed.  However,  this  point  should
not  be taken  as  an argument  for  protection  of  certain  crops  in  order  to  develop
new  varieties  (a  variant  of the  infant  industry  argument).  The  linkage  between
high  prices  and  development  of  new  seed  varieties  is  even  more  tenuous  in  India
than  elsewhere,  given  the  delinkage  of  the  India's  research  &  extension  services
from  market  signals. If such  high  yielding  varieties  are  developed  by Indian
or foreign  researchers,  then  arguments  might  be  made for  a favorable  price
7This  shows  up quite  clearly  in a recent  study  on natural  rubber  (Mani,
1989). Rubber  production  is  competitive  with  Malaysian  rubber  only  in  a small
part  of Kerala,  but  protection  and  subsidies  allowed  production  to  extend  into
climatically  less  suitable  zones.
8 See  Pursell  and  Roger  and  Scandizzo  and  Bruce.- 16  -
policy,  in  order  to  stimulate  rapid  dissemination.  In  the  meantime.  however.
there  is  no  dynamic  rationale  to  engage  in  a  protective  price  policy  that  will
result  in  static  inefficiency.
2.  The  role  of  Processing  and  Marketing  in  Competitiveness  The  analyses  of
protection  coefficients  reflect  two  elecents  on  the  domestic  side:
a)  relative  crop  yields  adjusted  for  relative  costs  of  land,  labor,  and  capital
and  the  exchange  rate  --  even  if  Indian  yields  are  low.  lower  prices  of  Indian
factors  of  production  (in  foreign  currency,  could  leave  Indian  agricultural
output  competitive  in  world  markets;
b)  cost  of  transport,  marketing  and  processing  (very  few  agricultural  products
enter  the  world  market  in  a  coapletely  unprocessed  state).
To  the  extent  that  marketing,  transport.  and  processing  margins  are  high
in  India,  the  price  at  the  farugate  is  squeezed  and Indian  products  tend  to
appear  uncompetitive  with  imports  and  too  high  priced  to  be  exported.  For
exa  ple,  in  the  edible  oil  couplex.  marketing  and  processing  costs  are  high  by
international  standards.  Moreover.  the  collection  and  transport  methods
contribute  to  the  aflatoxin  problem  for  groundnut  and  thereby  sake  Indian
production  of  groundnut  less  competitive  internationally.  This  problem  affects
not  only  groundnut  kernels,  but  the  by-products  from  refining  groundauts.  which
elsewhere  can  be  sold  for  cattle-feed.  but  which  in  India  contain  high  levels
of  aflatoxin.  Another  example  of  the  importance  of  trading  margins  is  found  in
a  recent  study  of  the  export  potential  of  agriculture  for  fresh  vegetables
(Bombay  Chamber  of  Commerce).  The  study  shows  that  wholesale  margins  represent
60-0S  of  the  f .o.b.  Bombay price  and  farogate  prices  only  20-40Z.  Hence.  there
seems  to  be  great  scope  for  making  Indian  agricultural  products  more  competitive
by  increasing  the  efficiency  of  processing  and  distribution,  as  well  as  by
increasing  agricultural  yields.
3.  The  impact  of  subsidies  on  incentives,  resource  allocation,  and
distribution  As  described  above.  the  estinated  subsidies  represent  a  large
fraction  of the  costs  of  production  of  the  four  crops  under  consideration.  In
calculating  the  ESC  incentive  measure.  subsidies  are  treated  as  equivalent  to
raising  the  price  by  the  proportionate  amount  of  the  subsidy,  although  subsidies
actually  lower  the  cost  of  production  and  thus  the  price  that  is  needed  to  cover
costs.  However.  there  are  three  considerations  that  make  the  impact  of  subsidies
somewhat  different  than  a  price  rise.
First.  most of the  subsidies  are  not  available  to  all  farmers,  only  to
those  with  access  to  inputs  such  as  canal  water,  power  lines.  and  bank  loans.
In  most  cases  the  subsidies  do  indeed  lower  the  cost  of  the  favored  producers 9.
This  encourages  the  subsidized  farmers  to  use  more  resources  and  to  produce  more.
However.  the  impact  of  the  subsidy  on  total  output  of  the  crop  or  domestic  prices
will  depend  not  only  on  the  extent  to  which  the  subsidized  farmers  expand  their
production  but  also  the  extent  to  which  their  additional  production  simply
91n  the  case  of  credit.  lower  interest  rates  may not  lower  costs;  the  credit
that  is  obtained  may  be  used  elsewhere.  or  simply  substitute  for  the  farmer's
own  funds  that  he  would  have  used  in  the  same  crop  anyway.- 17  -
displaces  part  of  the  output  of  unsubsidized  farmers.  To the  extent  that  total
output  remains  roughly  constant.  the  main  impact  of  the  subsidy  will  be  to  create
higher  incmes  for  the  subsidized  farmers,  rather  than  to  increase  output  or
lower  prices.  This  suggests  that  an  increase  in  the  support  price,  available
to  all  farmers.  probably  weould  increase  output  more  and  affect  the  incoue
distribution  less  than  a  similar  proportionate  subsidy  to  a  few  farners.l0
Second.  the  subsidies  would  accrue  to  any  crop  produced  by  the  subsidized  farmer.
Of  course  their  impact  on  different  crops  would  vary.  depending  on  the  intensity
of  use  of  the  subsidized  inputs  in  a  particular  crop.  The  subsidies  may  even
induce  farmers  to  shift  from  one  crop  to  another.  to  take  advantage  of  the
subsidy.  However.  this  means  that  the  ESC  calculations.  while  useful  in
comparing  the  incentives  relative  to  world  prices.  are  perhaps  less  useful  in
comparing  the  relative  domestic  incentives  to  different  crops.  Third.  in  order
to  access  the  subsidized  inputs,  it  nay  be necessary  for  farmers  to  make payments
outside  normal  channels,  for  example  payments  to  canal  operators  to  receive
releases  of  canal  water.  Thus,  t-he  true  costs  of  these  inputs  to  the  farmer  may
be  greater  than  estimated  here  and  the  provision  of  these  inputs  to  farmers  at
prices  below  cost  would  mainly  affect  the  distribution  of  income  and  not
incentives.  The  foregoing  three  points  suggest  that  the  impact  of  the
'subsidies-  on  prices  and  output  may  be  less  than  what  might  be  expected  and
their  impact  on  rural  income  distribution  may  be  greater.  Further  work  on
subsidies  is  needed  to  analyze  their  actual  impact.
4.  India's  Potential  Influence  on  World  Market  Prices  The  estimates  of
protectionlincentives  described  above  treat  world  market  prices  as  independent
of  the  volume  of  India's  sales  or  purchases.  However,  large  scale  buying  or
selling  could  alter  world  prices.  In  some  cases  this  may  b:  important  for
countries  like  India.  For  example,  the  world  rice  market  is  relatively  small
and  India's  entry  either  as  a  large  importer  or  exporter  could  disturb  world
prices  substantially.  Adjusting  for  this  possiblity  would  mean  that  under  the
importable  hypothesis  the  protection  coefficients  for  rice  should  be  even  lower,
i.e.  Indian  rice  is  an  even  more  efficient  import  substitute  than  shown  above
and  therefore  investment  in  rice  would  have  even  higher  economic  rates  of  return.
At  the same  time.  exports  would  be less  attractive  than  shown  above,  because
additional  Indian  exports  would  lower  the  price.  These  considerations  should
not,  however,  be  overstated.  First  there  is  the  question  of  how much extra  rice,
or  other  commodities,  would  be  produced  and  exported  with  a  shift  in  relative
prices. i.e. what is the domestic  supply elasticity  of output.  Second.
additional  trade  would  in  general  be  beneficial,  even  taking  into  account  the
effect  of  additional  Indian  sales  or  purchases  on  price. However,  the  standard
optimum  tariff  models  suggest  that  it  may  not  pay  for  India  to  go to  completely
free  tradell  in cases  where  it affects  the  international  price  significantly.
lOThe  reduction  in  fertilizer  price  is  available  to all  farmers  and  would
affect  output  more like  an across  the  board  price  rise.
11  See  for  example  Johnson.  In  the  simplest  partial  equilibrium  model,  free
exports  are preferable  to autarky.  provided  the  elasticity  of  demand  for  the
product is greater than the share  of the country  in world exports  of the
comnodity.  although  some  restriction  of  trade  will  lead  to  still  higher  benefits
for  the  country.- 18 -
CHAPTER 2
INDIA:  EFFECTIVE INCENTIVES  FOR AGRICULTURE
THE CASE OF WHEAT AND RICE
Introduction
2.01  Incentives to cultivators  of wheat and rice flow through  various
Government policies, of which output and input pricing are important
instruments.  The switch towards such a positive  price policy since the
inception of Agricultural Prices Commission (APC)  and Food Corporation of
India (FCI) in 1965 played its due role in faster adoption of HYV seeds
during the Green (Wheat)  Revolution of late 1960s.  More recently, a long
term agricultural  price policy has been announced  which seeks to make
Indiar farm sector "more  vibrant, more productive  and more cost effective,
and to integr  Ite it more closely in the strategy for balanced national
development".  The policy of minimum support/procurement  prices, in
effect extends an insurance cover to farmers  against the risk of sudden
and precipitous fall in the prices of their  produce, also encouraging
wheat and rice production.
2.02  Input pricing, on the other hand, directly affects farmers'
incentives through sizeable subsidies that are offered on vital inputs.
Economic subsidies  on fertilizers,  irrigation,  electricity and credit -
four kev inputs of modern agriculture,  touched  Rs. 118  billion in
1986-87  which represents  an estimated 16 to 17 percent of agricultural
GDP.  (Gulati  1988a).
2.03  Besides the pricing instrument, the  Government also uses several
other instruments that affect farmers' incentives.  For example, the
Government has planned to foster a second  Green Revolution in the eastern
region of India (eastern  Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal)
through a package of incentives,  that are largely  non-price in  nature.
Distribution of fertilizers  and certified seeds (in small packs) through
an extensive marketing network, involving the establishment of large
number of sales outlets, and regulated markets for the purchase of
outputsI is accorded a higher priority that the price factors under this
scheme.  The Government seems to  be following  a somewhat similar
strategy (supply  push) in its latest  Action Plan for foodgrain  production,
where 169 districts have been selgcted for a "big  push" in rice, wheat,
maize, gram and arhar production.
1 Agricultural Price Policy - A Long Term Perspective, Department of
Agriculture and Cooperation,  Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India,
1986.
For greater details on the definition and estimation  of economic
subsidy as different from financial subsidy, see  Ashok Gulati, 1988a.
See Report of Study Group on Agricultural Strategies for Eastern
Region of India.  Planning  Commission, Government of India,  July 1985; and
Report of the Committee on Agricultural Productivity in Eastern India
Reserve  Bank of India, 1984.
See Framework  Action Plan for Foodgrain Production (Report  of the Task
Force), Planning Commission,  GOI, March, 1988.- 19  -
2.04  Besides these incentives, Indian  cultivators also  benefit  from
extension  service programes.  Government, through its  various
agricultural universities and research institutions,  provides extension
service to farmers with a view  to educate them about the nost  appropriate
farming  practices.
2.05  All  such direct and indirect incentives that  farmers receivFe
through the  Government and the narket mechanism, appear to  converge  into  a
coinon  factor,  which seems to  be the  one most relevant  from  farners'  po-Tht
of  view,  namely  net  income  per  hectare.  The  net  income  of  cultivators
from  aay  particular  crop,  for  the  same  year,  differs  across  different
states  due  to  numerous  factors  ranging  from differentials in land
productivity  to uneven distribution  of various Gover  nent  incentives.  For
example, in 1983-G4 the  net income  per hectare (measured as the  difference
between  value  of  output  minus  cost)  of  wheat  cultivators  was Rs. 2684 in
Bihar,  Rs. 2174  in  Punjab,  Rs. 2007  in  Rajasthan  and  Rs. 1583  in  Harvana.
Similarly, paddy cultivators had net income  per hectare of Rs. 1946  in
Andhra  Pradesh,  Ks. 1867 in Assam, Rs. 2636 in Bihar, Rs. 3813 in
Karnataka,  Rs.  1570 in  Madhya  Pradesh,  Rs. 2334 in Orissa and Rs. 1869 in
Uttar Pradesh.
2.06  Knowledge of the crop and  region specific incentive structure, as
revealed  by net incomes per hectare, is  essential for a polic:-  maker
trying  to  attain  a  rational/desirable  cropping  pattern.  But  this
knowledge  remains  incomplete  as  these  estimates  essentially  emerge  froz
the  autarkical  nature  of  economy  and  are  devoid  of  any  consideration  of
the  role  that international  trade plays (or can play) in directing opti=a'
allocation  of  resources  across  crops  and  regions,  within  farm  sector.  Nor
do these estimates explicitly  bring out the impact  of input subsidies on
level and structure of incentives  for different crops in different
regions.  Thus. the  crude measure of net income  per  hectare  is  severely
handicapped and appears to be a rather distorted indicator of incentive
structures,  vhich may direct the policy maker tovards sub-optimal
allocation of resources  within agriculture.  A sore comprehensive approac-.
would require the decision maker to go  beyond the  realm of autarkv and
examine the issue of crop and region-specific incentives in agriculture
including  the international  perspective.  It is precisely this gap in
analytical information that this  paper aims to  bridge.  Accordinglv,  it
explores the question of 'effective  incentives  from a global angle and
inquires :  Where does the  Indian  cultivator stand vis-a-vis world price
situation?  Is he being net 'subsidised'  or net 'taxed'  in relation to
what  he would have  got from  his produce under a hypothetical situation o:
free international  trade  of inputs  and outputs  of agricultural sector?
2.07  The  primary objective of this  chapter is thus to quantifY the
average level and regional diversity  of effective incentives for Indian
wheat and rice cultivators during the 1980s.  Effective incentives  are
defined in terms of the 'effective protection'  accorded to domestic
cultivators from  their international  competitors.  The level of effecti.-e- 20 -
protection  reflects  policy  instruments  ranging  from  agricultural  trade
policy  to domestic  agricultural  price  policy. Three  different  variants  of
protection  coefficients  - Nominal  Protection  Coefficients  (NPCs),
Effective  Protection  Coefficients  (EPCs)  and  Effective  Subsidy
Coefficients  (ESCs),  are  estimated  for  different  states.
2.08  The  weighted  average  protection  coefficients  of  wheat  and  rice
across  the  states  generally  have  remained  below  unity  in the  seven  years  -
1980-81  to 1986-87. This  suggests  that  both  wheat  and  rice  cultivators,
on an average,  have  been "disprotected"  during  1980s,  relative  to  c.i.f.
import  prices. Put  another  way, the  levels  set  for  domestic  wheat  and
rice  prices  in  the  1980s  'taxed"  these  commodities,  relative  to
international  prices  adjusted  for  trade  and  transport  margins. Since  even
these  domestic  prices  resulted  in  a large  buildup  of government  stocks,
one  might  imagine  that  the  prices  that  would  have  equated  consumer  demand
and  production  would  have  been  even  lower. This  also  suggests  that  the
price  policy  was  a  compromise  between  increasing  returns  to  farmers  and
not  incurring  too  great  an expenditure  on subsidizing  wheat  and  rice
prices  through  the  Public  Distribution  System.  The figures  also  suggest
that  rice  cultivators  have  been "taxed"  more than  wheat  cultivators.
2.09  Based  on this  analysis,  rice  and  wheat  seem  to  be efficient
import  substitutes;  expansion  of their  production  in line  with  the  growth
in  domestic  demand  would  probably  yield  reasonable  economic  rates  of
return. However,  the  export  potential  of these  crops  is  much  less,  given
that  they  would  have  to compete  in foreign  markets  and thus  would  have  to
absorb  the  transport  margins  that  in  effect  protect  them  from  imports.
Wheat  is  not a  very  efficient  exportable  commodity,  given  prevailing  trade
and  shipping  costs  margins,  and  would  require  a large  subsidy  to  be
profitable.  Exports  of rice  in small  volumes  might  be feasible,  provided
foreign  exchange  received  a premium  of 25-30%  and  given  some  rebound  in
world  prices  from  the  mid-1980s  levels.
2.10  The  next  section  analyzes  the  nominal  protection  coefficients  for
wheat  and  rice  and  the  following  section  the  effective  protection
coefficients.  Section  C analyzes  the  effective  subsidy  coefficients  and
provides  a detailed  analysis  of the  subsidy  calculations  on the  main
agricultural  inputs,  which  are  used  in  subsequent  chapters. The  Chapter
ends  with  some  concluding  remarks  and  observations.
A.  Nominal  Protection  Coefficients  (NPC)  of output
2.11  As shown  in  the  methodological  section  of  Chapter  1, the  ratio  of
the  price  the  cultivator  actually  receives  for  his  produce  to  what  h-e
would  have  received  under  a hypothetical  situation  of free  trade  in the
output  (wheat  or rice)  is termed  the  Nominal  Protection  Coefficient
(NPC). The  NPCs  of  wheat  and  rice  are  estimated  under  the  hypotheses  that
the  relevant  commodity  is  an import  substitute  or an exportable,  the
importable  and  exportable  hypotheses  respectively.  In a large  country
such  as India,  it  is also  desirable  to  estimate  NPCs  specific  to  different
regions  (surplus  or deficit). Such  estimates  require  different
adjustments  in  calculating  reference  price  of  output. For  example,  if  one
is  estimating  the  region  specific  NPCs  of say  wheat  under  the  importable- 21 -
hypothesis  for  surplus  regions  like  Ludhiana  in  Punjab  (or  Karnal  in
Haryana),  the  reference  price  would  be calculated  as the  cif  price  of
imported  wheat  at Bombay  port  plus  port  clearance  charges  minus  internal
transport  cost from  Bombay  to  Ludhiana  minus  marketing  costs  and traders'
(distribution)  margins.
2.12  The assumption  underlying  this  approach  is that  imported  wheat
competes  with  Ludhiana  wheat  at Bombay  and  thus  sets  the  price  (equal  to
cif  price  plus  port  clearance  charges). The impact  of this  competition
falls  on the  Ludhiana  farmer,  for  whom  the  reference  price  (to  be
received)  is  reduced  by an  amount  equivalent  to  the  sum  of transport  costs
(from  Ludhiana  to  Bombay),  marketing  costs  and  associated  distribution
margins.
2.13  If,  however,  NPCs  are  estimated  for  deficit  markets,  such  as
Bhopal  in  Madhya  Pradesh  (or  Lucknow  in  Uttar  Pradesh),  the  reference
price  for  the  cultivator  would  be whatever  is  lowest:  cif  price  plus  port
clearance  charges  plus  transport  cost  to Bhopal  Plus  marketing  costs  and
distribution  margins;  or reference  price  in  one  of the  other  surplus
centres  (say  Ludhiana)  plus  transport  cost (from  Ludhiana)  to  Bhopal  plus
marketing  costs  and  distribution  margins.
2.14  The  domestic  producer  price  in  equation  (1)  is approximated  by
procurement  price (rather  than  farm  harvest  price)  of the  respective
crop.  This  is  because  (a)  procurement  price  (unlike  harvest  price)  takes
care  of qgality  aspect  and  upholds  the  principle  of "like  is  compared  with
the  like" and (b)  it  reveals,  in a sensg,  Government's  intentions  of
what  an average  farmer  "should'  receive.
2.15  The  details  regarding  estimation  of region-specific  NPCs  of  wheat
!--  - ----  -_-  -_  _ _
'  The  procurement  price  of  wheat  (or  rice)  relates  to the  fair  average
quality  (FAQ)  of the  product. The international  wheat  price  relates  to  US
Hard  Red  Winter  No.  2  with  ordinary  protein,  while  that  of rice  relates  to
Thai (Milled)  white  5%  Broken. In this  context,  it  may  be noted  that  in
India  the  predominant  wheat  varieties  (87%)  belong  to the  triticum
aestivum  family,  which  contains  many  soft  and  hard  varieties. However,  a
typical  Indian  commercial  wheat  has  a protein  content  of 10.7%  compared  to
11.38%  in  US wheat  and  10.07%  in  Australian  wheat.
6  An alternative  exercise  would  be to  take  domestic  prices  as those
hypothetical  prices  that  would  have  prevailed  in  absence  of government
intervention  in the  form  of support/procurement  operations.  It is  very
difficult  to  adjudge  precisely  what the  domestic  prices  would  be in such  a
counter-factual  situation,  yet  a rough  approximation  would  indicate  that
free  market  producer  price,  particularly  in  the  case  of wheat,  would  be a
little  lower  than  the  procurement  prices. This  is  because  the  pattern  of
market  arrivals,  especially  in  surplus  states  like  Punjab,  Haryana,
Western  Uttar  Pradesh,  is  such  that  within  weeks  immedicately  after
harvest  markets  get  flooded  with  wheat. Given  the  financial  resources  and
administrative  network  of  private  traders  it  might  not  be possible  for
them  to cope  up with  such  abundant  supplies. Moreover,  their  interest
also  would  be to let  the  producer  price  fall,  contrary  to  the  objectives
of FCI  to  provide  an effective  floor  to  producer's  price. In secondary
markets  of  deficit  state  also,  prices  are likely  to  be lower,  given  a
quicker  movement  of  wheat  from  surplus  to  deficit  states.- 22 -
and  rice  under  the  importable  and  exportable  hypotheses  during  the  1980s
are  spelt  out  in  Annexures  1  to 4.  It  may  be pointed  out  that  in  the  case
of wheat,  two  of the  states  selected  are  considered  surplus  (Punjab  and
Haryana),  and  the  other  two  deficit  (Uttar  Pradesh  and  Madhya
Pradesh).  Accordingly,  adjustments  pertaining  to  domestic  transport
costs  and  associated  margins  in  the  two  cases  for  calculating  reference
prices  are  different. For  Madhya  Pradesh  (Bhopal)  and  Uttar  Pradesh
(Lucknow)  wheat  is  assumed  to  flow  from  Punjab  (Ludhiana).  Under  the
exportable  hypothesis,  only  Ludhiana  wheat  is  considered  for  analysis,  as
Punjab  is  the  only  state  that  has  a large  wheat  surplus. The  point  of
competition  is assumed  to  be Tunis  in  Tunisia,  which  is roughly
equi-distant  from  India  arid  US,  thus  allowing  a comparison  between  fob
price  US and  fob  price  Bombay.
2.16  A similar  procedure  is  followed  in  estimating  the  NPCs  of rice
under  the  importable  and  exportable  hypotheses.  Six  rice  growing  states
were  selected  - Andhra  Pradesh,  Bihar,  Madhya  Pradesh,  Orissa,  PUnjab  and
Uttar  Pradesh. Only  Punjab  and  Andhra  Pradesh  are  considered  surplus
states. Rice  is  assumed  to flow  from  Punjab  to  Uttar  Pradesh,  Bihar  and
Madhya  Pradesh;  and from  Andhra  Pradesh  to  Orissa. Under  the  exportable
hypothesis,  Punjab  rice  is deemed  to  compete  with  Thai  rice  in  the  strait
of  Malacca,  which  is  equi-distant  from  Bangkok  and  Calcutta  ports  so that
fob  price  at Bangkok  and  at  Calcutta  are  compared.
2.17  The  resulting  set  of  NPCs  of wheat  and  rice  are  presented  in
Tables  2.1  and  2.2  respectively.
2.18  The  weighted  average  NPC  of wheat  under  the  importable  hypothesis
is  below  unity  for  all  of the  seven  years  under  consideration  (1980-81  to
1986-87),  averaging  0.80.  It  has  improved from  0.72  in 1980-81  to  0.91
in 1986-87,  but registered  wide  fluctuations  in  between,  which  primarily
synchronize  with the  volatile  behaviour  of international  price  of wheat.
Across  states,  the  surplus  areas  of  Punjab  and  Haryana  have  higher  NPCs
that  those  of the  deficit  states  (like  Madhya  Pradesh  and  Uttar  Pradesh),
indicating  a somewhat  "better  off"  situation  of surplus  vis-a-vis  deficit
regions  but also  reflecting  the  treatment  of transport  costs. It  must  be
noted  that  all  regions  (surplus  or  deficit)  during  all  the  years  had  their
NPCs  below  unity,  implying  that  wheat  cultivators  in India  have  been
'taxed'  on the  pricing  front  compared  with imports.
2.19  This  conclusion  reverses,  however,  when  wheat  is  viewed  as an
exportable  commodity. The  Punjab  wheat  cultivator,  under  the  exportable
hypothesis,  seems  to  be "protected"  with  an NPC  of  more  than  unity  all
through,  averaging  1.34. This  reversal  is  of course  because  exporting  of
wheat  implies  the  deduction  of the  transport  cost  up to  the  point  of sale,
whereas  under  the  importable  hypothesis  the  transport  cost  is  added  to the
international  price. Hence  a subsidy  would  seem  to  be needed  to  export
wheat.
A state  is  deemed  deficit  if its  contribution  to the  Central  Pool
falls  short  of its  withdrawal  from  it (for  the  specific  crop).- 23 -
Tbl  2,1t  Ntnaml  ProtectLon  Couffitients  of  Whest
States  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Average
Importable  Hypothesis
Haryana  0.75  0.76  0.89  0.79  0.79  0.79  0.98  0.84
(0.12)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13)
Madhya  Pradesh  0.69  0.70  0.80  0.80  0.72  0.71  0.80  0.75
(0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.1&)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)
Punjab  0.76  0.77  7.g0  0.90  0.80  0.80  0.99  0.85
(0.26)  (0.28)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.27)
Uttar  Pradesh  0.70  0.71  0-82  0.81  0.73  0.73  0.88  0.77
(0.50)  (0.47)  (0.49)  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.46)  (0.47)  (0.48)
Exportable  Hypothesis
Punjab  1.15  1.09  1.24  1.29  1.27  1.33  1.99  .. 34
Notes,
1.  For  estinational  details  of  NPCs,  see  Azmexures  1  and  2.
2.  Figures  withIn  parentheses  are  the  value  weights  derived  at  international  reference  prices  (See
Annexure  5).
2.20  The  weighted  average  NPC  of rice  under  importable  hypothesis  is
0.67  for  the  years  1980-81  to 1986-87  (Table  2.2).  It is  even  lower  than
that  of  wheat  (0.80),  indicating  that  rice  cultivators  have  been  more
"taxed"  on the  pricing  front  that  the  wheat  cultivators.  The  difference
between  NPCs  of rice  and  wheat  was  greater  during  1980-81  than  in
1986-87. Both  NPCs  rose  over  time  although  still  remaining  below  unity.
Under  the  exportable  hypothesis,  Punjab  rice  cultivator  seems  to  have
acquired  "protection"  only  during  1985-86  and  1986-87. But  his  average
situation  for  1980s  remains  that  of  being  'taxed'.
2.21  It  may  be pointed  out  here  that  estimation  of NPCs  in this
excercise  has  been  carried  out  at the  official  rate  of exchange. If  one
allows  for  a premium  on foreign  exchange  of 25  percent  or so,  then  the  net
NPCs  of wheat  and  rice  (adjusted  for  shadow  price  of foreign  exchange)
would  be even  lower,  indicating  a greater  degree  of "net  tax"  to  wheat  and
rice  cultivators.- 24  -
Tble  2.21  NLominal  Protection  Coefficients  of  Ric-
States  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83 1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  AveraSe
importable  Hypothesis
Andhra  Pradesh  0.45  0.52  0.77  0.72  0.74  0.81  0.82  0.69
(0.23)  (0.26)  (0.28)  f0,25)  ;0.21)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.23)
Bihar  0.43  0.51  0.72  0.68  0.69  0.75  0.77  0.65
(0.19)  (0.JS)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.17)  0.16)
Madhya  Pradesh  0.46  0.50  0.74  0.70  0.71  0.77  0.79  0.67
(0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (O.1S)  (0.1;
Orissa  0.44  0.50  0.72  0.68  0.69  0.75  0.76  0.65
(0.15)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.14)
Punjab  0.49  0.55  0.83  0.78  0.79  0.87  0.90  0.74
(0.10)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.13)
Uttar  Pradesh  0.45  0.50  0.73  0.69  0.70  0.76  0.78  0.66
(0.19)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.21)
Weighted  Average  0.45  0.51  0.75  0.70  0.72  0.78  0.80  0.67
Exportable  Hypothesis
Punjao  0.5  0.6  0.94  0.89  0.94  1.09  1.16  0.87
Notes:
1.  For  estimational  details  of  RPCs,  see  Amnexures  3  and  4.
2.  Figurgs  in  parentheses  are  the  value  weights,  where  the  values  are  estimated  at
international  reference  prices  (see  Amcexurn  6).
2.22  One  must  be cautious  about  drawing  inference  from  NPCs,  as the
Government  seems  to  be following  a  poligy  of deliberate  low  output  prices
and  low  input  prices  through  subsidies.  Thus,  a  better  understanding
would  necessitate  estimation  of Effective  Protection  Coefficients  (EPCs),
where  tradeable  inputs  are  evaluated  at international  prices,  and  of
Effective  Subsidy  Coefficients  (ESCs),  where  adjustment  is  made  for
subsidies  on non-tradeable  inputs.
8 The  underlying  philosophy  appears  to  be that  low  output  prices  of
wheat  and rice  would  keep  these  commodities  within  reach  of common  man,
and  low  input  prices  would  enable  small  farmers  also  to  adopt  new
technology.25 -
B.  Effgztive  Protection  Coefficients  of Output  (EPCs)
i.23  The Effective  Protection  Coefficient  (EPC)  of a  product  is
defined  as a ratio  of  value  added  at  domestic  prices  to  value  added  at
international  reference  prices. As noted  in  chapter  1, in  the  national
accounting  framework,  value  added  implies  sales  value  of output  minus  all
purchased  inputs,  in  protection  theory  it  has  a  different  meaning. Value
added  here is derived  as tle  difference  of sales  value  of output  and  all
traded  (tradeable)  inputs.
2.24  The  EPC  thus  adjusts  the  nominal  protection  on output  for  the
protection  on the  relevant  traded  (tradeable)  inputs. Thus,  the  FPC is  a
better  measure  of the  degree  of protection  (effective  incentives)  then  the
NPC.  Once  again  it is  usefu!  to  note  that  the  effective  protection  (EPC)
will  exceed  nominal  protection  (NPC)  to  the  extent  that  inputs  have  a
lower  (higher)  NPC than  the  NPC  on the  final  product. rhus,  the
estimation  of nominal  protection  on traded  (tradeable)  inputs  must  precede
estimation  of effective  protection  on  outputs. This  requires  detailed
information  on the  input  structures  of relevant  outputs.
2.25  The  input  structures  of  wheat  and  pad,dy  (Annexures  11  and  12)
have  been  averaged  over  three  years,  1981-82  to 1983-84,  to  bring  about
greater  stability  in input-output  relations.  These  structures  reveal  that
the  major  tradeable  inputs  are fertilizers,  seeds  and  farm  machinery
(machine  labor). Although  insecticides  also  are  a tradeable  input,  their
share  in  total  cost  is  very low  (about  2%).
2.26  It  may  be pointed  out  here that  treatment  of deprecia.:on  of
durable  inputs  often  poses  a  problem:  whether  it  should  be treated  as a
tradeable  or  non-tradeable  cost.  In this  paper,  depreciation  on farm
machinery,  especially  tractors,  threshers  etc.  is treated  as  a tradeable
input  and  accordingly  valued  at international  reference  price,  while
depreciation  on farm  buildings  etc.  is  taken  as  noy-tradeable.  The  NPC  of
fertilisers  (NPK)  is  estimated  at a  national  level  as  a weighted
average  of  NPCs  of  Urea (46%  N),  Diammonium  - Phosphate  (DAP,  18-46-0),
and  Muriate  of Potash  (60%  K20),  with their  respective  consumption
levels  acting  as  weights. Individual  NPCs  of  N, P and  K are  worked  out  as
ratios  of their  domestic  prices  that  farmers  pay  to their  international
reference  prices,  where  the  latter  are  calculated  by adding  distribution
costs  and  dealers'  margins  in  the  cif  prices  of  N,.P  and  K (See  Annexure
9  Theoretically,  the  protection  framework  requires  that  non-traded
inputs  be decomposed  into  their  tradeable  components  and  primary
non-traded  (non-tradeable)  components,  and  different  treatment  be accorded
to  both.  However,  empirically  such  refined  treatments  are  usually
Y6ecluded  by the  data.
Region-specific  NPCs  of fertilizers  would  require  detailed
information  on the  movement  of fertilizers  from  ports  to  regions,
associated  transport  and  handling  costs. A detailed  break  down  of these
costs  for  different  regions  is  missing  and  therefore  an average  national
figure,  which  the  Ministry  pays  to  pool  handling  agencies  is  used(see
Annexure  13 and  Gulati  1988).- 26  -
13). NPCs  of fertilisers  so  derived,  remained  below  unity  during  1980-81
to 1986-87  (average  - 0.82)  indjiating  that  Indian  cultivators  have  been
net  "subsidised"  on this  count.
2.27  The  NPCs  of farm  machinery  arn  proxied  by the  NPC  on tractors
only. Tractors  appear  to  be the  most  r.ominant  tradeable  farm  machinery.
Estimating  protection  on tractors,  hoiever,  is rendered  difficult  as the
world  market  in  tractors  is  not  competitive  and  reflects  circumstances
peculiar  to  each  importing  country. Also  India  stopped  importing  tractors
almost  a decade  ago.  Pakistan  imports  tractors  in  SKD  conditions  which
provides  very  low  cif  prices  and  cannot  be used  in  our  study. Moreover,
while  international  trade  is  primarily  in tractors  of 50  H'2plus range,
the  Indian  market  is domirlated  by tractors  of 30 to 35  HP.  Under
these  circumstances,  fob  price  of  tractors  exported  from  India  in 1.985-86.
is  used  to  estimate  NPC  of tractors.  Given  che  specifications  of the
exported  tractors  (11H-444  of 45  HP) its  fob  price  (Rs.69280)  is  adjusted
by deducting  anl  average  internal  transport  cost.  (from  Bomsbay  port  to the
farmer  point  in  North  India)  of  Rs.1500. To this  is  added  a  dealer's
margin  of  Rs.3850,  which  gives  the  reference  price  of tractor  (45  HP) in
North  India  as Rs.  71630. The  domestic  retail  price  of this  tractor  as
being  paid  by farmers  is  Rs.  90085. This  provides  NPC  figure  of  1.26  (-
90085/71630).  If tracters  are  treated  only  as exportables,  NPC  would  be
1.33  (-90085/(69280-1500).  A cross  check  using  the  movements  in the  unit
values  of world  imports  of tractors  vis-a-vis  that  of Indian  domestic
prices  of tractors  suggests  that  the  NPC  of 1.26  is  reasonable.  Given
limitations  on data  front,  this  figure  of 1.26  was  used  as  NPC for  ail  the
years  and  for  all  farm  machinery  included  under  the  cost  item  "machine
labor".
2.28  NPCs  of seeds  are  assumed  to  be equal  to the  NPCs  of their
respective  outputs. Resort  to this  approximation  is  primarily  because  of
lack  of information  on  cif  prices  of seeds  of  wheat  and  rice.  India  did
not import  these  seeds  at a commercial  scale  during  this  period  and the
international  market  of seeds  is  small  and  imperfect.  On thJ  other  hand,
it  sounds  reasonable  to  expect  that  seed  and  output  prices  of the  same
commodity  should  exhibit  a similar  pattern,  although  this  is  not  strictly
true  for  some  HVYs  that  are  sterile. Thus,  NPCs  of output  are  also  the
NPCs  of their  respective  seeds,  which  are  region-specific.
For  greater  details  on how  much  of fertilizer  subsidy  (financial)  as
announced  in  the  budgets  of Central  Government  goes  to agriculture  and  how
much to the  Fertilizer  Industry  or their  feedstock  supplying  agencies  see
Qulati,  1988a,  pp.  32-34,  Table  3.
Fifty  five  percent  of Indian  tractor  market  share  is  captured  by
30-39  HOP  range,  22%  by 20-29  HP range  and  18%  by 40-49  HP range  (1984
figures),  see  'Role  of Agricultural  Equipment  in  Modernising  Indian
Agriculture  and  Rural  Prosperity",  keynote  address  by K. M.  Metha,  Indian
Society  of  Agricutural  Engineers,  Silver  Jubilee  Convention,  October  29,
1985.- 27 -
2.29  Weighted  average  NPCs  of three  tradeable  inputs  - fertilisers,
farm  machinery  (machine  labour)  and  seeds,  are  estimated  for  each  relevant
state,  the  share  of a particular  input's  value  in  the  procurement  price  of
output  acting  as relevant  weight. These  are  estimated  separately  under
the  importable  hypothesis  for  wheat  and  rice (Annexures  14 and  15).
2.30  The  aggregate  values  of three  tradeable  inputs  in domestic  pricrs
that  go to  produce  one  unit  of  output,  along  with  their  weighted  NPCs
specific  to  each  region  of the  relevant  crop,  are  plugged  in  equation  (2)
of  chapter  1, to compute  the  Effective  Protection  Coefficients  (EPCs)  of
wheat  and  rice (Tables  2.3  and  2.4  respectively).
2.31  For  wheat,  under  the  importable  hypothesis,  the  EPCs  for  all  the
states  and  for  all  the  years  are  below  unity. The  weighted  average  EPC
for  the  seven  year  period  (0.75)  is  not  only  below  one  but also  lower  than
its  corresponding  NPC (0.80). This  is  because  the  NPC  of tradeable  inputs
is greater  than  NPC  of wheat,  which  makes  the  EPC  of  wheat  lower  than  its
NPC.
2.32  Under  the  exportable  hypothesis,  the  results  change  dramatically
and  the  EPC  of Punjab  wheat  (i.71)  turns  out  to  be more  than  double  its
EPC  under  the importable  hypotheses  (0.80). The  main  reason  underlying
this  result  is  that  transport  costs  are  deducted  for  exports  and  added ia
for  imports  and  these  form  a singificant  proportion  of doemstic  price  of
wheat. Where  these  costs  are  not  so  high (as  a percentage  of domestic
price  output)  results  under  exportable  hypothesis  do not  exhibit  such
significant  departures  from  their  corresponding  results  under  importable
hypothesis.  Also,  the  NPC  of  wheat  is  greater  than  NPC  of its  tradeable
inputs  under  the  exportable  hypothesis.  Across  states,  the  EPC  of wheat
is  highest  of Punjab  (0.80)  but still  remains  below  unity.
2.33  The  weighted  average  EPC  of rice  under  importable  hypothesis
(0.65)  is  below  unity,  is  lower  than  its  corresponding  NPC (0.67)  and  also
lower  than  EPC  of  wheat  (0.75).
2.34  It  should  be remarked,  however,  that  farmers  basically  sell  paddy
while  Lnternational  trade  is  in  rice.  Strictly  speaking,  the  protection
coefficients  being  estimated  are  not  at the  farmers  gate  but  at miller.
The  theoretically  correct  procedure  would  involve  estimation  of protection
to  the  milling  process  falling  in  between  paddy  and  rice,  and  adjust  that
to derive  the  true  protection  to  paddy  farmers. This  study  skips  this
adjustment  and  tproximates  protection  on paddy  (farmers)  with that  on
rice (millers).
2.35  These  results  have  significant  policy  implications  that  are
discussed  in  section  C.
13 It  would  require  another  detailed  study  on  protection  to the  rice
milling  indt-try  before  an accurate  estimate  could  be obtained  for  the  EPC
of  paddy.- 28  -
Table  2.3:  Effective  Protection  Coefficients  of  Wheat
State  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Average
Importable  Hypothesis
Haryana  0.70  0.70  0.84  0.85  0.75  0.75  0.96  0.79
(0.12)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13)
Madhya Pradesh  0.67  0.68  0.78  0.78  0.71  0.70  0.78  0.73
(0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)
Punjab  0.70  0.71  0.84  0.86  0.76  0.76  0.97  0.80
(0.26)  (0.28)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.27)
Uttar Pradesh  0.65  0.66  0.77  0.77  0.69  0.70  0.85  0.73
(0.50)  (0.47)  (0.49)  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.46)  (0.47)  (0.48)
WeLghted  Average  0.67  0.68  0.80  0.80  0.72  0.72  0.89  0.75
Exportable  Hypothesis
Punjab  1.29  1.16  1.35  1.47  1.55  1.71  3.44  1.71
Notes:  Figures  in  parenthses  are  the  value  veLghts  derived  at  international  reference  prices.
C.  Effective  Subsidy  Coefficients  of  OutDut
2.36  The  estimation  of ESCs  of  wheat  and  rice  involves  adjusting  their
EPCs  for  subsidies  and  taxes  on their  respective  non-tradeable  inputs,
namely  adding  on the  effective  subsidy  per  unit  to  the  domestic  EPC.  (See
equation  3,  Chapter  1).
2.37  In India,  farmers  receive  subsidies  on  non-tradeable  inputs  such
as  water,  electricity  and  credit,  while  taxes  paid  on  non-tradeable  inputs
such  as land  etc.  are  almost  non-existent  (less  than  1%,  see  Annexures  11
and  12). Thus,  it  is  primarily  subsidies  on  water,  electricity  and  credit
that  are  added  into  the  numerator  of the  EPC  to  derive  the  ESC.  It  may  be
remarked  that  subsidies  on fertilizers  are  not included  separately  in the
estimation  of ESCs  because  fertilizer  is  a tradeable  input  and  the  subsidy
has  already  been  taken  into  account  in  calculating  the  EPCs.- 29  -
Tablo  2.4  Effective  Protection  Coefficients  of  Rice
---- _-------------------------------------------------------------_--__------__---------------_--
State  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Average
------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__------------------
Importable  Hypothesis
Andhra  Pradesh  0.42  0.49  0.74  0.69  0.73  0.81  0.80  0.66
(0.23)  (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.25)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.23)
Bihar  0.44  0.50  0.71  0.67  0.68  0.75  0.76  0.64
(0.19)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.16)
Madhya  Pradesh  0.45  0.46  0.73  0.69  0.71  0.77  0.78  0.65
(0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.13)
Orissa  0.43  0.49  0.71  0.67  0.68  0.75  0.74  0.63
(0.15)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.14)
Punjab  0.46  0.51  0.80  0.75  0.77  0.87  0.88  0.72
(0.10)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.13)
Uttar  Pradesh  0.43  0.48  0.71  0.67  0.69  0.75  0.77  0.64
(0.19)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.21)
Weighted Averge  0.43  0.48  0.73  0.68  0.70  0.78  0.78  0.65
Exportable  Hypothesis
Punjab  0.47  0.57  0.93  0.88  0.95  1.13  1.19  0.87
Note:  Figures  Ln  parenthesis  are  the  value  weights  where  the  velues  are  estLmated  at  international
reference  prices.
2.38  Irrigation  and  electricity  subsidies  are  broadly  defined  and
measured  as the  difference  between  their  respective  annualised  resource
costs  and  revenue  receipts. The  credit  subsidy  is  estimated  as the
difference  between  interest  rate  being  charged  from  agriculture  Y s-a-vis
retail  trade,  and  an adjustment  for  the  defaults  in  agriculture.
2.39  More  precisely,  the  estimation  of the  irrigation  subsidv  was
carried  out  as follows:
Irrigation  Subsidy - operational  and  maintenance  expense  Rlus 10%  15
charge  on  capital  investment  per  hectare  of canal
irrigated  area  through  major  and  medium  irrigation
schemes  minus  gross  receipts  of these  schemes  from
agriculture.
14 For  greater  details  on numerous  problems  encountered  and  resolved  in
appropriately  defining  the  very  concepts  of these  subsidies  and
empirically  estimating  these  at  state  levels  first,  and  then  allocating
these  across  different  crops  in  each  state,  see (i)  Ashok  Gulati  (1988a):
Input  Subsidies  in  Indian  Agriculture  - A Statewise  Analysis  (Mimeo)  and
(ii)  Ashok  Gulati  (1988b):  Crop  SRecific  Allocation  of Input  Subsidies  - A
Methodological  Note (Mimeo).- 30 -
2.40  This  adjustment  renders  irrigation  subsidy  per  hectare  of canal
area irrigated  through  major  and  medium  irrigation  schemes. But  our
objective  is to  derive  irrigation  subsidy  per  unit  of  output  (i.e.  per
quintal  of  wheat  or rice). This  necessitates  further  adjustments
involving  certain  other  approximations.  Since  irrigation  water
requirements  of  different  crops  in  different  regions  differ  significantly,
irrigation  subsidies  even  on canal  irrigated  area  for  different  crops
should  not  be treated  as  equal. They  need  to  be adjusted  by their
relative  "water  weights",  where  the  latter  are  derived  as  ratios  of their
respective  irrigation  water  requirements  on total  irrigated  area  of
different  crops.  This  adjustment  enables  one  to  obtain  crop-specific
irrigation  subsidy  (per  hectare),  but  only  on their  canal  irrigated  area.
All area  under  a  particular  crop,  however,  is  not  canal  irrigated.  There
are  other  sources  of irrigation,  as  well  as unirrigated  area  under  the
crop. The task  would  have  been  much  easier  if  there  were  published  data
on source-wise  irrigated  area  under  different  crops. But  this
information is  unavailable  and instead  what  is  available  is  sourcewise
irrigated  area  under  all  crops  together  and  not  specific  to  each  crop.
Under  such  circumstances,  it is  assumed  that  the  sourcewise  break-up  of
irrigated  area  ypder  any  particular  crop  is  the  same  as that  under  all
crops  together.  This is  further  adjusted  by the  ratio  of irrigated
area  under  the  crop (irrespective  of source)  to total  area  of the  crop.
This  provides  the  ratio  of canal  irrigated  area  to total  area (irrigated
plus  unirrigated)  under  the  crop. It is this  ratio  which  is  multiplied  by
the  irrigation  subsidy  per  hectare  of canal  irrigated  area  under  that
specific  crop  to  obtain  the  irrigation  subsidy  per  hectare  of the  crop.
Dividing  it  by the  yield  of the  crop,  one  gets  the  final  result  of
irrigation  subsidy  per  quintal  of that  crop  (wheat  or rice). This
exercise  is repeated  for  each  relevant  state,  for  each  year (1980-81  to
1986-87)  and  for  different  crops. Results  pertaining  to  irrigation
subsidy  (so  derived  on  per  quintal  basis)  on wheat  and  rice  appear  in
Tables  2.5  and  2.6  respectively.
2.41  The electricity  subsidy  is  calculated  as follows:  first
electricity  consumption  of the  different  crops  is  estimated  (on  per
hectare  of electric  tubewell  irrigated  area  basis)  by multiplying  the
irrigation  water  requirements  of the  different  crops  (m.ha)  by 7.5  KWH,
which  is  the  technical  specification  of energy  consumption  of  a 5 HP  pump
to lift  1 cm,  ha.  water. Next,  it is  multiplied  by the  subsidy  per  unit
of electricity,  where  the  latter  is  calculated  by taking  difference
15  This  10%  consists  of interest  (opportunity)  cost  at the  rate  of 8.44%
(which  is  the  redemption  yield  on long  term  Government  bonds  maturing  in
J215)  and  1.56%  on account  of depreciation  charges.
See  Gulati  (1988)  where  this  exercise  is  carried  out in  detail  taking
funjab  as an example.
This  assumption  brings  in  some  margin  of  error  in  our  final
estimates,  which  presumably  can  be reduced  to  some  extent  if  these  numbers
are  constructed  at district  level  first. This  exercise,  however,  is  not
undertaken  in this  study  due  to  constraints  of time  and  resources.- 31 -
between  average  cost  of operation  (generation  plus  distribution)  of State
Electricity  Boards  (Rs/KWH)  and the  revenue  received  from  agriculture
(Rs/KWH)  by the  Board. This  renders  the  electricity  subsidy  on per
hectare  basis  (crop-specific)  on electric  tubewell  irrigated  area. But
all  area  under  a crop  is  not  irrigated  through  electric  tubewells. There
are  other  sources  of irrigation  as  well,  and  much  of the  cropped  area  is
unirrigated.  This  entails  further  adjustments  before  the  final  estimates
are  obtained. The  ratio  of tubewell  irrigated  area  to  net irrigated  area
of the  state  from  all  sources,  under  all  crops  combined,  is assumed  to  be
the  same  as for  each  specific  crop (due  to lack  of crop-specific
information).  This  ratio  is  multiplied  by the  ratio  of irrigated  area
under  a crop  to its  total  area,  which  provides  us a ratio  of tubewell
irrigated  area  to  total  area  (irrigated  plus  unirrigated)  of  the  crop  in
T blj 2.5t Subsidies  on  Non-Tradeubl  Itwuts  of  Wheat
State  Input  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87
Haryana  IS  21.87  24.08  24.75  27.49  29.14  26.84  32.18
ES  1.35  1.76  1.55  1.69  2.18  2.28  2.46
CS  1.53  2.18  2.46  2.88  3.09  3.15  3.15 *
TS  24.75  28.02  28.76  32.06  34.41  32.27  37.79
Nadhya Pradmsh  IS  29.12  29.52  30.55  30.23  34.75  36.06  37.78
IS  0.53  0.85  1.14  1.15  1.30  1.41  1.38
CS  2.23  2.89  3.19  3.05  4.07  4.16  4.16 *
TS  31.88  33.26  34.88  34.43  40.12  41.63  43.32
Punjab  IS  11.16  11.43  12.26  13.43  13.54  13.85  15.37
RS  1.01  1.00  1.23  1.33  1.63  1.90  2.18
CS  1.85  2.17  2.41  3.34  2.96  2.94  2.94 *
TS  14.02  14.60  15.90  18.10  18.13  18.69  20.49
Uttar Pradesh  IS  20.53  22.78  22.36  23.98  26.70  27.57  31.22
as  0.94  0.97  0.94  0.97  1.13  1.09  1.08
Cs  1.19  1.79  1.93  2.16  2.45  2.51  2.51 *
TS  22.66  25.54  25.25  27.11  30.28  31.17  34.81
*  Credit subsdy  for 1986-87 Ls  taken as sams as that for 1985-86  due to lack  of required information.
Note:  IS  - IrrLiation Subsidy, ES - Ilectricity  Subsidy,  CS  - Credit SubsLdy and TS - Total  Subsidy.
the  crop  in  the  relevant  state. But  all  tubewells  are  not  electric
tubewells,  there  are  diesel  ones  also. Thus,  this  ratio  is  further
multiplied  by the  ratio  of electric  pumps  to total  pumpsets  in the  state.
The resulting  ratio  in  turn  is  multiplied  by the  electricity  subsidy  per
hectare  of electric  tubewell  irrigated  area  (crop-specific)  and  then
divided  by yields  of the  respective  crops. The  final  result  is the
electricity  subsidy  (crop-specific)  on a per  quintal  basis  for  different
years  and  states. (Tables  2.5  and  2.6).- 32
Tabls 2.L. Subsidies  an  Non-trad-able  Inruts  of  Rie.
State  Input  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87
Subsidy
------------------------------------------------------------- __--------------__-----------
Andhra  Pradesh  iS  53.75  51.25  50.41  50.77  54.72  49.41  55.96
ES  0.71  0.90  1.20  1.59  1.73  1.54  2.10
CS  3.19  3.35  4.07  4.22  5.57  6.47  6.47  *
TS  57.65  55.50  55.68  56.58  62.08  57.42  64.53
BLhar  IS  42.73  58.63  73.51  53.08  52.84  54.99  59.47
ES  1.95  3.08  5.02  3.85  4.40  4.21  5.05
CS  1.19  1.89  2.00  2.24  2.56  2.83  2.83  *
TS  45.87  63.60  80.53  59.17  59.80  62.03  67.35
Mdhya  Pradesh  IS  39.19  45.01  54.45  43.33  60.20  46.12  63.29
ES  0.43  0.77  1.18  0.92  1.29  1.00  1.27
CS  3.24  4.16  4.46  4.31  5.99  6.13  6.13  *
TS  42.86  49.94  60.09  48.56  67.48  53.25  70.69
Orissa  IS  45.14  53.79  72.46  48.75  63.51  55.65  64.47
ES  0.25  0.36  0.68  0.46  0.60  0.54  0.70
CS  1.58  1.87  2.41  2.42  2.90  2.90  2.90  *
TS  46.97  56.02  75.55  51.63  67.01  59.09  68.07
PunJab  1S  53.91  54.87  56.74  64.02  64.02  74.47  78.13
ES  3.59  3.50  4.08  4.67  5.90  7.02  7.64
Cs  2.76  3.24  3.48  4.88  4.50  4.46  4.46  *
TS  60.26  61.61  64.30  73.57  74.42  85.95  90.23
Uttar  Pradesh  IS  43.48  46.14  49.88  48.38  51.86  49.87  59.99
ES  0.58  0.74  1.28  1.22  1.96  2.23  2.82
CS  1.68  2.52  2.63  2.97  3.50  3.60  3.60  *
TS  45.74  49.40  53.79  52.57  57.32  55.70  66.41
* Credit  subsidy  for  1986-87  Ls  taken  as  same as  that  for  1985-86  due  to  lack  of required  Lnform-tion.
Note: IS  - Irrigation  Subsidy,  CS  - Credit  SubsLdy.  ES  - Electricity  Subsidy  and  TS - Total  Subsidy.
2.42  In the  case  of  wheat,  however,  one  also  needs  to  add into  the
above  results  the  electricity  subsidy  due  to  threshing  operations  carried
out  through  electrically  operated  threshers.  The  technical  specifications
provide  that  a thrssher  with  9"  head  operating  on 5  HP electric  motor
clears  approximately  two  quintals  of wheat  per  hour  and  consumes  3.75  KWH
of electricity.  But  all  threshing  is  not  done  through  electric  motors,
there  are  diesel  motors  as  well.  It is  assumed  that  the  ratio  between
electricity  operated  threshers  and  diesel  operated  threshers  is  the  same- 33 -
as that  between  electric  and  diesel  tubewells.  Multiplying  this  ratio  by
3.75/2  KWH,  one  gets  electricity  consumption  per quintal  of  wheat,  which
is  further  multiplied  by subsidy  on per  unit  of electricity  (Rs/KWH)  to
get  electricity  subsidy  per  unit  of  wheat  (Rs/q)  due  to  threshing
operations.  This  is  added  into  the  electricity  subsidy  derived  earlier  on
irrigation  operations  to  get  the  total  electricity  subsidy  per  quintal  of
wheat  for  different  years  in  the  relevant  states.
2.43  The  cradit  subsidy  is  deemed  to  be composed  of two  components:
the  (a)  the  interest  subsidy  that  accrues  to cultivators  due  to the
concessional  rate  of interest  that  is  charged  from  agricultural  sector
vis-a-vis  some  other  sector  of the  economy,  say  retail  trade,  (which  comes
to  about  4.5%  p.a.);  (b)  the  default  subsidy  which  accrues  to agriculture
in the  form  of  bad debts  that  will  never  be paid  back  to the  lending
institutions.  While  the  interest  subsidy  is estimated  at 4.5%,  the
default  subsidy  is calculated  by taking  40%  of loans  having  a default
history  of  more  than  3  years  as bad  debts  (see  Gulati,  1988a  for  greater
details). This  provides  the  total  credit  subsidy  at state  level. Since
information  on institutional  credit  specific  to  each  crop  does  not  exist,
one  has to  work  with  certain  assumptions  for  allocating  credit  subsidy
across  different  crops. One  approach  would  be to  assume  that  it is
equally  distributed  (on  per  hectare  of gross  cultivated  area  basis)  across
all  crops. The  other  way,  presumably  better,  would  be to  assume  that  it
is  allocated  across  different  crops  according  to  the  relative  share  of
that  crop's  value  productivity  to  the  aggregate  value  productivity  of all
crops. This  would  imply  that  credit  is  distributed  equally  not  on per
hectare  basis  but  per  rupee  of value  added  in agriculture  through  all
crops. If  a  particular  crop  contributes  more  per  unit  of its  output,  as
high  value  crops  do,  then  its  share  in  credit  subsidy  would  be accordingly
higher  (See  Gulati,  1988a  for  more  details).
2.44  The  subsidies  on the  three  non-tradeable  inputs  - irrigation,
electricity  and  credit,  so  allocated  across  wheat  and  rice  in  the
different  relevant  states  over  the  period  1980-81  to 1986-87,  on  per
quintal  basis,  appear  in  Tables  2.5  and  2.6. The  irrigation  subsidy  turns
out  to  be much  more important  than  the  subsidies  on electricity  or credit,
representing  75%  to 90%  of per  unit  subsidies.
2.45  Looking  at the  state  data,  in the  case  of  wheat,  the  highest
amount  of subsidy  accrues  to  Madhya  Pradesh  primarily  due  to irrigation.
Punjab,  on the  other  hand,  happens  to  be at the  lower  end  of the  scale.
The  underlying  reason  seems  to  be relatively  much lower  capital  cost
involved  in irrigating  one  hectare  of land  through  major  and  medium
schemes  in the  Punjab  than  in  MP.  However,  such  a result  does  not  occur
in  case  of rice  because  water  requirements  of rice  in  Punjab  are  much
higher  than  in  other  states  and  since  we have  used "water  weights"  in
allocating  irrigation  subsidy  across  crops,  the  irrigation  subsidy  for
rice  in Punjab  is  much  higher  than  in the  case  of  wheat. Thus,  Punjab
tops  the  rice  states  in  havina  highest  total  subsidy  per quintal  of rice.
2.46  The impact  of all  these  subsidies  on incentive  structures  of
wheat  and  rice,  is  captured  once  these  are  added  in the  numerator  of the
EPC  to  derive  the  ESC.  ESCs  of wheat  (Table  2.7)  under  the  importable  and
exportable  hypotheses  turn  out  to  be significantly  higher  than  either  EPCs- 34 .
Table 2.7s Effective Subsidy CoefficLents of Wheat
States  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  AveraSe
Importable Hypothesis
Haryna  0.90  0.92  1.08  1.10  0.99  0.97  1.27  1.03
(0.12)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13)
Madhya  Pradesh  0.90  0.89  1.01  1.00  0.94  0.93  1.04  0.96
(0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.12)  0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)
Punjab  0.82  0.82  0.98  1.01  0.88  0.89  1.15  0.93
(0.16)  (0.28)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.2S)  (0.28)  (0.27)
Uttar Pradesh  0.82  0.83  0.95  0.95  0.88  U.SS  1.09  0.91
(0.50)  (0.47)  (0.49)  (0.48)  (0.43)  (0.46)  (f.47)  (r.48)
WeiLhted Average  0.76  0.85  0.99  0.99  0.90  0.90  L.12  0.93
ExPOrtable  Hypothesis  1.57  1.35  1.57  1.73  1.81  2.00  4.07  2.01
Note:  Figures  Li  parentheses  a:e  the  value  Veights,  where the  values  are  estlmated  at  Laternational
reference  prices.
or NPCs. The  weighted  average  ESC  of  wheat  under  importable  hypothesis,
is  0.93  for  the  period  1980-81  to 1986-87,  compared  to  an  NPC  of 0.80  and
EPC  of 0.75. On average  the  estimated  subsidies  on non  traded  inputs  on
wheat  thygs  represented  24%  of  value  added  (including  non  traded
inputs).  In 1986-87,  due  to a sharp  dip  in  the  international  price  of
wheat,  wheat  received  positive  protection.  Under  the  exportable
hypothesis,  wheat  cultivators  of Punjab  had  positive  protection  all  years,
which  increased  tremendously  in  1986-87.
2.47  Across  the  states,  the  adjustment  for  subsidies  suggests  the
Haryana  wheat  cultivator  is  somewhat  protected  (ESC  - 1.02)  compared  to
wheat  cultivators  in  other  states  for  whom  the  ESC  still  remains  below
unity.
2.48  The  weighted  average  ESC  of rice  under  importable  hypothesis  is
0.87 (average  of 1980-81  to  1986-87),  which  is  much  higher  than  the  NPC
(0.67)  and  EPC  (0.65). Thus,  the  esti;.ated  subsidies  on  non traded  inputs
represented  almost  34%  of value  added  including  non-traded  inputs.
2.49  The  ESC  on rice  is  lower  than  the  ESC  of wheat  (0.93). Punjab
18 The  proportionate  subsidy  can  be derived  by noting  that  ESC  - EPC  +
(Subsidy/VAR  ).- 35 -
Table  2.8:  Efecttve  Subsidy  CoeffLoicnts  of  Rice
--------- _------_-----------------_----------------------------------__------__------------------
States  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Average
------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__------------------
Importable  HypothesLs
Andhra  Pradesh  0.59  0.66  0.98  0.91  0.96  1.04  1.05  0.88
(0.23)  (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.25)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.23)
Bihar  0.57  0.69  1.03  0.88  0.89  0.96  1.00  0.86
(0.19)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (O.A6)  (0.17)  (0.16)
Madhya  Pradash  0.58  0.59  0.97  0.86  0.93  0.95  1.04  0.85
(0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.13)
Orissa  0.56  0.65  1.00  0.84  0.90  0.95  0.98  0.84
(0.15)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.14)
Punjab  0.64  0.71  1.10  1.05  1.07  1.23  1.26  1.01
(0.10)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.13)
Uttar  Pradesh  0.57  0.63  0.93  0.86  1.02  0.96  1.02  0.85
(0.19)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.21)
We thted Aver.g  0.58  0.65  0.99  0.90  0.96  1.01  1.06  0.88
Exportable  Hypothesis
Punjab  0.65  0.77  1.26  1.21  1.30  1.60  1.68  1.21
Note:  Fipures  in  parentheses  are  the value  veights,  whore  rhe values  are  estimated  at  international  references  prices.
rice  under  both the  importable  and  exportable  hypotheses,  appears  to
receive  positive  protection,  which  was  quite  high in 1986-87  (ESC  - 1.26
and  1.68  under  the  two  hypotheses,  respectively).  The  protection  of
Punjab  rice  clearly  reflects  the  high irrigation  subsidy.
2.50  In  the  case  of the  other  states  the  ESC  of rice  remains  below  the
ESC  of wheat;  in the  case  of Punjab  this  ordering  reverses. Rice
cultivators  of the  Punjab  (and  presumably  of Haryana  too)  are  not  only
more  protected  than  the  rice  cultivators  in  other  states  but  also  more
protected  compared  to  wheat  cultivators  in the  Punjab  itself. However,
the  ESC  of Punjab  rice  under  exportable  hypothesis  (1.21)  although  greater
than  unity,  is significantly  lower  than  ESC  of  wheat  (2.01). Again  this
reflects  lower  the  share  of transport  costs  (domestic  and international)- 36 .
and  other  marketing  margins  in the  international  price  of rice,  than  in
case  of  wheat. Since  the  adjustments  pertaining  to transport  costs  and
margins  required  under  exportable  hypothesis  are  different  than  those
under  importable  hypothesis,  protection  coefficients  of  wheat  under  the
exportable  hypothesis  and importable  hypothesis  exhibit  a greater  degree
of  variation  than  that  of rice.
D.  Concluding  Observations  and  Future  Outlook:
2.51  What  do the  estimated  results  of NPCs,  EPCs  and  ESCs  reveal?
What  signals  do they  provide  for  agricultural  price  policy,  trade  policy
and  investment  programmes  within  agriculture,  so that  resources  can  be
allocated  more  efficiently  in  an effort  to  achieve  a rational/desirable
cropping  pattern?
2.52  The  results  suggest  that  wheat  and  rice  cultivators,  on an
average,  have  experienced  disprotection,  (net  'taxation"),  on the  pricing
front  during  1980s,  compared  to  what  would  have  prevailed  under  free
trade. This is  despite  large  subsidies  on  various  inputs. Under  the
importable  hypothesis,  it  may  be recalled  that  the  estimates  of the
weighted  average  NPCs,  EPCs  and  ESCs  for  both  wheat  and  rice,  were  all
below  unity  for  the (average)  seven  year  period  of 1980s  (1980-81  to
1986-87)  (Table  2.9). The  degree  of net  "taxation"  (measured  by the
inverse  of ESCs)  has  been  higher  for  rice  cultivators  (ESC  - 0.87)  than
for  wheat  cultivators  (ESC  - 0.93). Reflecting  the  large  estimated
subsidy  on irrigation,  Haryana  in the  case  of wheat  (ESC  - 1.02)  and
Punjab  in  the  case  of rice  (ESC  - 1.00)  remained  free  from  net
"taxation".  These  results  reflect  the  large  estimated  subsidy  on
irrigation.  These  results  also  suggest  that  Indian  agricultural  price
policy  has  had some  "bias",  not  only  in favour  of  wheat  vis-  -vis rice,
but  also  in favour  of norther  states  of Punjab  and  Haryana.
2.53  Effective  incentives  (ESCs)  in  both  wheat  and  rice  improved
during  1980s  (i.e.  they  moved  closer  to international  levels). However,
domestic  agricultural  price  and  subsidy  policy  with respect  to these  crops
played  little  if  any  role  in  the  improvement,  which  mainly  reflected  a
sharp  decline  in  the  international  prices  of the  commodities,  especially
during  1986  and  1987  see  Table  1.10). The  international  price  of rice  in
1987,  at 1985  constant  dollars,  e.g.,  was  less  thant  half  of  what it  was in
1980s. The improvement  has  been  faster  in  case  of rice,  with  the  ESC
having  gone  up from  0.57  in 1980-81  to  1.04  in 1986-87,  than  in  case  of
wheat,  where  ESC  moved  up from  0.75  to  1.12. Similarly,  wheat  price  had
declined  by about  44%  over  this  period  (Table  2.10).
20 It  may  be noted  that  a similar  conclusion  was  drawn  by Ashok  Mitra
although  though  an entirely  different  approach  of analysis  (see  Ashok
Mitra,  Terms  of  Trade  and  Class  Relations  :  An Essay  in  Political  Economy,
Frank  Cass,  London,  1977).- 37 -
Table  2.9:  Regional  Dispersion  of Effective  Incentives  for  Wheat  &  Rice Cultivators
in  India  (Average  1980-81  to  1986-87)
Crop/Hypothesis/States  NPCs  EPCs  ESCs  Index  of ESCs
(Weighted  Average
- 100)
Wheat (Importable  Hypothesis)
Haryana  0.84  0.79  1.03  110.75
Madhya  Pradesh  0.75  0.73  0.96  103.22
Punjab  0.85  0.80  0.93  100.00
Uttar  Pradesh  0.77  0.73  0.91  97.85
Weighted  Average  0.80  0.75  0.93  100.00
Wheat (Exportable  Hypothesis)
Punjab  1.34  1.71  2.01
Rice (Importable  Hypothesis)
Andhra  Pradesh  0.69  0.66  0.88  100.00
Bihar  0.65  0.64  0.86  97.72
Madhya  Pradesh  0.67  0.65  0.85  96.59
Orissa  0.65  0.63  0.84  95.45
Punjab  0.74  0.72  1.01  114.77
Uttar  Pradesh  0.66  0.64  0.85  96.59
Weighted  Average  0.67  0.65  0.88  100.00
Rice (Exportable  Hypothesis)
Punjab  0.87  0.87  1.21
2.54  Short  term  projections  by the  World  Bank  indicate  that  these
commodity  prices  are  likely  to  remain  at their  present  levels,  at least  up
to 1990,  and  that  even  by 2000  they  will  not  recover  to their  1980
levels. This  would,  imply,  therefore,  that  as the  years  unfold  Indian
wheat  and  rice  cultivators  would  retain  the  level  of effective  incentives
achieved  during  1986-87,  and  might  even  become  more  protected  if  domestic
prices  of these  commodities  are  raised  and  exchange  rate  does  not
depreciate  significantly.- 38  -
Table  2.10,  Temporal  Behaviour  of  Protection  Coefficients  of Wheat  and  Rice  (WeLghted  Average)
._______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Crop /Hypoehesais/Protectlon  CoeffLelent  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Average
------------------------------------------------------------- __---------.-.--__--------------------------------
Wheat (Iqiortable  Hypothesis)
NPCs  0.72  0.73  0.84  0.84  0.76  0.76  0.91  0.80
EPCs  0.67  0.68  0.80  0.80  0.72  0.72  0.89  0.75
ESCs  0.76  0.85  0.99  0.99  0.90  0.90  1.12  0.93
Wheat (Exportable  Hypothesis)
NPCs  1.15  1.09  1.24  1.29  1.27  1.33  1.99  1.34
EPCs  1.29  1.16  1.35  1.47  1.55  1.71  3.44  1.71
ESCs  1.57  1.35  1.57  1.73  1.81  2.00  4.07  2.01
Rice  (Importable  Hypothesis)
NPCs  0.45  0.51  0.75  0.70  0.72  0.78  0.80  0.67
EPCs  0.43  0.48  0.73  0.68  0.70  0.78  0.78  0.65
ESCs  0.58  0.65  0.99  0.90  0.96  1.01  1.06  0.88
Rice  (Exportable  Hypothesis)
NPCs  0.50  0.60  0.94  0.89  0.94  1.09  1.16  0.87
EPCs  0.47  0.57  0.93  0.88  0.95  1.13  1.19  0.87
ESCs  0.65  0.77  1.26  1.21  1.30  1.60  1.68  1.21
Short  Rum ProjectLons  Long  Run
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1995  2000
liJ;rnstional  Price  of  Wheat  1  183  187  161  168  167  173  136  102  109  115  108  133  138
(Constant  S/MT)
International  Price  of  Rice  2  416  461  284  275  255  216  178  176  185  170  171  209  213
(Constant S/MT)
Notes:  1: International  price is  at 1985 constant dollars.  For wheat variety covered is  Canadian No. 1
Western  Red Spring 13.5X, basis in  store Thunder Bay, domestic: from April 1985, St. Lawrence export.
2:  Rice  prices  are  also  at  1985  constant  dollars.  Variety  covered  ls  Thai  white,  milled  5X broken,  government  standard.
export price. FOB Bangkok.
Source: Half Yearly  Revision of ConmodLty Price Forecasts - Jan. 1988, International  Commodity Markets Division
International  Economics  Department,  The  World  Bank.- 39 -
2.55  It  may  be recalled  here that  the  above  results  hold only  when
wheat  and  rice  are  viewed  as importables  and  estimates  of  protection
coefficients  are  derived  at ofricial  exchange  rate. If,  however,  one
attaches  a premium  of say  25%  on foreign  exchange  to  allow  for
over-valuation  of exchange  kate,  and  reworks  the  protection  coefficients,
the  ESCs  so derived  would  turn  out  to  be very  close  to  cost  benefit
indicators  such  as  Domest'c  Resource  Cost  (DRC). The  "adjusted'  ESCs
(adjusted  for  exchange  rate)  would  be  more  depressed  than  the  estimates
derived  above. These  new  results  would  indicate  that  wheat  and  rice  are
efficient  import  substitutes,  and  ceteris  naribus  are  likelv  to remain  so
in  the  coming  years. This  would  imply  that  the  eco.'rmic  rate  of return
(ERR)  on investment  programmes  promoting  production  of these  commodities
would  be high,  so long  they  are  import  substitutes.  ERR  would  be higher
in  case  of rice  than  in the  case  of wheat. Within  rice,  it  would  be
highest  in  backward  states  like  Orissa,  Madhya  Pradesh,  Bihar  and  eastern
Uttar  Pradesh  and  lowest  in  Punjab  (Haryana).  The implications  of these
results  are  very  clear  :  rice  may  be promoted  in  high  rainfall  areas  of
eastern  India  and  less  so in  the  north  western  belt.  In this  context,  the
Special  Rice  Programme  launched  by Government  of India  in the  eastern
states  since  1984-85  deserves  special  mention  as this  would  have  much
higher  ERR  than  rice  programmes  anywhere  else.
2.56  At this  juncture,  the  desirability  of rice  cultivation  in
Punjab-Haryana  belt invites  a comment. It  may  be noted  that
Punjab-Haryana  belt is  primarily  a low  rainfall  region. Since  rice  is a
water  intensive  crop,  irrigation  requirements  are  very  high (about  164
cms/ha). Not  only  is there  is  a sizeable  subsidy  on canal  irrigation  in
these  areas;  electric  tubewells  are  also  subsidized  heavily. The  marginal
cost  of  a new  plant  supplying  electricity  to agricultural  sector  is  quite
high,  perhaps  as much  as Rs.  1.50  per  KWH. Given  the  acute  shortage  of
electricity,  especially  during  peak  seasons,  it  might  be realistic  to
attach  a  premium  to  electricity  process  and  take  its  shadow  price  at about
Rs.  2  per  KWH. On an electric  tubewell  (5  HP)  irrigated  paddy  field,  it
would  consume  about  1230  KWH  of electricity  per  hectare  to  draw  164  cms  of
water. This  amounts  to  a subsidy  of around  Rs.2337  per  hectare  (as  the
revenue  receipt  from  agriculture  in  Punjab  in  1986-87  was  about
Rs.0.l/KWH. Thus,  1230  x 1.90  - 2337). Dividing  it  by an average  yield
of even  50  quintals,  the  electricity  subsidy  on per  quintal  of electric
tubewell  irrigated  rice  would  turn  out  to  be Rs.47,  raising  the2ESC
substantially  and  indicating  a  very  low  ERR  for  tubewell  rice.
21 This is  a very  rough  calculation  to  provide  a feel  of the  magnit-..es
involved. It does  not  take  into  account  the  need  for  vertical  pumping  out
the  water  in  water  logged  areas  of Punjab  that  might  arise  if  rice  is
cultivated.  The  much lower  subsidy  shown  in table  2.6  reflects  a) an
average  stibsidy  per  kwh  of  Rs.  0.4  and  the  averaging  of the  total  subsidy
across  all  rice  production.- 40
2.57  Under  the  exportable  hypothesis,  the  protection  coefficients  of
wheat  (NPCs,  EPCs  and  ESCs)  were  above  one  for  the  1980s  (average  1980-81
to 1986-87). The  ESC  of  wheat,  for  example,  was  2.01,  alt2.ough  in  1986-87
it  had touched  even  4.07.  The  ESC  of rice,  on the  other  hand,  though
greater  than  unity,  was significantly  lower  (1.21). These  results,
therefore,  suggest  that  wheat,  and  to a lesser  extent  rice  are  not
efficient  exportable  commodities,  the  more  so since  1986-87. A direct
implication  of this  for  the  policy  maker  allocating  resources  would  be to
expand  production  of rice  and  wheat  to the  point  they  are  import
substitutes  and  thereafter  keep  a rate  of growth  that  equals  their  demand
profiles. Investment  programs  to  produce  wheat  for  exports  do not  appear
to  be economically  attractive  propositions.  Rice  exports  would  be
efficient  provided  a  premiumq  of 20-25%  were  given  to foreign  exchange
earnings,  international  prices  were  to rebound  and  expansion  takes  place
in  the  high  rainfall  areas.-41-
Annesure I:  Eatisation  of  W(PV  of  Ihoit  flenortable  HNvothesis)
Particulars  Unit  1960-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-81  1985-86  1966-87
1. Price  (fob,  US gulf)  April-June  US $/Mr  162.33  174.6?  161.33  158.67  154.00  139.33  115.67
2.  Freight  $/Kr  53.86  46.42  29.54  30.00  30.00  30.00  25.33
3. Exchange  Rate  (April-June)  IS-Rs  7.84  8.48  9.40  10.01  11.03  12.44  12.51
4.  Price  (C &  F) - (1#2)x(3)/10  Ra/q  169.49  187.48  179.42  188.86  202.95  210.65  176.39
5.  Port  clearance  charges  Rs/q  5.00'  5.00'  7.44  10.18  18.44  20.00'  25.00'
6.  Landed coat  at  port  (4.5)  Rs/q  174.49  192.48  186.86  199.09  221.39  230.65  201.39
7.  Marketing  costs  and traders  margin  Rs/q  7.02  7.80  8.52  9.06  9.12  9.42  9.72
9  ;:  of  yrocureaent  price  (exclud4n4
docestic  transport  cost)
8.  Reference price  for  surplus  States  Ra/q  167.47  184.68  176.34  189.98  212.27  221.23  191.67
(eocluoing  dozestic  transport  cost
(6-7)
9.  All  India  Procurenent  price  of  wheat  Ra/q  117.00  130.00  142.00  151.00  152.00  157.00  162.00
10  Ifarvans  (Krnea.L)
10.  Transport  cost  from Bo2bsy to
Sarnal  (1675  kas)  Ra/q  12.23  14.57  19.09  20.27  20.27  23.45  25.96
11.  Reference price  for  Haryana (8-10)  Ra/q  155.24  170.11  159.25  169.71  192.00  19?.78  165.71
12  XPC  of  wheat (9/11)  0.75  0.76  0.89  0.89  0.79  0.79  0.98
adhya  Pradesh (Bhopal)
13  Transport  cost  from  Ludhiana  to  Ra/q  7.66  9.13  11.97  12.70  12.70  14.70  16.27
Bhopal  (1050  kas)
14  Reference  price  for  MIP  (17+13+7)  Rs/q  168.65  185.52  177.74  189.36  211.71  219.45  201.39
15  NPC  of  wheat (9/14)  0.69  0.70  0.80  0.80  0.72  0.71  0.80
Pun1ab (Ludhifn)
16  Transport coat  from Bombay  to  Rs/q  13.50  16.09  21.09  22.38  22.38  25.90  2C.67
Ludhian  (1850  km*)
17  Reference price  for  Punjab (8-16)  R%/q  153.97  168.59  157.25  167.60  189.89  195.33  163.00
18  Nr  'wheat  (9/17)  0.76  0.77  0.90  0.90  0.80  0.80  0.99
Uttar  Prdesh  (Lucknow)
19  Transport  cost  from  Ludhiana to  Ra/q  5.26  6.26  8.21  8.71  8.71  lO.06  11.16
Lucknow  (720 kas)
20  Referenca  price  for  UP (17+19.7)  Rs/q  166.25  182.65  173.98  185.37  202.72  214.83  183.88
21  KPC  of  wheat (9/20)  0.70  0.71  0.62  0.61  0.73  0.73  0.88
liotes:
1.  *  *  estiated
1.  International  prices  are  of  US Hard *inter  No.  2  variety  and balon;  to  those  months  (April  to  June)  that  correspond  with  the
peak marketin4 suason of  wheat in  India.
2.  Marketin 1 costs  and traders'  argins  (eAcept  transport  cost)  are  eStisaLed  at  6S of  the  proCuresent  price,  which  is  an approxi-
eate  avers 5,t  of  five  years  (1980-81  to  1984-15)1  see Anneaure 10 for  details.
3.  In  estimatin,  ttansport  costs,  it  is  assumed  that  401 of  wheat eoves by  road,  and that  road  transportation  is  about  40:  costlier
than  rail  urar.port.  Thus,  the  ultimate  Lransport  cost  is  1.16  times  thc  rail  coat  of  trau sportation.
4.  For  surplus  states  (Punjab  and  Haryana)  referance  price  is  e&timated  by  deductn  from  the  Landed cost  at  port  the  donestic
transport  cost  and associated  rarketin,;  costs  and traders  r.ra5ins.  wemreas for  deficit  states,  (  Ld.Jh)a  Pr.desh  and  L'ttar
Pradesh),  these costs  are  added an the reference  price  of  the nearest  surplus  state  (ass  teXt  for  reabons).
Sourcess  1.  FAO  Monthly bulletin  of  Statistics  (for  Row  1)
2.  FAO  Trade Year  hook  (for  Row  2)
3.  Rbl Bulletin  (for  Row  3)
4.  }C0 Annual Reoorts  (for  Rowa  5 and 9)ANNEXIIJ'E  2:  NOMIE':AL  PWTECTLON' COE';'FICIC::TS  OF PUJNIJAB  If.'!.A7  (EXPOPTAAil.l  I[Y!POT"ZSIS)
Particulars  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-33  1983-34  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Average
I  fob price at Bombay port (=  fob  S/MT  162.33  174.67  161.33  158.67  154.00  139.33  115.67
Price at US gul )  (April-June)
2  Exchange Rate (April-June)  1$=Rs  7.84  8.48  9.40  10.01  11.03  12.44  12.51
3  fob price at Bombay port  Rs/q  127.27  148.12  151.65  158.83  169.86  173.33  144.70
4.  Port clearance char,es  Rs/q  5.00e  5.00e  7,44  10.18  18.44  20 .00e  25.00e
4t  5  Transport cost from Bombay to  Rs/q  13.50  16.09  21.09  22.38  22.38  25.90  28.67
Ludhiana
6  Harketin, costs &  distribution  Rs/q  7.02  7.80  8.52  9.06  9.12  9.42  9.72
margins Q 6% of procureiment  price
7  Reference price at Ludhiana  Rs/q  101.75  119.23  114.60  117.21  119.92  118.01  81.31
(3-4-5-6)
8  Procurement Price  Rs/q  117.00  130.00  142.00  151.00  152.00  157.00  162.00
9  NPC for Ludhiana wheat farmer  1.15  1.09  1.24  1.29  1.27  1.33  1.99  1.34
For references,  see Anmexure 1.
e - estimated.-43-
Annexure  3: Estimation  of  NPCs  of  Rice  tImportable  lypothesis)
Particular*  Unit  1980-8l  1981-82  1982-83  1983-44  1928-S5  1985-S6  1986-87  Ave.
I  Price  for  (job  Bangkok)  (Occ-Jan)  USS/MlM  447.50  590.25  262.21  278.25  238.00  226.75  210.75
2  Freight  SMwr  21.54  16.56  11.92  12.00  12.00  12.00  10.13
3  Exchanbe  Rate  (Oct-Jan)  IS-90  7.88  9.10  9.74  10.46  12.3'  12.10  13.02
4  Price  (C  d  F)  (Row I  *  Row  2)  Row 3/10  Ra/q  369.60  372.02  266.94  303.60  308.00  2S8.89  287.26
S  Port  clearance  charaes  RS/4  b.00  6.00  S.45  11.56  15.&8  20.00  25.00
6  Landed  cost  at  port  (Row S +  Row 6)  Rs/q  375.60  37S.02  275.39  315.16  323.88  308.69  312.26
,dbhra_PradPeh (Vijsayada)
7  Procurenent  Price  Rv/q  165.50  190.50  201.55  217.30  227.40  235.30  241.60
8  Marketind  costs  and  distrlbucton  Rs/q  9.27  9.52  10.08  10.85  11.37  11.76  12.08
mar5 lns  (L  S:  of  procuresee  price)
9  Transport  cost  froo  Madras  port  to  Re/q  2.85  3.39  4.45  4.72  6.72  5.46  6.04
Vijaywada  (390  kbs)
10  Reference  price  for  A.P.  (6-8-9)  Ro/q  364.48  365.11  260.86  299.58  307.79  291.67  294.14
11  NiPCs for  Andhre Pradesh  Rice  0.45  0.52  0.77  0.72  0.74  0.81  0.82  0.69
farmer  (7/10)
Bihar  (Patna)
12  Procureaent  price  Rn/q  165.50  183.25  194.20  209.35  219.15  226.75  232.90
13  Plarketing  costs  and  distribution  on  Rs/q  8.27,  9.16  9.71  10.47  10.96  11.;34  11.64
ear&ins  (0.05  x  Row 12)
14  Transport  cost  froo  Ludhiana  to  Petna  Rs/q  8.47  10.09  13.22  14.04  14.04  16.24  17.98
(1160  kaa)
15  Refereneo  price  (30+13+14)  Ra/q  371.21  372.79  268.70  308.07  316.77  300.74  303.28
16  PC  for  Bihar  Rice  fareer  (12/15)  0.45  0.51  0.72  0.68  0.69  0.75  0.77  0.65
Madhva Pradesh  (Bhopal)
17  Procuremat  price  Re/q  169.50  187.30  198.10  213.55  223.55  231.30  237.50
1S  Marketing  costs  and  distributlon  Rtaq  8.47  9.36  9.90  10.68  11.18  11.56  11.87
mrgins
19  Trsaa.,ort  cost  frcs  Ludhiana  to  Re/q  7.66  9.14  11.97  12  . 12.70  14.70  16.27
Bhopal  (1050 kaa)
20  Reference  price  (30*18.19)  370.60  372.04  267.64  306.94  315.65  299.42  301.80
21  NPC. for  'Yadhya  Pradesh  RIce  farmer  0.46  0.50  0.74  0.70  0.71  0.77  0.79  0.67
(17/20)
Orlsa  (Bhubneehwar)
22  Procurement  Price  Re/q  166.50  191.25  202.30  219.15  228.30  237.80  244.20
23  Marketing  costs  and  distribution  Rs/4  8.32  9.56  10.11  10.91  11.41  11.-9  12.21
mergine
24 Transport  cost  frog  Vijay-ads  to  Rs/q  6.35  7.57  9.92  10.53  10.53  12.18  13.S8
Shubneshwar  ;870  k"a)
25  Reference  price  (10.23+24)  Rs/q  379.15  352.24  280.99  321.02  329.73  315.74  319.83
26  NPCs for  Orises  Rice  foraer  (22/25)  0.44  0.50  0.72  0.68  0.69  0.75  0.76  0.65
hfrJ&L(Ludhian&)
27.  Procuremnt  price  Rs/q  174.50  193.80  204.85  220.65  230.75  238.70  245.00
28  Yarketing  costs  and  distribution  Re/q  8.72  9.69  10.24  11.03  11.54  11.93  12.25
margins
29  Transport  cost  frog  Calcutta  port  to  Rs/q  12.41  14.79  19.38  20.57  20.57  23.d0  26.35
Ludhlana  (1700  kba)
30  Reference  price  (6-2S-29)  Rs/q  354.47  353.54  245.77  283.56  2;1.77  273.16  273.66
31  YPCs for  Punjab  (27/30:  0.:9  0.55  0.83  0.78  0.79  0.87  0.90  0.74
teri  Prdezsh  (Lucknow)
32  Procuroeant  price  Rs/q  164.50  182.80  193.20  208.05  217.65  225.10  231.05
33  MArketing  costs  snd  distribution  Rs/4  8.22  9.14  9.66  10.40  10.88  11.25  I1.55
sar6ins
34  Transport  cost  frog  Ludhina  to  R,/q  5.26  6.26  8.21  8.71  8.71  10.08  11.16
Lucknow (720  kba)
35  Reference  price  (30.33.34)  Rs/q  367.95  368.94  263.64  302.67  311.36  294.49  296.37
36  "PCe  fOtLUttLrr#desh.(32/35)  1  . 0-45  0.50  0.73  0.69  0.70  0.76  0.78  0.60
Nlotes:
1.  e  . estimated
1.  International  prices  are  of  Thai  (milled)  White S1 broken  variety  and  belong  to  those  months  (October  to  January)  that  corres-
i  pond with  the  peak  marketing  season of  rice  In  India.
2.  !arketing  costs  and traders  margins  (eacept  trensport  cost)  are  estimated  at  57 of  the  procuresnt  price,  which  Is  en epproal-
ate  average  of  5 years (10o-at8  to  1984-85),  see Ansesure  10  for  details.
3.  5  as  footnote  3  l  Annaeure  1.
4.  Putnjb  end  Andhre  Pradesh  are  taken  as  surplus  sttea  and  their  reference  price  to  timated  by  deducting  frog  the  landed  cost
at  port  the  domestic  transport  coat  end  associated  marketin  costs  and  traders  margins.  On  the  otner  hand,  Blhor.  'sihpa
Pradeeh.  Orl  so  end  Uttar  Pradesh  era  treated  as  detfcit  states io  rice.  Rice  is  enased  to  flow  from  Pluoab  to  bliher.  'dlaya
Predesh  ead  Uttar  Pradesh  while  In  case  ot  Orfsee  it  flows  tros  Andhre  Pradesh.  The  reference  prlces  of  rice  for  deticit  staes.
|theretore,  are  worked  out by  eddin,  transport  co0ts  sad  asseclated  margins  In  th  reference  prLce  of  the  aurpius  stte  frto 
where  rice  flow.  to  the  relevant  deficit  stete.Annexure  4:  Nominal  Protection  Coefficients  of  Puniab  Rice  (Exportable  llypothesis)
Particulars  Unit  1980-81  1931-32  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-:
1  fob  price  it  Calcutta  (Oct-Jan)  $/MT  477.50  390.25  262.25  273.25  238.0Q  226.75  210.50
(-  fob price  at Bangkok)
2  Exchange  Rate  (Oct-Jan)  1$=Rs  7.63  9.10  9.74  10.46  12.32  12.10  13.02
3  fob  price  at  Calcutta  (Oct-Jan)  Rs/q  376.27  355.13  255.43  291.05  293.22  274.37  274.07
4  Port  clearance  charges  Rs/q  6. 00e  6.00e  8 . 45e  11.56  15.88  20 . 00e  25.00E
sr
5  Transport  cost  from  Ludhiana  to  Rs/q  12.41  14.79  19.38  20.57  20.57  23.80  26.35
Calcutta  (1700  kms)
6  Marketin4  costs  and  distribution  Rs/q  8.72  9.69  10.24  11.03  11.54  11.93  12.25
margins  (C  5Z  of procurement  price)
7  Reference  price  at  Ludhiana  (3-4-5-6)  Rs/q  349.14  324.65  217.36  247.89  245.23  218.64  210.47
8  Procurement  price  at Ludhiana  Rs/q  174.50  193.80  204.85  220.65  230.75  238.70  245.00
9  NPCs  of Rice  for  Ludhiana  farmer  (8/7)  0.50  0.60  0.94  n  0.94  1.09  1.16
Note: e - estimated
For  References,  see  Annexure  3.Atinexure  5:  Esttnation  of Value  Wet.lhts  of .Theat  (Tmoortable  Hypothesis)
Unit  1980-81  1l8l-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Ave.
Haryana
Production  (w.t.)  3.49  3.68  4.35  4.46  4.42  5.26  5.06
Reference  price  Rs/q  155.24  170.11  159.25  169.71  192.00  197.78  165.71
Value  Rs 10  m.  541.79  626.01  692.74  756.91  848.64  1040.32  838.49
Value veight  0.12  0.13  0.13  0.12  0.12  0.14  0.13  0.12
Hadhya Pradesh
Production  (m.t.)  3.14  3.31  3.80  4.37  3.94  4.13  3.87
Reference  price  Rs/q  168.65  185.52  177.74  189.86  211.71  219.45  201.39
Value  Rs.10  a.  529.56  614.07  675.41  827.50  834.14  906.33  779.38
Value  weight  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.14  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.12
Punlab
Production  (  7.68  8.55  9.16  9.42  10.18  10.99  11.15
Reference  price  Rs/q  153.97  168.59  157.25  167.60  189.89  195.33  163.00
Value  Rs.10  *.  1182.49  1441.45  1440.41 1578.79  1933.08 2146.68  1817.45
Value  weidht  0.26  0.28  0.26  0.26  0.28  0.28  0.28  0.27
Uttar  Pradesh
Production  (m.t.)  13.39  12.75  15.26  16.12  15.68  16.48  16.08
aeference  price  Rs/q  166.25  182.65  173.98  185.37  207.72  214.83  183.88
V.lue  Rs.10  *.  2226.09 2328.79 2654.94  2988.16 3257.0S  3540.40 2956.79
Value  weight  0.50  0.47  0.49  0.48  0.48  0.46  0.47  0.48
Total  value  of  4  states  Rs.100n.  4479.93 5010.31  5463.49  6151.37  6872.91  7633.73 6392.11
Agg.  value  weight  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  i.0O  1.00Annexure  6:  Eritmation  of  Valu Wet  l::hts of Rtce  (TIportable  lvypothesis)
Particulars  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-E5  1985-86  1986-87
Andhra  Pradesh
Production  m.t.  7.01  7.87  7.67  8.79  6.91  7.61  6.74
Referenee  price  Rs/q  364.48  365.11  260.86  299.58  307.79  291.67  294.14
Value  Rs.10  m.  2555.00 2973.41 2000.80  2633.31 2126.83 2219.61 1982.50
Value  veight  0.23  0.26  0.28  0.25  0.21  0.20  0.19
Cihar
Productlon  m.t.  5.64  4.26  3.07  4.97  5.38  6.02  6.01
Reference  price  Rstq  371.21  372.79  268.70  308.07  316.77  300.74  303.28
Value  Rs.10  m.  2093.62  15bu.08  .824.91  1531.11 1704.22 1810.45 1822.71
Value  weight  0.19  3.15  0.12  0.14  0.17  0.16  0.17
Madhya  Pradesh
Production  m.t.  4.05  3.83  3.45  4.80  3.76  5.42  4.27
Reference  price  Rs/q  370.60  372.04  267.64  306.94  315.65  299.42  301.80
Value  RsA.10  m.  1500.93  1424.91  923.36  1473.31 1186.84 1622.86 1298.69
Value  weight  0.14  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.12  0.14  0.12
Orissa
Production  m.t.  4.30  3.85  2.99  5.12  4.17  5.23  4.83
Reference  price  Rs/q  379.15  382.24  280.89  321.02  329.73  315.74  319.83
Value  Rs.10  m.  1630.34  1471.67  839.86  1643.62  1374.97 1651.32 1544.78
Value  weight  0.15  0.1.  0.12  0.15  0.14  0.15  0.15
Puniab
Production  m.t.  3.22  3.75  4.15  4.54  5.05  5.45  6.02
Reference  price  Rs/q  354.47  353.54  245.77  283.56  291.77  273.16  273.66
Value
Value  Rs.10  m.  1141.39  1325.77  1019.94  1287.36  1473.44  1488.72  1647.43
Value weight  0.10  0.13  0.14  0.13  0.14  0.13  0.16
Uttar  Pradesh
Production  m.t.  5.57  5.90  5.65  6.78  7.16  8.31  7.26
Reference price  Rs/q  367.95  368.94  263.44  302.67  311.36  294.49  296.37
Value  RJ.10  m.  2049.48  2176.75  1489.57  2052.10  2229.34  2447.21  2151.65
Value weight  0.19  0.20  0.21  0.19  0.22  0.22  0.21
Total  of  above  six  states
Production  m.t.  29.79  29.46  26.98  35.00  32.43  38.04  29.11
Value  Rs. loM.  10970.76  10860.54  7098.44  10620.81  10095.64  11240.17  10437.76
Value weight  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00Annexure  7:  Procurement  Prices  of  Vheat  (FAO)  and  R.ice  (Common)  Selected  States
(Rs/iuintal)
States  'Marketing  Years
1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87
RICE
Andhra  Pradesh  165.50  190.50  201.55  517.30  227.40  235.30  241.60
Bihar  165.50  183.25  194.20  209.35  219.15  226.75  232.80
Haryana  175.25  194.70  205.85  221.75  233.90  241.90  248.30
Madhya  Pradesh  169.50  187.30  198.10  213.55  223.55  231.30  237.50
Orissa  166.50  191.25  202.30  218.15  228.30  237.80  244.20
Punjab  174.50  193.80  204.85  220.65  230.75  233.70  245.00
Uttar  Pradesh  164.50  182.S0  193.20  208.05  217.65  225.10  231.05
WHEAT
Same  for  all  States  117.00  130.00  142.00  151.00  152.00  157.00  162.00
Source:  FCI  Annual  R!eports  (Various  years)-48-
AN1NEXURE  8:  APPROXIMATE  RAIL  DISTANCE
From  To  Distance
(K'ms)
Bombay  Port  Bhopal  (tI.P.)  880
(Maharashtra)
-do-  Lucknow  (U.P.)  1375
-do-  :arnal  (Ilaryana)  1675
-do-  Ludhiana  (Punjab)  1850
Calcutta  Port  Bhubneshwar  (Orissa)  410
(West  Bengal)
-do-  Patna  (Bihar)  540
-do-  Lucknow  (U.P.)  980
-do-  Ludhiana  (Punjab)  1700
M-adras  Port  Vijaywada  (A.P.)  390
(Tamil  'adu)
-do-  Bhopal  (M.P.)  1480
Ludhiana  Bhopal  1050
Ludhiana  Lucknow  720
Ludhiana  Patna  1160
Ludhiana  Vijaywada  2070
Vijaywaed  Bhubneshwar  870A'NEXUR¶ 9:  FREIf'ThT  RATE  S FO" F0OlECR.'ENS
(Rs/'-r  I'mi)
1930-81  1981-82  1982-33  1933-84  1934-85 1985-86  1986-87
1  Railway  frei 0ht (revised)  for  foodgrains  0.063  0.075  0.098  0.104  0.104  0.121  0.134
2  Railway  & Road  weighted  frei8ht  catc  0.073  0.087  0.114  0.121  0.121  0.140  0.155
Notes:  1.  Railway  freights  acLually  are telescopi.c  in  nature  and tai,er-down  with the increase  in  distance. lHowever,
in this study, they are Lak-en  as  flat rates per MT Vin,  based  on the freight  revenue  and total  distance
covered.  It  means these  are basically  v;eighted  avera6e  (ex-post)  frei 6ht rates.
2.  For row-2,  it is assumned  that 40' ef  rauw  moves by road  and that  the road  transportation  is 40c  costlier
than the rail transportation.  t  provides rail and road weiQjtted  freidht  rate as 1.16 times the rail
freight rate. (There is  admittedly  scope of further researcht  and fir.Aina  up this estimate. It is hot
undertalken  here due to constraints  of time  and resources).
Source:  Annual  Report  and Accounts,  Indian  Railways,  Hinistry  of "ailways,  Covernment  of India.Annexure  10: HarketinR  Costs  (excluding  transport  costs)  and  Distribution  "argins
States  1980-81  1981-32  19G32-83  19,23-54  1984-SS  Average
RICE
Andhra  Pradesh  9.96  10.71  11.05  11.52  12.32
(6.02)  (5.62)  (5.43)  (5.30)  (5.64)  5.61
Bihai  9.96  10.50  10.83  11.23  11.57
(6.02)  (5.73)  (5.58)  (5.39)  (5.28)  5.60
Hadhya  Pradesh  10.08  1v).62  10.94  11.40  11.71
(5.95)  (5.67)  (5.52)  (5.34)  (5.24)  5.54
Orissa  10.00  10.74  11.07  11.54  11.35
(6.00)  (5.62)  (5.47)  (5.29)  (5.19)  5.51
Punjab  11.23  11.81  11.15  11.62  12.92
(6.43)  (6.09)  (5.44)  (5.27)  (5.60)  5.77
un
Uttar  Pradesh  9.93  10.48  10.30  11.24  11.53
(6.04).  (5.73)  (5.59)  (5.40)  (5.30)  5.61
WHEAT
Same  as f'r  all  States  8.51  8.90  9.26  9.53  9.56
(7.27)  (6.85)  (6.52)  (6.31)  (6.29)  6.65
Notes:
1.  M1arketini  costs  and  distribution  mar:ins  consist  of interest  cost,  handling  expenses,  storage  charges,  esta-
blishment  charges,  distribution  margin  of the  wholesaler  and  miscellaneous  expenses  arising  out of transi;
and storabe  losses.  Althou8n  these  components  differ  from  state  to state  and  season  to  season  for  wheat  and
rice,  no firm  estimotes  are available  for  different  regions  especially  for  the  1930s.  'towever,  a review  of
some  empirical  studies  (IJAE.  July-September  1985,  and FCI Annual  Reports)  r.-..ls  that  a major  chunk in
the  marketing/distribution  cost is that  of interest  and freight  (above  ;  !.  Freight  is treated  separately
and is not included  here  because  it will depend  upon the  distance  covezed  by fcodgr:ai  . while  moving  from
one state to another.  Interest  is calculated  for two  months  at the rate  of 13 per  cent  on the  procurernent
price of the grain.  Hlandling  expenses,  storage  charges,  establishmenit  charges,  wholesaler's  distribution
margin  and miscellaneous  expenses,  all are estimated  at the  rate  of Pe.  1 per  (iLiintal  each.  These  expenses
are added  to interest  cost  derived  earlier.  Resulting  set  of figures  indicating  ayproximate  marketing  costs
(excluding  transport  cost)  and  distribution  margins,  appears  in  Aiinexure  10.
2.  Figures  in parentheses  arc percentages  to their  respective  procurement  prices.  Thc  figures  used  in  this  paper
are  6.  for  whieat  and  5'  for  rice.-51-
Annexure  11: Input  Structure  of  W.heat  (Average  of  1981-S2  to  1983-84)
Cost  Inputs  liaryana  Mladhya  Punjab  Uttar
Prsdesh  Pradesh
Operational  Cost  66.95  53.82  60.70  67.58
Human  Labour  16.80  13.89  14.64  16.47
Bullock  Labour  7.81  10.92  3.00  13.S7
Mlachine  Labour  10.54  2.44  12.37  7.42
Seed  7.84  1O.oO  4.57  6.51
Fertilisers  13.42  7.40  19.36  13.o63
Manure  0.16  0.37  0.36  1.36
Insecticide  1.27  0.01  1.55  0.04
Irri6ation  charges  7.45  6.53  3.02  6.47
Interest  on  workina  capital  1.72  1.43  1.66  1.72
,Iiscellaneous  - - 0.18  -
Fixed  Cost  33.50  46.18  39.30  32.42
Rental  value  of  ow:ned  land  21.0S  33.07  23.29  21.75
Rent  paid  for  leased  in  land  1.25  0.16  5.67  0.°S
Land  revenue,  cessesItaxes  0.25  0.31  0.09  0.38
Depreciation  on  imaplements  and
farm  b4ildings  1.70  4.22  1.82  2.22
Interest  on  fixed  capital  8.77  8.40  8.44  7.16
Total  cost  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
(Rs/ha)  (3790.08)  (2977.88)  (4057.98)  (3631.87)
Cost  C2/q (Rs/q)  132.75  134.95  127.26  134.27
Procurement  price  (Rs/q)  148.33  148.33  148.33  145.33
Notes: 1. It may  be remarkted  that  machine  labour  includes  operating  expenses  (fuel,
lubricants  etc),  interest  and  depreciation  of farr.  machinery  like  tractors,
threshers  etc.
2.  The  operating  costs,  depreciation  and  interest  of  irrigation  pum,p,  however,
caes under the input  item 'Irrigation  charges'.  Since this item also
i :ludes  electricity  or canal  charges  paid  on account  of irri;ation,  the
cc t  of  pump  couldn't  be  separated  out  as  tradeable  input.
3.  The cost items  interest  on fixed  capital  and Depreciation  on implements
and  'arm  buildings,  primarily  relate  to  nori-tradeable  inputs  like  buildings
on zhe  farm  etc.
4.  M1achine  labour  in  this  study  has  been  approxinated  only  by  tractors.
Source:  _omzrehensive  ScheIme  for the Study  of Cost of Cultivation  of Principal
CroDs  in India,  Directorate  of Economics  and Statistics,  Mlinistry  of
Abriculture,  Governrment  of India.-52-
Annexure  12: Input  Structure  of  Paddy  (Average  of  1981-82  to  1983-84)
Cost  items  Andhra  Bihor  Mladhya  Orissa  Punjab  llttar
Pradesh  Pradesh  Pradesh
Operational  Cost  65.47  51.51  57.39  61.03  63.87  63.25-
Human  Labour  25.53  24.S5  22.93  29.20  20.09  26.42
Bullock  Labour  7.16  13.36  15.91  14.52  2.26  13.76
Machine  Lebour  2.65  0.11  0.10  0.02  6.67  1.63
Seed  3.37  4.24  8.54  6.54  2.19  5.62
Fertilisers  15.24  4.,7  5.72  3.44  15.41  8.07
Manure  4.12  1.04  2.42  5.02  1.46  2.41
Insecticide  1.81  0.02  0.33  0.28  2.09  0.14
Irrigation  char6es  3.67  0.74  0.16  0;54  11.94  3.72
Interest  on  workin-  capital  1.89  1.19  1.39  1.46  1.74  1.47
Fixed  Cost  34.53  48.49  42.61  38.97  36.13  36.75
Rental  value  of  owned  land  29.05  41.09  - 25.40  23.43  24.41
Rent  *aid  fcr  leased  in  land 0.38  0.26  32.02  7.08  .'60  0.90
Land  revenue,  cesses  &  taxes 0.63  0.88  0.13  0.28  0.06  0.47
Depreciation  on  implements  1.54  1.00  4.31  2.04  1.35  2.51
& farm  buildin-s
Interest  on fixed  capital  3.05  5.23  6.09  4.17  6.69  8.47
Total  cost  100.00 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
(Rs/ha)  (4519.1502569.71)  (1695.90)(2376.25)  (5920.70)  (2851.21)
Cost  C2/q  (?s/q)  125.09 125.25  106.95  115.39  109.50  117.46
Procurement  price  (fls/q) 2C3.12  195.60  199.65  203.90  206.43  194.68
of  R.ice
Notes:  Sauie as  in  ;:tnexure  11.
S'ource:  Comprehens-.ve  Scheme  for  the  Study  of  Cost  of  Cultivation  of  Principal  Crops
in  India,  Directorate  of  Economics  and Statistics,  Ministry  of A-riculture,
Government  of  India.Annexure  13:  Nominal  Protection  Coefficients  of  Fertilisers  (N.  P  and  K)
Particulars  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87
Urea (N)  (46S  Nitrogen)
1.  Landed coat  (C & F)  at  Port  1896  2085  1380  1400  2000  2160  1340
2.  Handling  expevrsesa  to  pool  handling  750  900  900  900  1000  1000  1000 (2)
agencie5
3.  Dealer's  Margin  (3)  105  120  120  130  0  133  130
4.  Domestic  price  2000  2350  2350  2150  2150  2150 (1)  2350
S. NPC for  the  farmer  4/1C+2+3)  0.73  0.c.  0.98  0.88  0.69  0.65  0.95
Di-amontum  Phosphate: P(DAP. 18-46-0)
1.  ianded  Cost  (C & F)  at  Port  2185  2206  2210  2050  2550  2490  2500
2.  Handllng  expenses-  750  900  900  900  1000  1000  1000 (2)
3.-  Dealer's  margin  (3)  125  145  145  190  190  190  190
4. Domestic price  3050  3600  3600  3350  3350  3350 (1)  3600
5.  NPC  for  the  farmer  4/(1+2+3)  1.00  1.11  1.11  1.07  0.90  0.91  0.98
Huriate  of Potash:  Y (601  K2D)
1. Landed  cost  (C  & F)  at  Port  1192  1246  935  1000  1200  1350  1190
2.  Iandling  expenses'  750  900  o?0  900  1000  1000  1000 (2)
3.  Dealer's  Har0in  (3)  80  90  J  95  95  95  95
4.  Domestic price  1100  1300  1.'  '  1200  1200  1200 (1)  1300
5. NPC  for  the  farmer  4/(1+2+3)  0.54  0.58  0.67  0.60  0.52  0.51  0.57
Weighted  Averaae  NPC  of  Fertiliser  0.77  0.82  0.97  0.89  0.72  0.69  0.91
(M.  P  and  K) for  the  farmer
Notes:
*  Pool  handling  charges  basically  consist  of port  handling  and  port  dues,  transit  and  storage  losses,  depot  handling  charges.
finance  charges.  storase  charges,  freight,  inventory  holding  cost.  cost  of bags  anu begging,  administracive  overheads
and  contingencies  etc.
1. These  domestic  prices  are  upto  31.1.1986.
2. Since  1.4.19S6.  Government  introduced  'Tender  System'.  But  we don't  have  any  Information  about  the  ' is  uat were  finally
given  the  contract.  In  view  of this  charges  of  1985-86  are  taken  as th."  L986-87  also.
3.  Dealer's  margin  taken  her'  is  that  of private  dealers.  For  Cooperatives,  it is  generally  a  bit  htigher.
4. Landed  prices  (C S  t) of imported  fertilisers  are calculated  from  Fertiliser  Statistics.  1986-87  (p-1-
70) for  1980-81
and  1981-82;  for  later  years  these  are  receivel  from  )Iinistry  of  Agriculture.
5. Weighted  average  NPCs  are  calculated  by atteching  weights  to NPCs  of N, P and K separately  in the  ratio  of 0.67,  0.22
and  0.11  which  is  the  ratio  of  their  respective  consumption  levels  averaged  over  1980-81  to  1985-S6.
Sources:
1. Department  of  fertilisers.  Hinistry  of Agriculture.  Covernment  of Indla.
2. Fertiliser  Statistics.  Fertiliser  Association  of  India.
3. Fertiliser  Association  of India.  Nev  Delhi.-54-
Annexure  14: NiPCs  of  Tradeable  In2uts  of  Wheat
State/Years  NPCs  of  _  All  Tradeable
Seeds  rertTi  serq  Farm  Inputs
(NPK)  Machinery
(Tractors)
1. Harvana  1980-81  0.75  0.77  1.26  0.92
1981-82  0.76  0.82  1.26  0.95
1982-83  0.89  0.97  1.26  1.04
1983-84  0.89  0.89  1.26  1.0i
19S4-85  0.79  0.72  1.26  0.91
1985-36  0.79  0.69  1.26  0.90
1986-87  0.98  0.91  1.26  1.04
Weighted  (Average  1981-82  to
198?-.84)  7.02  12.01  9.43  28.46
2. !!adhva  Pradesh  1980-81  0.69  0.77  1.26  0.78
1981-82  0.70  0.82  1.26  0.30
1982-S3  0.80  0.97  1.26  0.91
1983-84  0.80  0.89  1.26  0.S8
19S4-85  0.72  0.72  1.26  0.78
1965-56  0.71  0.69  1.26  0.76
1986-87  0.80  0.91  1.26  0.89
Weights  (Ave.  1981-82  to
1983-84  9.82  6.73  2.22  18.77
3. Punjab  1980-81  0.76  0.77  1.26  0.93
1981-62  0.77  0.82  1.26  0.96
1982-83  0.90  0.97  1.26  1.05
1983-E4  0.90  0.89  1.26  1.01
1984-85  0.80  0.72  1.26  0.91
1985-S6  0.80  0.69  1.26  0.89
1986-87  0.99  0.91  1.26  1.03
iWeights  (Ave.  1981-22  to
1933-°4')  3.92  16.61  10.61  31.14
5. Uttar  Pradesh  1980-81  0.70  0.77  1.26  0.88
1981-82  0.71  0.82  1.26  0.91
1982-83  0.82  0.97  1.26  L.kgi
1903-84  0.81  0.89  1.26  0.97
1984-85  0.73  0.72  1.26  0.> o
1985-S6  0.73  0.69  1.25  0.95
1986-87  0.88  0.91  1.26  0.99
Weights (Ave.  1981-82  to
1983-84)  5.91  12.42  6.74  25.07
Four  States  1980-81  0.72  0.77  1.26  0.29
combined  1981-82  0.73  0.82  1.26  0.92
1982-83  0.84  0.97  1.26  1.01
1983-84  0.84  '  0.89  1.26  0.98
1984-85  0.76  0.72  1.26  0.8°
1985-86  0.76  0.69  1.26  0.86
1906-87  0.91  0.91  1.26  1.01
i;eights  (Ave.  1981-32  to
19°3-84)  6.67  11.94  7.25  25.86
'otc:  The  weights  'averabe  of  19,1-E2  to  19"3-°4)  are  tne  percentage  sharu:  of  the
relevant  input's  value  in  the  prccurement  price  of  the  output  (wheat).-55 -
Annexure  15: NPCs  of  Tradeable  Innutr  of  Rice
State/Year_  NPCs  All  Tradeable
Seeds  Fertflisers  Form  Inputs
(NPK  )  Machinery
(Tractors)
1. Andhra  Pradush  1980-81  0.45  0.77  1.26  0.78
_.  1981-82  0.52  0.82  1.26  0.82
1982-83  0,77  0.97  1.26  0.97
1983-84  0,72  0.89  1.26  0.90
1984-85  0.74  0.72  1.26  0.79
1965-86  0.81  0.69  1.26  0.78
1986-87  0.82  0.91  1.26  0.93
Weights  (Ave.  1981-82  to
1983-84  2.07  9.38  1.63  13.08
2.  Bihar  1980-81  0.45  0.77  1.26  0.63
1931-82  0.51  0.82  ;.26  0.68
1982-83  0.72  0.97  1.26  0.85
1983-84  0.6S  0.8')  1.26  0.79
1984-85  0.69  0.72  *  1.26  0.71
1985-86  0.75  0.09  1.26  0.72
1986-R7  0.77  0.1  1.26  0.85
Weights  (Ave.  1981-82  to
1963-84)  2.71  3.18  0.07  5.96
3. Mtadhya  Pradesh  1980-81  0.46  0.77  1.26  0.58
1981-82  0.50  0.82  1.26  0.63
1982-83  0.74  0.97  1.26  0.83
1983-84  0.70  0.89  1.26  0.77
1984-85  0.71  0.72  1.26  0.71
1985-86  0.77  0.69  1.26  0.74
1986-87  0.79  0.91  1.26  0.84
Weights  (Ave.  1981-82  to
1983-84  4.57  3.06  0.05  7.6S
4. Orissa  1990-81  0.44  0.77  l.:6  0.55
1981-82  0.50  0.82  1.26  0.61
1982-8.  0.72  0.97  1.26  0.80
1983-84  0.68  0.89  1.26  0.75
1984-85  0.69  3.72  '.26  0.70
1985-86  0.75  0.69  .26  0.73
1986-87  0.76  0.91  1.26  0.81
Weights  (Ave.  1981-82  to
1983-84  3.70  1.95  0.01  5.66
5. Puniab  1980-81  0.49  0.17  1.26  0.87
1981-82  0.55  0.1i2  1.26  0.91
1982-83  0.83  0.')7  1.26  1.03
19S3-84  0.78  0.39  1.26  0.98
1984-85  0.79  0.72  1.26  0.87
1985-86  0.87  0.69  1.26  0.86
1986-87  0.90  0.91  1.26  1.00
Weights  (Ave.  1981-82  to
1983-84  1.16  8.17  3.54  12.87
6.  Uttar  Pradesh  1980-81  0.45  0.77  1.26  0.70
1961-82  0.50  0.82  1.26  0.74
1962-83  0.73  0.97  1.26  0.91
1983-84  0.69  0.89  1.26  o.e5
1994-85  0.70  0.72  1.26  0.77
1985-86  0.76  0.69  1.26  0.77
1986-87  0.78  0.91  1.26  0.83
Waidhts  (Ave.  1981-62  to  -
1983-84  3.39  *  4.87  0.98  S.24  - A
7. Six  States  1980-S1  0.45  0.77  1.26  0.72
cotbined  19S1-32  0.51  0.82  1.26  0.77
l9e2-83  0.75  0.97  1.26  0.93
1  1983-84  0.70  0.89  1.26  0.87
1984-95  0.77  0.72  1.26  0.79
1985-86  0.78  0.69  1.26  0.78
1986-87  0.80  0.91  1.26  0.91
Weights  (Ave.  1981-82  to
1983-84  2.93  5.10  1.05  9.08
Note:  The  weights  (average  of 1981-82  to  1983-84)  are  the  percentage  shares  of the
relevant  input's  value  in  the  procurement  price  of  the  output.  (Rice).- 56 -
Chapter  3
INDIA :  EFFECTIVE  INCENTIVES  FOR  AGRICULTURE
THE  CASE  OF COTTON
Introduction
3.01  This  chapter  attempts  to  quantify  the  degree  to  which  the
domestic  market  for  Indian  seed-cotton  (kapas)  during  1980s  was dilinked
from  world  markets,  thus  resulting  in  a  deviation  or  "distortion" in
domestic  prices,  compared  to international  prices. These  distortions
reflect  the  outcome  of  numerous  policy  measures  pertaining  to  cotton  that
the  Government  undertakes  from  time  to time. The  measures  range  from
export  quotas  and  the imposition  of  minimum  export  prices  on the  one  hand,
to  domestic  support  price  and  monopoly  procuffement,  on the  other. This
chapter  also  attempts  to  quantify  the  impact  of these  Government  policies
by region  and  variety  of  cotton. To measu-e  these  distortions  in  prices,
this  study  adopts  the  standard  methodology and  estimates  three
different  variants  of protection  coefficients  of seed-cotton  (kapas)  -
Nominal  Protection  Coefficients  (NPCs),  Effective  Protection  Coefficients
(EPGs)  and  Effective  Subsidy  Coefficients  (ESCs). In  conjunction  with the
similar  estimates  for  other  crops.,  this  helps  in  understanding  the
incentive  structure  across  crops  and  regions  in Indian  agriculture. The
effective  incentiveq  are  different  from  what  the  cultivators  actually
receive  in terms  of return  over  cost.  While  the  fariaiers  generally  respond
to  "Return  Over  Cost"  signals,  policy  makers  must go  beyond  "Return  Over
Cost"  estimates  and  measure  effective  incentives;  where  foreign  trade  is
viewed  as  a transformation  frontier  offering  an  opportunity  to  allocate
resources  more  efficiently. Besides,  these  estimates  can  act as  crude
proxies for  cost-benefit  indicators  such  as Domestic  Resource  Cest
(DRC)  and thereby  indicate  the  degree  of comparative  advantage  in  the
production  of  various  crops  in  different  regions. Thus,  these  estimates
indicate  the  directions  in  which  domestic  policies,  especially  those
relating  to trade  and  pricing,  deserve  significant  changes  in  order  to
evolve  a  more rational  cropping  pattern  utilizing  scarce  resources  of the
country  more  efficiently.
3.02  The estimates  of  varietal  and  regional-specific  protection
coefficients  obtained  in this  scudy  indicate  a situation  of dis-protection
for  the  Indian  cotton  cultivators.  That  is,  domestic  prices  are  less  than
international  prices. This  is true  whether  the  comparison  is  versus
imports  (prices  compared  at Bombay)  or exports  (prices  compared  at  a
foreign  port,  in  this  case  Japan). These  results  suggest  that  Indian
cotton  is  an efficient  export  crop,  as well  as an  efficient  import
substitute. The  regional  variation  in  effective  incentives  reveals  that
Maharashtra  and Punjab  are  well  above  average  while  Andhra  Pradesh  is  much
below  average. Thus the  degree  of dis-protection  is  greater  for
extra-long  staple  cotton  growers  (MCU-5  in  Andhra  Pradesh)  than  for  the
varieties  grown  in  the  northern  and  western  belts.  This  result  suggests
that  perhaps  the  greatest  opportunity  for  expanding  exports  efficiently
lies  in  stimulating  greater  production  of  the  extra-long  staple  (MCU-5)
variety  of  Andhra  Pradesh.
1 The  word "distortion'  in  this  study  is  used  to  convey  the  meaning  of a
deviation  in  prices  from  what  would  otherwise  prevail  in  absence  of  such
5egulatory  policies,  in  particular  from  international  prices.
See  Chapter  1,  Scandizzo  and  Bruce,  and  Pursell  and  Roger.
Effective  subsidy  coefficients  when  adjusted  for  shadow  price  of foreign
exchange,  are  very  close  to  cost-benefit  indicators.- 57 -
3.03  Section  A of this  chapter  presents  an introductory  note  on
different  aspects  of  cotton  economy  in  India. Section  B estimates
region-specific  NPCs  for  different  varieties  of seed-cotton  (kapas). NPCs
of tradeable  inputs  and  EPCs  of  seed-cotton  (kapas)  are discussed  in
section  C.  Section  D estimates  subsidies  on  non-tradeable  inputs  and
adjusts  them  to  derive  ESCs  of seed-cotton  (kapas). Finally,  section  E
contains  some  concluding  observations  as also  the  future  outlook  of
effective  incentives  for  Indian  cotton  cultivators.
A.  A Brief  Introduction  to  the  Indian  Cotton  Economy:
3.04  India  ranks  first  in  area (22.68%),  fourth  in  production  (10.16%)
and sixty  fourth  in  yield  (with  less  than  half  of the  average  world  yield)
among  the  seventy  eight  countries  that  grow  cotton. 4 During  1984-85  and
1985-86  (average),  India's  share  in  world  cotton  exports  was a  mere 1.3
per cent,  while in  carryover  stocks  its  share  was  about  4.18  per  cent.
3.35  Historically,  India  has  been  an  expor  er of raw  cotton. As early
as 1800  AD, India  exported  150  thousand  bales.  During  the  19th  century
cotton  cultivation  in  India  expanded  rapidly  and  'covered  almost  6 million
hectares  of land  at the  dawn  of the  twentieth  century,  yielding  more  than
3  million  bales  of  cotton  lint. And though  home  consumption  wag rising,
about  two-third  of the  production  still  sought  export  outlets'.  The
Swadeshi  movement  during  early  years  of the  20th  century  stimulated  cotton
cultivation  and,  by the  end  of 1920s,  cotton  covered  an area  of 10  million
hectares. Production  was about  5.5  million  bales,  of  which  almost  two
thirds  was exported. The outbreak  of the  second  World  War reduced  India's
cotton  exports  severely. But  the  final  blow  came  from  partition  of the
country  in  1947,  when  more than  25  per  cent  of the  cotton  acreage,
covering  the  better  part  of the  undivided  India's  cotton  land,  and  nearly
40 per  cent  of the  cotton  production  (most  of  which  of long  and  medium
staple  varieties)  was lost  to  Pakist  In.  India  was left  with  over  98  per
cent  of the  cotton  textile  industry.  This  single  event  converted  India
into  a Pet importer  of  cotton  overnight. During  the  period  1951-52  to
1977-78  India  imported,  on average,  655  thousand  bales  against  average
annual  exports  of 255  thousand  bales. Although  Indian  cotton  experienced
a technological  break-through  in  1968-69  with  the  release  of  Hybrid-4  and
MCU-5  varieties,  the  real  impact  of this  breakthrough  on  exports  was felt
only  from  1978-79  onwards. During  1978-79  to  1987-88,  India  exported  an
average  of 521  thousand  baleg  per  annum,  against  average  imports  of about
48 thousand  bales  per annum.  In  October  1986,  a long  term  cotton
export  policy  was announced,  under  which  the  Government  planned  to  export
600 thousand  bales  annually  for  three  years  beginning  from  1986/87.
However  the 1987  drought  and its  aftermath  reduced  cotton  production,  and
the  government  restricted  exports  to  ensure  domestic  supplies  at favorable
prices  for  the  textile  producers.
3.06  The trading  in  cotton,  both  domestic  and international,  is
subject  .o  several  Government  interventions.  For  example,  the  Government
4 Figures  relate  to  average  of 1984-85  and 1985-86  cotton  year.  Cotton:
World  Statistics,  International  Cotton  Advisory  Committee,  April,  1987.
Madhoo  Pavaskar  (1985): Saga  of the  Cotton  Exchange,  Popular  Prakashan,
Xombay,  p. 3.
7  Op.  cit.  p. 5.
8  01D. cit.  pp. 10-11.
Statement  prepared  by Directorate  of Economics  and  Statistics,  Ministry
of Agriculture,  Government  of India  (August  1988).- 58  -
not  only imposes  quota  restrictions  on the  exports  of  cotton  but  also
stipulates  minimum  export  prices  (MEP). The  Government  releases  the
export  quota  in instalments  over  the  cotton-year.  It also  allocates  the
released  quota  amongst  various  exporting  agencies  like  Cotton  Corporation
of India  (CCI),  Maharashtra  State  Cooperative  Cotton  Growers  Marketing
Federation  (MSCCGMF),  Gujarat  State  Cooperative  Cotton  Federation  (GSCCF),
as  well as  private  traders. For  about  a  decade,  private  trade  was  not
granted  an export  quota  for  long  staple  cotton. It  was  only  in  February
1986,  facing  a glut  in  the  domestic  market  and  in  response  to the  repeated
demands  of  private  trade,  that  the  Government  allowed  private  traders  to
participate  in the  exports  of long  staple  cotton,  subject  to  a minimum
export  prices  fixed  by the  Textile  Commissioner,  a  bank  guarantee  at  the
rate  of Rs.  250  per  bale  and  a time  limit  of  90 days  for  shipment. Even
then  its  share  was  below  20  per  cent  in  long  staple  cotton  export  quota
(see  Annexure  2).  On the  import  front,  the  Government  canalizes  imports
of  cotton  through  its  Cotton  Corporation  of India  (CCI).
3.07  In the  domestic  cotton  market,  Government  iY8ervention  starts
with  the  fixation  of support  prices  for  seed-cotton,  followed  by its
procurement  either  in the  open  markei  by the  CCI,  or on a  monopoly
procurement  basis  as in  Maharashtra.  These  agencies  also  get  raw
Director's  Report,  The  East  India  Cotton  Association  Ltd.,  Indian
Cotton  Annual,  1984-85,  No.  66,  p. 5.  These  conditions  were  relaxed
subsequently  due  to  tough  competition  in the  international  market,  e.g.,
5P  were  reduced,  then  waived;  the  bank  gurantee  was  reduced  to  Rs. 100.
"The Commission  for  Agricultural  Costs  and  Prices  (CACP)  recommends
support  and  international  markets,  etc. Exact  weightage  of these  factors
remains  secret  and  varies  over  time. For  1988-89,  minimum  support  prices
wire  fixed  for  32  varieties  of seed-cotton,  versus  40 for  1986-87  season.
The  CCI,  which  came  into  existence  in  July  1970,  procures  raw  cotton
at market  prices  which  may  be above  or equal  to the  support  prices.
Maharashtra,  however,  follows  monopoly  procurement  (since  1972-73)  and,
therefore,  gets  raw  cotton  from  farmers  at fixed  prices. Till  1985-86
these  were  neither  free  market  prices  not  the  support  prices  announced  by
the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  (or  Textile  Commissioner),  nor  the  prices  paid
by CCI.  Instead,  the  Maharashtra  Government  used  to fix  its  own  cotton
prices  for  the  different  varieties. The  price  fixation  scheme  also  was  a
unique  one. The  Maharashtra  State  Cooperative  Marketing  Federation
(MSCMF)  assured  a guaranteed  price  to  cotton  growers,  80%  of  which  was
paid  to farmers  on their  tendering  of  kapas  to  MSCMF  and  the  balance  at
the  end  of the  season. After  selling  cotton,  cotton-seed  and  cotton
waste,  the  MSCMF  announced  a final  price  based  on the  prices  actually
realised  by MSCMF  from  its  sales. If the  final  price  was  greater  than  the
guaranteed  price,  the  difference  was  paid  to the  growers  as  bonus,  after
deducting  a small  amount  (25%)  for  the  Price  Fluctuation  Fund.  If,  on the
other  hand,  the  guaranteed  price. The loss  was  made  up either  from  Price
Fluctuation  Fund  or from  Government  exchequer,  if  the  Price  Fluctuation
Fund  was  not  sufficient.  In 1985-86  this  scheme  incurred  a  huge loss  of
Rs.  3.5  billion  and  the  Government  of  Maharashtra  set  up a Committee  to
inquire  into  the  resons  which  led  to  such  a situation. From  the  1986-87
season  MSCMF  has  been  given  an extension,  on the  condition  that  its
guranteed  price  will  not  be  higher  than  the  support  price  announced  by
CACP.- 59 -
cotton processed into lint and distribute lint to many textile  mills,
especially those owned by the National Textile Corporation.
3.08  The degree of Central and State Government intervention in the
domestic market is about 30 per cent and in the export market exceeds 80
per cent (see  Annexures 3 and 4).
3.09  There are no zoning/movement  restrictions in cotton marketing.
Futures trading has not been permitted since 1966-67,  despite favourable
recommendations  of the two expert committ  s on the subject  headed by M.L.
Dantwala  in 1966  and  A.M. Rusro  in 1981,  and  the  comfortable  supply
situation during the 1980s  (except in 1987-88,  which was an year of
severe drought).  This is because the Government always has considered
futures trading  as a speculative activity  which did not serve any
worthwhile cause either of the farmers or consumers.  Non-transferable
specific delivery contracts, however, were allowed  with the concurrence of
the Forward Markets Commission.  The duration of delivery period was
restricted to a maximum of three  months from the date of signing the
contract.  The  'otton  Textile Mills also face restrictions regarding the
quantum of cotton (lint) stocks they can keep.  This inventory limit used
to vary between 1 to 3 months' consumption of mills in different regions
of India, related to differentials in their  proximity to major wholesale
cotton markets.  On 17th January, 1986, in  view of the comfortable supply
position, the Textile Commissioner raised the stock limit of cztton lint
by  mills to six months average consumption for all the mills.  Cotton
textile mills as well as trade  had been subjected to Selective Credit
Control by Reserve Bank of India since-1965-66,  with minor modifications
in different years.  It is only in the Policy Statement of April 1986,
that cotton and seed-cotton (kapas)  are exempted from the operation of
Selective Credit Control. 5
3.10  On the production front,  cotton accounts for about 4.6 per cent
of India's gross cropped area, which is the highest amongst all cash
crops.  It follows major £greals like rice (22.75%),  wheat (13.55%),  jowar
(9.15%) and bajra (6.3%).  The total area under cotton has marginally
declined over the last three decades from 8.09 million hectares in 1955-56
to 7.07 million hectares in 1986-87.  Nevertheless,  production increased
from 4.18 million bales (of 170  kgs each) to 7.01  million bales over the
same period (official  statistics)  and is estimated to have exceeded 10
million bales in 1988/89.  This implies that there  has been a significant
rise in productivity over the  period.
;- Pavaskar (1985),  p. 103.
13 Very recently, East India Cotton Association has been permitted
futures trading in four varieties of cotton - H-4, DCH-32, MCU-5 and
Shankar-6, w.e.f. June 1987 (see  Times of India,  May 1, 1987).
14  OR,  cit.  p. 13.
15 Directors' Report, the East India Cotton Association Ltd., Indian
Cotton Annual 1984-85,  p. 7.
16 Figures relate to triennium  ending 1984-85, Source: Directorate of
Economics and Statistics,  Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India.- 60 -
3.11  Across the different states,  Maharashtra accounts for 35.8 per
cent of all-India cotton area  but contributes  only 16.7  per cent to
all-India cotton production, primarily  because of an average yield (79
kgs/ha) which is less than half of the all-India average cotton yield (185
kgs/ha).  On the other hand, Gujarat which accounts for 18.5 per celt of
cotton area, contributes 21.7 per cent to all-India  cotton production.
Andhra Pradesh is next in its contribution to all  1india  cotton production
(13.8%),  very closely followed by Punjab (13.3%).  A remarkable
feature  of Andhra's cotton economy is the phenomenal rate of growth in
cotton production (12.8%  p.a.) during 1967j18 to 1985-86,  primarily
supported by increasing  yields (8.9%  p.a.)  resulting from  a
technological  break-through in extra-long cotton.
3.12  Much of cotton area in India is unirrigated (70.5%).  Punjab and
Haryana have the highest percentage of irrigated  cotton area (97.5  per
cent), with Maharashtra  having only 4.7 per cent.
3.13  India produces a wide range of cotton varieties,  which are
grouped into five categories on the basis of their staple length.  These
are (a) Short Staple (below 19 mm); (b)  Medium Staple (20 mm to 21.5 mm);
(c) Superior  Medium Staple (22m to 24mm); (d)  Long Staple (24.5mm to 26mm)
and (e) Superior  Long Staple (above  27 mm).  The north-western  belt of
India, comprising Pur.jab,  Haryana and Rajasthan, specialises  mainly in
short and medium staple  varieties, while the Southern  and Westery9parts of
India  basically produce long and superior 'ong staple varieties.
3.14  The staplewise  production and consumption  pattern of cotton for
the 1980s are presented in  Annexure 7.  Although production and
consumption figures  are not strictly  comparable, as they are culled out
from different sources, one can observe the changes in the two trends over
time.  Combining short and medium staple in  one category,  waich has low
counts and is used for making inferior  cloth or handloom, one finds that
production has lagged  behind consumption.  On the other hand, in total
superior varieties --  medium, long and superior-long --  there is a
relative surplus.  The Government  has been trying to overcome this
varietal imbalance in demand-supply.  For example, on the 25th June 1982,
the  Government readjusted the excise duty in a way such that the mill
sector is induced to spn  more superior medium and long staple, as well as
to avoid underspinning
17  All these figures relate to the average of 1983-84 to 1985-86, see
Annexure 5.
18  Andhra's growth rate of cotton production during 1977-78 to 1985-86
is even more remarkable (16.2%  p.a.).  (Based  on production figures
released by Directorate of Economics  and Statistics  upto 1983-84 and
Cotton Advisory Board figures for 1984-85 and 1985-86).
19 This classification does not conform exactly to the one adopted in
International standards (see  Annexure 6).
20 (See  CACP Report on Price Policy for Crops Grown in the 1983-84
Season, p. 23).- 61 -
3.15  An interesting  aspect  of Indian  cotton  production  statistics  is
that  the  official  estimates  differ  significantly  from  those  prepared  by
the  trade,  due  to differences  in the  methodology  adopted. There  has  been
a systematic  lower  estimate  in  Gover ent statistics  ranging  from  6.6%  to
35.5%  during  1980s  (See  Annexure  8).  The  Seventh  Plan (1985-90)
assumed  a  base level  production  of 7.5  million  bales  in 1984-85  and  kept  a
target  of 9.5  2million  bales  in 1989-90,  giving  a compound  annual  growth
rate  of 4.8%.  Buc in  1984-85  the  actual  production  of cotton  (as  per
official  statistics)  turned  out  to  be 8.5  million  bales,  while  the  trade
statistics,  which  are  often  considered  more  reliable,  reveals  that  in
1984-85  the  cotton  production  was 10.15  million  bales  and  rose  to 10.70
million  bales  in 1985-86. These  figures  far  exceed  the  target  of the  7th
Plan  set  at 9.5  million  bales  for  1989-90.
B.  Nominal  Protection  Coefficients  of Seed-Cotton  (kapas)
3.16  Following  the  methodology  described  in  chapter  1, the  nominal
protection  coefficient  (NPC)  of seed  cotton,  is  defined  as the  ratio  of
the  domestic  price  of cotton  to  the  comparable  international  reference
price  of the  relevant  variety  and  is  calculated  below  under  two
alternative  hypotheses:  (a)  when  domestic  cotton  is  a substitute  of
foreign  cotton  and  the  two  are  expected  to  compete  at  Bombay  (importable
hypothesis)  and (b)  when domestic  cotton  is  an exportable  commodity  and
competes  with foreign  cotton  at some  foreign  part,  in this  case  Japan
(exportable  hypothesis).  Accordingly,  the  relevant  maritime  freight,
processing,  marketing  costs  and  trading  margins  are  added  to  the
international  price  to derive  the  cif  Bombay  price  for  the  importable
hypothesis  but  subtracted  from  the  international  price  to  derive  the
reference  price  for  the  exportable  hypothesis.
3.17  Before  proceeding  to the  estimation  of NPCs  for  seed-cotton,  a
few  remarks  are in  order. First,  seed-cotton  as such  is  not  imported  or
exported;  rather,  international  trade  is  primarily  in  cotton  lint  and
sometimes  in  cottonseeds,  but  separately.  Thus,  seed-cotton  is  a joint
product  and,  therefore,  estimating  its  NPC amounts  to  calcu.Lation  of NPCs
of  cotton  lint  and  seeds  both.
3.18  Second,  cotton  is  traded  internationally  after  ginning  and
pressing  operations  have  been  carried  out. A precise  estimation  of
protection  coefficients  of seed-cotton  (kapas),  therefore,  also  would
involve  estimation  of the  protection  to the  ginning  and  pressing  industry,
which  needs  to  be adjusted  in  order  to  obtain  precise  measure  of
protection  to  cotton  cultivators.
21 In 1985,  Government  set  up  an expert  committee  to suggest  measures
for  improving  the  quality  of official  estimates.  The  report  has  been
finalised  but  was  not formally  submitted  to  Government  by August  1988.
The  contents  of the  Report  have  not  been released.
22 See  Seventh  Five  Year  Plan,  Vol.  II,  1985-90,  Planning  Commission,
Government  of India,  p. 5.  Also  see  p. 7  for  categorywise  breakup  of
production  targets.
23 The  present  exercise  skips  this  adjustment  for  want  of time  and
resources.- 62
3.19  Third,  a  choice  regarding  the  appropriate  varieties  of cotton
from  domestic  and  international  markets  must  precede  estimation  of  NPCs  of
cotton  so that  the  principie  of "like  is  compared  with  the  like"  is
upheld. The  Annex  to this  chapter  contains  details  of the  selection  of
the  domestic  varieties  and  the  comparable,  foreign  varieties  and  the
calculations  of the  adjustments  for  freight  and  processing  under  the  two
hypotheses.
3.20  The  estimation  of  weighted  NPCs  for  Indian  cotton  under  the
importable  and  exportable  hypotheses  is  carried  out  by attaching  value
weights  to  the  region  and  variety  specific  NPCs  obtained  for  1980s. The
value  weights  are  derived  as the  relative  shares  of  different  varieties  in
total  value  of seed-cotton  processed,  value  being  calculated  at
international  reference  prices  (See  Annexure  20).
3.21  The  resulting  set  of  NPCs (Table  3.1)  indicate  an overall
situation  of disprotection  to Indian  cottons  i.e.  domestic  prices  are
lower  than  external  prices. This  conclusion  is true  under  both  the
importable  and  exportable  hypotheses.  Hence  Indian  cotton  would  be a
highly  efficient  export  but  for  the  barriers  that  delink  the  domestic  and
the  world  market.
3.22  The  degree  of disprotection  is  greatest  in  the  case  of  extra-long
staple  cottons  like  MCU-5  being  grown  in the  southern  belt.  This  is
followed  by J-34/320F/Punjab  American  of the  north  and  then  the  S-4/6  and
H-4  varieties  of  western  parts  of India. During  1981-82,  there  was
marginal  protection  in S-4/6  and  J-34/320F  under  the  importable
hypothesis.  However,  the  disprotection  of  MCU-5  swamped  the  small
protection  to  other  varieties,  making  the  overall  picture  one  of
disprotection  even  in 1981/82. Under  the  exportable  hypothesis,  the
result  that  emerges  is disprotection  for  most  years  (except,  1981/82  and
1985/86). The  seven  year (1980-81  to  1986-87)  average  NPCs  for
Maharashtra  and  Gujarat  do exhibit  positive  protection  under  the
exportable  hypothesis. But  when  Andhra  Pradesh  is  grouped  with  other
three  states,  the  weighted  average  NPC  moves  below  unity  (0.92),
indicating  disprotection  on balance  for  cotton  cultivators  under  the
exportable  hypothesis.- 63 -
Table  3.1:  8ominal  Protoction  Co  fficients  of  Soad-Cotton tKaoasl
ypothesLs/State  Cotton  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Average
---------------------------------------- _--------------------------__--_-----__-------------------------------
Importable  Hypothesis
Mabrashtra  H-4  0.88  0.99  0.89  0.81  0.93  1.31  0.93  0.96
(0.21)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.13)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.18)
Gujarat  Shankar-4  0.93  1.02  0.88  0.80  0.77  0.93  0.87  0.89
(0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.18)  (0.24)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.20)
Punjab  J-34/320F  0.71  1.06  0.85  0.72  0.83  0.80  0.82  0.83
(0.34)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.26)  (0.31)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.32)
Andhra  Pradesh  MCU-5  0.68  0.72  0.71  0.57  0.48  0.55  0.73  0.63
(0.30)  (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.43)  (0.28)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.30)
W.ighted  Average  0.77  0.94  0.82  0.68  0.73  0.86  0.83  0.80
Exportable  Hypothesis
Mahhrahtra  H-4  1.05  1.24  1.00  0.90  1.08  1.60  1.07  1.13
(0.21)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.13)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  0.18
Gujarat  Shankar-4  1.11  1.26  0.99  0.88  0.88  1.10  0.98  1.03
(0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.18)  (0.24)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.02)
Punjab  J-341320F  0.85  1.33  0.99  0.81  0.97  0.95  0.95  0.98
(0.34)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.O )  (0.31)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.32)
Andhra  Pradash  MCU-5  0.73  0.77  0.74  0.59  0.50  0.58  0.76  0.67
(0.30)  (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.43)  (0.28)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.30)
WUehted  Average  0.89  1.13  0.92  0.74  0.83  1.01  0.93  0.92
Note:  Figures  In  parentheses  are  value  veights  at  international  reference  prices  (Sen  Annexure-20).  For
1980-81  and 1981-82  veights used ago  those  of  1982-83:  and  for  1986-87  these  are  of  1985-86,  due  to  lack
of  required  information  for  these  years.
C.  Effective  Protection  Coefficients  (EPCs)
3.23  As shown  in  Chapter  1,  equation  2,  the  Effective  Protection
Coefficient  is  defined  as the  ratio  between  value  added  at domestic  prices
to  value  added  at  world  prices  (reference  prices),  where  value  added  is
estimated  as the  difference  between  value  of output  and  its  traded
(tradeable)  inputs. Hence,  the  estimation  of  NPCs  above  can  be used,  in
conjunction  with  estimates  of the  protection  on imports,  to derive  EPCs
for  seed-cotton.  The  variety  and  region-specific  cost  structures  of64 -
seed-cotton  (kapas)  (Annexure  25)  reveal  that  the  major  tradeable  inputs
are  plant  protection  chemicals  (insecticides  and  pesticides),  fertilizers,
farm  machinery  (machine  labour)  and  seeds. For  farm  machinery  and
fertilizers,  NPCs  are  the  same  as those  derived  in the  previous  chapter
for  wheat  and  rice. For  cotton-seeds  the  NPCs  as estimated  in  Annexures
14  and  15  are  used. Thus,  plant  protection  chemicals  are  the  only
tradeable  input  that  requires  in  depth  analysis. The  Annex  describes  the
methodology  and  the  approach  used  to  calculate  effective  protection  using
the  formula  in  Chapter  1.  The  results  are  summarized  in  Table  3.2.  As the
NPCs  of seed-cotton  are  different  under  the  importable  and  exportable
hypotheses,  separate  estimates  of  EPCs  under  t..e  two  hypotheses  as shown
in  Table  3.2.
Table 3.2:  Effective Protection of Coefficients of Seed-Cotton fKa!2s)
Hypothesis/State  Variety  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86...  1986-87  Average
rmuo-rtabLe  Hyvorhasis
Maharashtra  H-4  0.85  0.96  0.85  0.78  0.91  1.31  0.89  0.93
Gujarat  S-4/6  0.65  0.73  0.60  0.54  0.52  0.65  0.59  0.61
Punjab  J-34132F  0.62  0.97  0.78  0.62  0.74  0.71  0.72  0.74
Andhra  Pradesh  MCU-5  0.57  0.61  0.60  0.51  0.40  0.46  0.62  0.54
Weighted  Average  0.66  0.82  0.71  0.58  0.62  0.74  0.69  0.69
Exportable  Hvoothesis
Maharashtra  H-4  1.03  1.23  0.97  0.87  1.07  1.65  1.04  1.12
Gujarat  S-416  0.82  0.97  0.70  0.61  0.61  0.81  0.66  0.74
Punjab  J-34132F  0.75  1.28  0.89  0.71  0.88  0.86  0.85  0.89
Andhra  Pradesh  MCU-5  0.62  0.66  0.63  0.49  0.41  0.48  0.65  0.56
Weighted  Average  0.78  1.04  0.80  0.62  0.71  0.89  0.79  0.80
Note:  Weights  are th  same  as  Ln  TabLe  3.1.- 65  -
3.24  Table  3.2  suggests  that  the  incentives  to  produce  cotton  are  even
less  than  the  NPCs indicate;  i.e.  EPCs  turn  out to  be lower  than  NPCs  for
relevant  cotton  varieties  in  different  states. This  is  because  the
protection  accorded  tradeable  inputs  is  greater  than  the  nominal
protection  of seed-cotton,  in this  case  seed  cotton  receives  negative
nominal  protection  while  inputs  are  protected.
3.25  The  regional  and  varietal  dispersion  of  average  FPCs,  under  both
the  importable  and  exportable  hypotheses,  !s  fairly  large. For  example,
average  (1980-81  to 1986-87)  EPCs  under  importable  hypothesis  range
between  0.54 for  Andhra  Pradesh  (MCU-5)  to  0.93  for  Maharashtra  (H-4). A
similar  pattern  emerges  under  the  exportable  hypothesis.  This  suggests
distortion  in the  varietywise  pricing  of seed-cotton  (kapas)  in  India.
D.  Effective  Subsidy  Coefficients  (ESCs)
3.26  Variety  and  region-specific  Effective  Subsidy  Coefficients  of
seed-cotton  are  estimated  by adjusting  EPCs  for  subsidies  on non-tradeable
inputs  (irrigation,  electricity  and  credit),  as shown  in  chapter  1,
equation  3.  Subsidies  on irrigation  and  electricity  are  derived  by
estimating  the  difference  between  their  respective  resource  costs  and
revenue  receipts;  the  credit  2gubsidy  is  deemed  to  consist  of interest
subsidy  and  default  subsidy.
3.27  The  estimated  subsidies  (Table  3.3)  exhibit  a  wide  variation
across  states. Punjab  cotton,  for  example,  gets  a subsidy  that  is  almost
four  times  that  of  what  Andhra  Pradesh  cotton  receives. The  difference  is
mainly  due  to the  estimated  irrigation  subsidy,  which  varies  significantly
depending  upon  the  extent  of irrigated  area  under  cotton  in  the  states.
3.28  Taking  into  account  the  subsidies,  one  can  calculate  ESCs  of
seed-cotton  under  the  importable  and  exportable  hypotheses  (Table  3.4).
The  weighted  average  ESCs  are  below  unity  for  all  years  under
consideration  (except  1981-82,  under  the  exportable  hypothesis  only).
Maharashtra  cotton  (H-4)  and  Punjab  cotton  (J-34/320F)  have ESCs  greater
than  unity  under  exportable  hypothesis  (average  1980-81  to 1986-87),  while
long  staple  cotton  of  Andhra  Pradesh  (MCU-5)  has the  lowest  ESCs  under
both the  importable  and  exportable  hypotheses.  The  results  broadly
indicate  that  ESCs,  though  higher  than  EPCs,  still  remain  below  the  NPCs
(weighted  average)  under  both  the  importable  and  exportable  hypotheses.
24  For  greater  details  on statewise  estimation  of subsidies,  see
Gulati. It  may  be  mentioned  here that  allocation  of irrigation  subsidy
across  crops  is  done  on the  basis  of  water  requirement  (so  called  water
weights)  of the  different  crops  while  the  credit  subsidy  is  allocated  on
the  basis  of their  relative  value.- 66 -
TabLa  3.32 Subsidies  on  Non-tradgable  Itwuts  of  Saad-Cotton  (Raoas)
(RJ.  per quintal)
---------------------------------------------------------------- __-----------__---------------------------
States  Cotton  Input  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87
Variety  Subsidy
-------- _----------------------------------------------------__-------_------__-_-------------------------
Maharashtra  9-4  IS  4.65  5.09  5.37  5.77  6.17  6.63  7.10
ES  0.18  0.24  0.33  0.38  0.47  0.58  0.59
CS  13.94  13.13  17.16  17.54  19.83  21.90  21.90
TS  18.77  18.46  22.86  23.69  26.47  29.11  29.59
Gujarat  S-4/6  IS  11.26  12.08  12.95  13.88  14.88  16.97  17.08
ES  0.29  0.14  0.28  0.28  0.43  0.50  0.45
CS  9.33  8.24  11.43  11.37  10.30  16.78  16.78
TS  20.88  41.34  24.66  25.53  25.61  34.25  34.31
Punjab  J-34/320F  IS  39.06  42.05  51.06  86.77  39.48  45.38  41.99
ES  2.62  2.7  3.70  6.38  3.34  4.31  4.13
CS  7.2  8.23  6.76  11.28  9.99  8.25  8.25
TS  48.88  52.98  61.52  104.43  52.81  57.94  54.37
Andhra Pradesh  W";-5  iS  3.06  2.79  2.54  2.31  2.10  1.91  1.74
ES  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.07
CS  12.16  10.38  13.03  13.5  15.56  16.72  16.72
TS  15.26  13.22  15.63  15.88  17.73  18.69  18.53
----------------------------------------------------------------- __----------__---------------------------
*  assumed  to  be  the  same as  that  for  1985-86  due to  lack  of  required  information.
rS - Irrigation Subsidy  ES - Electricity  Subsidy
CS - Credit Subsidy  TS - Total Subsidy
3.29  Subsidies  thus  partially  offset  the  impact  of input  costs  that
exceed  world  market  prices. It  must  be recalled  that  subsidies  affect
different  regions  and farmers  differently,  and  the  use  of the  average
subsidy  calculations  overstates  the  benefit  to  the  marginal  farmer  and
thus  the  impact  of subsidies  on  prices  (para  1.26). Nonetheless,  these
results  have  important  implications,  which  are  discussed  in  the  next
section.- 67  -
Table 3.At  gffectLve  Subsidy Coefficients  of  Seed-Cotton (Kapos)
--------  ------------------------- _-------_---------------__-----------------__------------------------
Hypotheuia/State  Cotton  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Average
Variety
Importable  Hypotheals
Maharashtra  H-4  0.89  1.00  0.89  0.81  0.95  1.39  0.95  0.98
Gujarat  S-4/6  0.70  0.84  0.65  0.58  0.56  0.74  0.65  0.67
Punjab  J-24/320F  0.70  1.11  0.93  0.79  0.83  0.83  0.82  0.86
Andhra  Pradesh  MCU-5  0.59  0.63  0.62  0.53  0.41  0.48  0.63  0.55
WeLghted  Average  0.71  0.90  0.79  0.64  0.67  0.82  0.75  0.75
Exportable  Bypothesis
Keharashtra  H-4  1.07  1.28  1.01  0.91  1.12  1.73  1.10  1.17
Gujarat  S-4/6  0.88  1.11  0.75  0.65  0.66  0.92  0.73  0.81
Punjab  J-34/320F  0.86  1.46  1.07  0.90  1.00  1.01  0.97  1.04
Andhra  Pradesh  MCU-5  0.64  0.68  0.65  0.51  0.43  0.50  0.66  O.58
Weighted  Average  0.84  1.13  0.88  0.69  0.78  0.99  0.86  0.88
------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__---------------------------------
Note:  WeLghts  are  the  same  as  Ln Table  3.1.
E.  Concluding  Remarks  and  Future  Outlook
3.30  Effective  incentives,  as measured  by the  various  protection
coefficients  under  both the  importable  and  exportable  hypotheses,  indicate
that,  Indian  cotton  cultivators  have  experienced  disprotection  or "net
taxation"  on average  during  1980s  (1980-81  to 1986-87). This  situation
has  emerged  as a consequence  of distortions  in the  market  brought  about  by
regulatory  policies  of the  Government,  especially  those  pertaining  to the
pricing  and  trade  of raw-cotton.  The  degree  of "net  taxation"  is  greater
under  the  importable  hypothesis  (weighted  ESC  - 0.75)  than  under
exportable  hypothesis  (weighted  ESC  - 0.88).- 68 -
3.31  Across  states,  incentives  are  dispersed  widely. Maharashtra
cotton  cultivators  received  incentive  levels  30  per  cent  more  than  the
(weighted)  average  incentives  available  co Indian  cotton  cultivators
(Table  3.5). Compared  to  Andhra  Pradesh  (with  ESC  - 0.55),  Maharashtra's
cotton  growers  enjoyed  incentive  levels  that  were  78  per  cent  higher  under
the  importable  hypothesis  and  102  per  cent  higher  under  the  exportable
hypothesis. Such  a wide  difference  across  the  regions  in  effective
incentives.was  mainly  due  to the  monopoly  procurement  scheme  of  MSCMF  with
its  unique  system  of pricing  in  terms  of guaranteed  and  final  prices  (for
details  see  footnote  11).  It  may  be recalled  here  that  this  scheme
resulted  in  huge losses  to  MSCMF  totalling  Rs.  3.5  billion  in a single
year (1985-86).  It is  precisely  in this  very  year  that  Maharashtra  had
the  highest  ESC  of all (1.39  under  the  importable  hypothesis  and  1.73
under  the  exportable  hypothesis).  Clearly,  the  high  protection  extended
to  Maharashtra  cotton  growers  was  at the  expense  of  Covernment  exchequer,
for  which  the  Federation  has  had to face  an  enquiry  committee.
3.32  Temporally,  the  behaviour  of effective  incentives  (weighted
average  ESCs)  follow  an "X"  shape  curve. Under  the  importable  hypothesis
they  start  at  a level  of  0.71  in 1980-81,  suddenly  shoot  up to  0.90 in
1981-82,  gradually  decline  to  0.79  in  1982-83  and  further  to  0.64 in
1983-84. Thereafter  for  two  successive  years  they  improve  to  0.82 in
1985-86  and  then  again  fall  to  0.75,  (Table  3.6). Under  the  exportable
hypothesis,  the  pattern  is  similar,  although  the  level  of effective
incentives  is  higher. On an average,  during  the  1980s,  ESCs  under  both
hypotheses  remained  below  unity,  indicating  that  cotton  is  not  only  an
efficient  import  substitute  but  also  an  efficient  exportable  commodity.
3.33  T..e  delinking  of the  domestic  and  world  market  thus  reduced  the
returns  available  to  producers  of cotton  and  hence  lowered  the  resources
devoted  to  cotton  production,  compared  to  what  would  have  prevailed  under
a more  open  economy. Since  incentives  to  cotton  diverged  more  from  world
market  prices  than  other  "competitiven  crops  (e.g.  wheat,  rice,
groundnuts),  an adjustment  of  relative  prices  would  have increased
efficiency  and  brought  a net  foreign  exchange  benefit  to  the  economy.
3.34  The  foregoing  calculations  do not  take  into  account  any  scarcity
premium for foreign exchange --  they use the official exchange rate.
Allowing  for  a  premium  of say  25 per  cent  on foreign  exchange  would
increase  the  divergence  between  domestic  and  world  prices  and  imply  even
greater  benefits  would  be obtained  from  devoting  more  resources  so  cotton
production.  In  particular,  the  adjusted  ESCs  would  imply  that  investment
programs  to  grow  cotton,  especially  long  staple,  would  yield  a high
economic  rate  of return. In  this  context,  it  may  be mentioned  that  cotton
being  a commercial  crop  would  almost  certainly  respond  to  price  signals
rather  quickly. It  also  has  capacity  to  provide  more  employment  due  to
its  labour  intensive  crop  technology.  What  is therefore  required  is  a
change  in  the  pricing  and/or  trade  policies  relating  to  cotton,  so that
the  extent  of distortions  in  pricing  of raw  cotton  can  be reduced.- 69  -
Table  3.5,  Regional  Qisortsion  of  Effective  Incentives  for  Cotton  Cultivators  lAvr  1980-81  to  1986-87).
------------------------------------------------------.-- _--------__---------__--_---------------------------
Particular*  NPCs  EPC  ESCs  Index  of  Cotton  VarLety
ESCs (weighted  OomstLe  International
(Avl100)
Importable  Sypothesis
Maharashtra  0  0.96  0.93  0.98  130.67  H-4  Mexican
Gujarat  0.89  0.61  0.67  89.33  S-4/6  California  (SM  I  11/8")
Punjab  0.83  0.74  0.86  114.67  J-341320F  Orleans/Texas  Cl")
Andhra  Pradesh  0.63  0.54  0.55  73.33  MCU-5  Giza  67/69181
Weighted Average  0.80  0.69  0.75  100.00
Exportable  Hypntbesis
Maharashtra  1.13  1.12  1.17  132.95  9-4  Mexican
Gujarat  1.03  0.74  0.81  92.04  S-4/6  California  (SM 1  1/8")
Punjab  0.98  0.89  1.04  118.18  J-341320F  Orleans/Texas  (Ci)
kAdhra  Pradesh  0.67  0.56  0.58  65.91  MCU-5  Giza  67/69/81
Weighted  Average  0.92  0.80  0.88  100.00
----------------------------------------------------------------- __----------__--------------------
3.35  To start  with,  a beginning  can  be made  in  case  of superior  long
and  extra-long  staple  cottons  like  MCU-5,  DCH-32  and  Suvin  etc.  In this
context,  the  Government's  decision  to export  600  thousand  bales  from
1986-87  se&son  was  a  welcome  step. Leaving  aside  except'onal  years  like
the  drought  of 1987-88,  when  the  cotton  crop  fails,  the  policy  of
exporting  staple  cotton  should  be followed. Another  welcome  step  on the
part  of  Government  is to  provide  extension  to  MSCMF  on the  condition  that
it  aligns  its  guaranteed  price  to the  support  price  announced  by Central
Government.  Although,  these  recent  changes  in regulatory  policies  are  in
right  direction,  more  is  needed,  especially  on export  front. Coaditions
on the  export-quota,  its  allocation  by the  Government  amongst  various
exporting  agencies,  the  imposition  of the  minimum  export  price  etc.  at
times  become  so stringent  and  suffocating  that  their  ultimate  effect  does
not  percolate  down  to the  cultivators.  Hence,  a more  liberal  set  of
policies  governing  exports  of raw  cotton  is  required,  if cotton
cultivators  are  th  be offered  higher  incentives  and  cotton  is to  become  an
important  export.
25 Incidentally,  promoting  cotton  exports  and  cotton  production  would
contribute  to  edible  oil  production  marginally.  This  is  because  cotton  is
a joint  product  and  any  efforts  to  promote  its  production  also  would
increase  the  supply  of  cottonseeds,  and  thus  edible  cottonseed  oil.- 70 -
Table  3.6 Temooral Bohaviour of Protection Coefficitnts  (Weighted  Average)
Particulars  1980-81  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1986-87  Average
importable  Hypothesis
NPC%  0.77  0.94  0.82  0.68  0.73  0.86  0.83  0.80
EPCs  0.66  0.82  0.71  0.58  0.62  0.74  0.69  0.69
ESCs  0.71  0.90  0.70  0.64  0.67  0.82  0.75  0.75
Exportable  Hypothesis
NPCs  0.89  1.13  0.92  0.74  0.83  1.01  0.93  0.92
EPCs  0.78  1.04  0.80  0.62  0.71  0.89  0.79  0.80
ESC3  0.84  1.13  0.88  0.69  0.78  0.99  0.86  0.88
Short term projection  Long Run
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  19%5  2000
International  price of  196  176  155  184  180  132  89  126  113  105  117  158  153
cotton at 1985 constant
dollars  (cotton  outlook  index
A cif  Liverpool)  (c/Kg)
Source:  Half Yearly  RevisLon  of  CommodLty Price Forecasts - Jan. 1988,  The  World  Bank  (for  international  price
of cotton).
3.36  What is  likely  to  be the  future  scenario? Cotton  prices  in the
world  market  at 1985  constant  dollars,  have  fluctuated.  Sharp  movements
could  affect  the  protection  coefficients  of Indian  cotton. Short-term
projections  by the  World  Bank  (January  1988)  indicate  that  cotton  prices
are  likely  to  remain  depressed  during  1988  to  1990. Although  these  prices
are  likely  to  be higher  than  those  prevailing  during  1986,  they  are  likely
to  be lower  than  1987  prices,  and  significantly  lower  than  those  in  1983.
Even  in the  long  run,  real  world  cotton  prices  are  not  likely  to touch
their  1983-84  levels,  though  they  are  expected  to  be much  higher  than
those  that  are  likely  to  prevail  during  late  1980s. However,  at  no point
in  time  until  2000  AD,  are  world  cotton  prices  are  likely  to  tovch  the
trough  they  fell  into  during  1986. This  forecast  suggests  that  Indian
cotton  is likely  to remain  disprotected  unless  significant  changes  are
undertaken  in  policies  governing  domestic  prices  and  international  trade.
This  is  particularly  true  if  one  allows  for  a premium  on foreign
exchange. In sum,  cotton  is likely  to  remain  an efficient  import
substitute  and,  most  likely,  an efficient  exportable  commodity. Hence  the
economic  rate  of return  on investment  programs  promoting  cotton  production
is  likely  to  remain  high.- 71 -
ANNEX
A.  Comparable  Varieties  of Froeign  Cotton
Four  varieties  are  selected  from  domestic  market,  which  belong  to
different  staple  length  groups  and  are  quite  dominant  in the  important
cotton  growing  tracts  of India: J-34/320F  with  a staple  length  ranging
between  22  mm to 23  mm from  the  north  (Punjab-Haryana  tract);  Hybrid-4  (26
mm to  28  mm) from  Maharashtra,  Shankar-4/6  (29  mm to 31  mm) from  Gujarat
and  MCU-5 (32  mm to 34  mm) from  Andhra  Pradesh. While  Punjab  American
(J-34/320F)  belongs  to the  superior  medium  groups  by Indian  standards,  the
otner  varieties  fall  in  the  superior  long  staple  group  (above  27 mm).
However,  as  per international  classification,  J-34/320F  would  belong  to
medium  staple  group,  H-4  to  medium  long  staple  group  and  S-4/6  and  MCU-5
to  long  staple  group  (see  Annexure  6).
Which  foreign  cotton  varieties  are  comparable  to the  four  Indian
varieties  cited  above? East  India  Cotton  Association  (EICA),  which  is  the
biggest  cottoy  Association  of traders  in  India,  has  a reference  guide  on
this  subject.  According  to  this  guide,  MCU-5  (superior)  which  is
widely  grown  in  Andhra  Pradesh  and  Tamil  Nadu,  has  a staple  length  between
32  mm to 34  mm,  micronaire  3.0  to 3.5  and  spinning  counts  of 50s  to 60s  is
comparable  to  Giza  69/67  and  Sudan  6B.  Depending  upon  the  availability  of
price  series  in the  international  market,  Giza  67/69/81  is  selected  for
comparison  with  MCU-5.
The fact  that  DCH-32,  which  is  considered  superior  to  MCU-5,  is
quoted  much  lower  than  Giza  67/69/81  in  the  international  market
(Liverpool  cotton  services),  sometimes  may  cast  doubts  about  the
reliability  of varietal  comparisons  that  is  made  here.  But  talks  with  the
exporters  revealed  that,  although  qualitatively,  MCU-5  is  comparable  to
Giza  67/69/81,  it  fetches  a lower  price  because  of the  following  reasons:
(a)  European  market  is  relatively  conservative,  especially  in the  use  of
superior  varieties. They  have  been  using  Egyptian  cotton  for  a long  time
and  changing  to  new  varieties  like  Indian  MCU-5,  would  be difficult  and
take  some  time;  (b)  The  above  factor  of  difficult  entry  into  an already
captured  market  becomes  more  important  because  of irregular  and  uncertain
supply  of Indian  superior  cotton  in  the  international  market. Since  the
use  of any  particular  cotton  variety  requires  some  changes/adjustments  in
the  machinery  using  it,  the  user  wants  to  have  a regular  flow  of that
variety  at least  for  a couple  of years,  which  Indian  cotton  exporters
can't  ensure. In  this  regard,  exporters  were  of the  opinion  that  the  long
term  cotton  export  policy  of  October  1986,  which  commits  to  a minimum
export  of 600  thousand  bales  per  annum,  would  be of some  benefits;  (c)
Quite  often  Indian  exporters  can't  keep  up the  delivery  schedule,  which
has affected  adversely  the  demand  and  therefore  the  price  of Indian
superior  cotton;  (d)  Lack  of strict  standardisation  procedure  is  also
responsible  for  its  lower  price. Since  cotton  of the  same  variety  differs
from  state  to state  due  to  differences  in  moisture/agro-climatic  reasons,
1 Introducing  Indian  Cottons:  Higher  Medium  to  Extra  Lone  Staple,  EICA
(undated).  It is  specially  prepared  to introduce  Indian  cottons  to
foreigners  in the  wake  of  emerging  Indian  cotton  exporters. This  booklet
is  revised  in 1986,  deleting  some  varieties  which  have  gone  out  of
cultivation  and inducting  some  new  varieties  which  have  been  permitted  for
exports.- 72 -
any  mixing  of these  distorts  the  true  lustre  of the  fibre  and  thus  lowers
its  acceptability  in  the  international  market;  (e)  domestic  restrictions
of MEP  and  export  quotas,  which  are  released  in instalments  and  remain
uncertain  till  the  last  moment,  and the  shipment  period  of 90 days  from
the  date  of issue  of the  registration  certificate,  all  go  against  the
competitive  strength  of Indian  exports,  which  ultimately  results  in lower
prices  of Indian  superior  cottons  In  relation  to  comparable  foreign
cottons  in international  markets.
The  EICA  guide  compares  Shankar-4  (superior)  which  has  staple
length  of 29 to 31  mm,  micronaire  3.8  to  4.2  and  spinning  counts  44s to
60s  with  California  Acala  SJV,  Elpaso  and  Colombia  Acala. In  this  study
Shanker-4  is  compared  with  California  1 1/8"  being  quoted  in  Liverpool.
On the  other  hand,  H-4 (average)  with staple  length  26 to 28  mm,
micronaire  3.1  to 3.9  and  spinning  counts  34s  to  44s is  compared  with
Mexican  cotton  as appearing  in  Liverpool  quotations.  Finally,
J-34/320F/Punjab  American  with  staple  length  of 22  mm to 23  mm,  micronaire
between  3.5  to  4.3  and  spinning  counts  of 24s  to 28s,  is  compared  with
Orleans/Texas  (1")  middling.
B.  Freight  and  Processing  Adjustments
The first  requirement  NPCs is  the  calculation  of reference  prices
of relevant  foreign  cotton.:  under  importable  and  exportable  hypotheses.
These  are  derived  as follows  :  Cotton  Outlook  (Liverpool  Publication)
contains  cif (Liverpool)  prices  for  various  internationally  significant
varieties  of  cotton. In  comparing  Shankar-4  with  California,  H-4  with
Mexican  and  J-34/320F  and  Orleans/Texas  (1")  Middling,  the  maritime
freight  (Annexure  9) from  North  Europe  to  US South-west  coast  is  aeducted
and the  rreight  from  US south-west  coast  to India  (Bomba. is added  in  cif
(Liverpool)  prices  of foreign  cottons.  This  provides  (Bombay)
price  of relevant  foreign  cottons  for  the  specific  months  that  correspond
to  peak  marketing  periods  of comparable  Indian  growths. From  this  is
deducted  the  domestic  processing,  marketing  costs  and  trading  margins  (as
derived  in  Annexures  10 to  13)  for  different  states,  separately.  These
costs  include  ginning  and  pressing  charges  together  with  the  accompanying
overheads,  market  cess,  purchase  incidentals,  labour  charges,  brokerage,
insurance,  interest  on  capital  deployed,  storage,  transport  (road/rail)
charges  etc. The  rest  is trading  margin.  After  deducting  all  these,
the  resulting  set  af  figures  are  the  lint  values  of importable  cottons  at
region-specific  ginneries.  To  move from  lint  to  seed-cotton  (kapas),  one
requires  similar  information  on  cottonseed.  But  such  information,
especially  on  variety-specific  international  prices  of cotton-seeds,  is
not  available  as international  trading  in  this  commodity  is  very  scanty.
2 In the  case  of  Giza  67/69/81  comparison  with  MCU-5,  maritime  freight
from  North  Europe  to  North  Africa  is  decucted  from  North  Africa  to India
is added.
3 It  may  be observed  in  these  Annexures  that  processing,  marketing  costs
and  trading  margins  as a ratio  of the  value  of cotton  lint  and  seeds  in
1980s  is  comparable  to  what  prevailed  during  sixities  (Pavaskar  and
Radhakrishnan,  1970,  pp.  19-22)  or  during  seventies  (Indian  Merchants
Chamber,  1978,  PAtel  and  Pandey,  1978),  Singh  et al 1979,  pp.  50-51;
Pavaskar,  1981,  pp.  31-43;  Ranade  et al 1982,  pp.  69-73).73 -
However,  we  have the  cottonseed  prices  prevailing  in  US markets  during
the  period  1980-81  to  1985-86. In  order  to  obtain  fob (US  gulf)  price  of
cottonseed,  an  approximate  expenditure  of 3  per  cent  towards  fob  expenses
is  added  in  the  US domestic  price  of cottonseed. Maritime  freight  from
US gulf  to  India  is  assumed  to  be roughly  15  per  cent  higher  than  what
existed  for  wheat (FAO  series)  during  1980s.4 Annexures  14 and  15
provide  details  of  cottonseed  prices. Adjusting  fob  expenses  and
maritime  freight  rates  as applicable  under importable  and exportable
hypotheses,  one obtains  relevant  reference  prices  of cottonseed. Adding
reference  prices  of 100  kgs  of  cotton  lint (variety  and region-specific)
and reference  price  of 190.3  kgs of  cottonseeds,  one  gets  reference  price
of 294  kgs  of seed  cotton  (kaoas),  under  the  assumption  that  lint  ginning
ratio  is 34  per  cent  and  ginning  loss  is  1.3  per  cent.  Divising  domestic
prices  of  variety-specific  seed-cotton  (ka2as)  in  different  regions  by
relevant  reference  prices  of seed-cotton  (kaRas),  the  resulting  figures
obtained  are the  NPCs  of  variety  and  region-specific  seed-cotton  (kagas)
under  importable  and  exportable  hypotheses  (Annexures  16  to 19  and 21 to
24).
The available  information  on imports  and  exports  of  pesticides,
especially  cif and  fob  prices,  is  not  sufficient  enough  to  enable  precise
estimation  of NPCs  of the  particu.ar  insecticides  that  are  used  for
cotton  plant  protection. The  major  pest  attacks  from  which  cotton
cultivation  in Indla  has to  be  protected  is  that  of  pink  bollworm  and/or
spotted  bollworms.  Important  insecticides  to  control  this  pest  are:
Carbaryl,  Eudosulfan,  Phosalone  and  Monocrotophos.  A weighted  average
NPC of  Endosulfan,  Phosalone  and  Monocrotophos  is  derived  for  1983-84  on
the  basis  of the  scanty  information  could  be gathered. The  NPC tu  ns out
to  be 2.7,  which  is  utilised  in this  study  for  1980-81  to 1986-87.
4 This  premium  of 15  per  cent,  which  is  an approximate  figure,  is
assumed  because  (a)  cottonseed  is lighter  and  more  volumino's  compared  to
wheat;  (b)  trading  in  cottonseed  is less  frequent  than  in  wheat  and (c)
cottonseed  trading  is in  smaller  quantities  than  that  of  wheat.  All
these  factors  are  responsible  for  higher  maritime  freight  for  cottonseed
than  for  wheat.
3  nPale  or pink  coloured  caterpillars  damage  squares,  bolls  and
cotton  seeds. It leads  to  premature  shedding  of squares  and  bolls. The
damaged  seed-cotton  (ka2as)  gives  lower  ginning  percentage,  lower  oil
extraction  and inferior  spinning  quality.  (See  Cotton,  The  Fertilizer
Association  of India  (1984),  pp. 89-90).
6 There  is  no information  on  Carbaryl. But  we  do have  some  prices  for
1983  prevailing  in  US domestic  market  for the  other  three  insectidices
(World  Bank). Adding  30%  of those  prices  for  fob  expenses,  insurance  and
freight  from  US to  India,  we have  worked  out  the  approximate  cif  prices
of these  insecticides.  Comparing  these  with  the  corresponding  Indian
domestic  prices  during  1983  (derived  from  DGTD  Report  1982-84),  we
computed  NPCs  of  Endosulfan  (1.85),  Phosalone  (2.63)  and  Monocrotophos
(4.60),  separately. Attaching  approximate  weights  of 0.5,  0.25,  and  0.25
to these  to  account  for  their  relative  use in  cotton  plan  protection,  we
derived  a weighted  NPC  of 2.7  for  insecticides.  This  was cross-checked
from  the  import  data  (Quantity  and  value)  obtained  from  Pesticides
Association  of India  for  the  year  1985-86,  and  domestic  prices  from
National  Organix  Chemical  Industries  Ltd.  and  Rallies  India  Ltd.  The
protection  coefficient  of 2.73  seemed  quite  reasonable.- 74 -
Once  NPCs  of different  tradeable  inputs  are  obtained  (Annexure
26),  their  weighted  NPCs  are  ostimated  by attaching  value  weights  to the
NPCs  of individual  tradeable  inputs. The  value  weights  for  different
tradeable  inputs  (Annexure  27)  are  calculated  as share  of each  such  input
in  domestic  selling  price  of relevant  seed-cotton  (kapas)  variety,
averaged  over  1981-82  to 1983-84. Since  input  cost  structures  for
different  cotton  varieties  in  different  states  (Annexure  25)  differ
significantly  and  since  domestic  selling  prices  of relevant  seed-cotton
varieties  also  differ,  the  resulting  weights  make  NPCs  of all  tradeable
inputs  (together)  significantly  different  across  states. For  example,
while  Maharashtra  has an  average  (1980-81  to 1986-87)  NPC  of 1.34,  Andhra
Pradesh  exhibits  an NPC  as  high  as 2.00  closely  followed  by Gujarat  (1.98)
(Annexure  26). This is  because  both in  Gujarat  and  Andhra  Pradesh,
expenditure  on  plant  protection  chemicals  (insecticides)  is  very  high  and
this  input  has the  highest  protection  coefficient  too. Higher  expenditure
on insecticides  is incurred  presumably  due  to  frequent  pest  attacks  on
cotton  of these  regions  due  to  the  very  agro-climatic  reasons. This
raises  overall  share  of tradeable  inputs  in  domestic  price  of seed-cotton
in these  two  states  (Gujarat  and  Andhra  Pradesh)  much  higher  than  in  other
states.
The  estimated  NPCs  of tradeable  inputs  (Annexure  26)  and  NPCs  of
seed-cotton  (Table  1)  are  plugged-in  to  equation  (2)  of chapter  1 to
calculate  EPCs  of seed-cotton.  It should  be noted  that  NPCs  of
seed-cotton  are  different  under  the  importable  and  exportable  hypotheses
and,  accordingly,  application  of above  equation  would  provide  separate
estimates  of EPCs-under  the  two  hypotheses  as  shown  in  Table  3.2.-75-
Annenure  3.1:  Balance  Sheet  of Cotton  in India
Hundred  thousand  bales  of 170  Kos  each)
Particulars  1980-81  1981-82  1982-8J  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87 Averaoe
.----  - - -------  _. -----  - - ....  -.. .. -. -. -.....................  -----  . ..................................... 
. Estisated  carry  over  or  27.4 . 2.3a  27.20  205.4t  16.00c  28.38d  39.50e  20.02f
last Seotemner
2.  Estisated  crop  production  Iq  77.80  84.00  86.50  75.16 101.50  107.00  S5.O0 90.00
3.  Imports  - 0.50  - - 1.00  - - 3.00
4.  Total  sueply  105.20  106.80 113.70  100.57 118.50  135.83  134.50  113.00
5.  Comsumption  by  Hills  76.80  71.20  75.60  80.06  86.50  86.57  95.00  92.00
6.  Entra-Factory  consumptior.  3.50  4.70  4.70  4.6  4.65  5.1(B)  5.SlI  5.5(B)
(including  Asbar  Charkbia
Surgical  dressinq  factories
and  vaste  spinning  units)
7.  Eiports  7.9a  3.70  6.60  3.57  2.95  4.50  14.47  0.43
8.  Total  off-take  88.20  79.60  86.90  8e.28  94.10  96.17  114.97 97.93
9.  Carry  over  on 31st  Auoust  17.00  27.20  26.80  12.29  24.40  39.66  19.53  15.07
e  :  . adjustment
b  Fiwe-  of C.A.B.  Neeting  held  on 1.10.84
c F1gures  ef C.A.B.  heeting  held  on  20.8.85
d  FiDures  of C.A.8.  fleetina  held  or.  9.1.97
c  *iores  of C.A.B.  fleeting  held  on  17.8.87
f  '-  of C.A.B.  fleetine  nelo  on 1.S.88
q  e  estimates  (Commercial  Product-r.  encludina  domestic  consumption,
(BI  h,  s-Factory  c2usueption
Source:  iirectorate of  Economics  &  Siatistics. finistry of Agriculture.  8overneent  o' India.-76-
Annenure  3.2:  Anencyvise  and  Varietywise  ESoort  Suota Announced  for 1985-86  Season
(No.  of Bales  of 170  los  each)
Eiportino  hoency  Cotton  Variety  Total
Stapie  Pengal  lellow  Soft  hard
Cottor  teshi  Pickings Cotton Cetton
Waste kaste
Cotton  Corporation  of  ind)a  4,50.000  39.00('  5,000  8  4,94,000
IISCIIF  5.23,904  5,23.904
6ujirat  Federation  1,11.000  83.096
(-27,904)
Andhra  Pradesh  20.000  3,435
(-lo.562)
Tasil  ladu  10.000
(-10,000)
Pun  jab  State  Federation  6.000  6,000
Ra.  'han  State  Federation  2.000  2.000
Priv  Trade  2,44.504 20,000  20,000 t  2.84.504
All  A  :s  13.59.408  67.000 25.000  30.000  5 Lakh  Ka  14.26.942  a
(-54.466)
Share  c- yrivate  trade  in  18.74  29.85  80.00  19.94
totli  Ennort  Quota  (Z)
kGtE:
it  '  to be  allocated  between  CCI  ind  private erade.
It ItI wa o be  allocated  between  CCI,  pDtate  trade  and  State  Federations.
a. Esclu  .nq  5 lakh  lgs  of Hard  Cotton  laste.
1. Fioures  in brackets  vith neoative  sinrs indicate  cuota  cancelled/vithdravn/surrendered.  It  has  therefore.
been  eeoucted  in estisating  tota! (net)  nuota  reie.sed.-77-
Aneouie  3.3:  Decree  of  State  Intervention  io Doeestic  Cotton  Ntarketiml
Particular  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1092-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-67  1987-88  Averaae
(P)  (P1
Purchased  by
ISCIF  '000  bales  1278  1516  176i  786  1702  2920  1248  1200  1552
CCI  '000  bales  1179  1056 971  525  669  1574  823  646  930
Sub-total  '000  bales  2457  2572  2734  1311  2371  4494  2071  1846  2482
Production  (Trade
estioates)  '000  bales  7780  8400  8650  7516 10150  10700 9500  9000  8962
Share  of NSCIF  and  CCI
puarchses  in  total
production  31.58  30.62  31.61 17.44 23.36 42.00  21.80 20.51 27.69
Notes:  ISCIF  stauds  for labarashtra  State  Co-operative  earketinq  Federation.
CC5  stanids  for Cotton  Corgoration  of India.
Source:  1. PSCNF
2.  CCI
3. Directorate  of Economics  and  Statistics,  ftinistry  of Agriculture.  6overneent  of India.-78-
ANNEX  3.4  DE6REE  OF  STATE  INTERVENTION  IN  EXPORT  RARKET  OF  COTTON.  1981-82  TO  1984-85
(thousand  bales)
...................  ..................................................  _...........................
Ezporting  Agencies  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  Average
..-  -------  - ----  - ---  - - - ------  _._  .......... _.
C.C.I.  46.42 273.60 113.67  80.73  128.60
RSCNF  256.07 339.14  159.62 68.05 205.72
6SCCF  47.41 17.45 21.40 18.88 26.28
APSCiF  - - 0.82  0.20
Private  Trade  15.74  34.55 59.33 11.00 30.15
Total  365.64  664.74  354.02  179.48  390.97
Share  of  Ml &  ISClF
in Total  Eiports(R)  82.73 92.18 77.20 82.89 85.51
Notes CCI  is Cotton  Corporation  of India;  ISClF  is  aIbbarshtra  State  Cooperative
Narketinq  Federation;  6SCCF  is 6ujarat  State  Cooperative  Cotton  Federation;
APSCIF  is Andbra  Pradesb  State  Cooperative  larketing  Federation.
Source:  Indian  Cotton  Annual,  different  Years.  Director's  Reports  of  the  East  India
Cotton  Assocation.  Bobay.-79-
Annei  3.5:  REGIONAL  DIKENSIONS  OF  COTTON  PROIUTION  IN  INDIA
State  Average  1983-84  to 1985-86  Comuound  Growth  Rates  irrigated  area
Prodhctioa  Area  Yield  1967-68  to 1985-86  ()  to total  area
(Percentage  (Percentage  (Ags/Hec.  Prodaction  Yield  unoer  cotton  (l;
sbare)  share) weighted  average  1982-83
RIbarashtra  16.73  35.81  79  1.77  1.68  4.7
Gujarat  21.6?  18.45  200  0.57  1.62  30.9
Panjab  13.25  7.41  304  1.78  i-) 0.82  97.5
tarnataka  8.39  10.96  130  3.19  4.31  10.7
Audibr  Pradesh  13.81  7.19  326  14.51  10.78  5.4
Haryama  7.39  4.62 272  3.82  0.48  97.5
Tamil  ie  6.38  3.05  356  1.16  3.45  3;.2
ladbya  Prades  5.52  7.02  134  0.43  2.08  9.i
Raiasthan  5.93  4.7e 211  5.80  i.l  90.7
Others  0.91  0.71
All  India  100.00  100.00  185  2.56  2.54  .9.5
(8212  tb  (7561  th.hic)
bales  of  170
Eqs  eack)
Note:  If ve  teclude  1983-84,  vhich  vas  an  eiceptionally  bad  year  for Punjab  cotton.  Punjat  *ould  rank  tbird  in
teres  of prodection  and  first in tires of yield.
Source:  Directorate  of Econouics  and  Statistics,  Rinistry  of  A;ricalture.-80-
Annei  3.6:  CATE6ORISATION  OF  DIFFERENT  STAPLE  LEOTH  COTTONS:  INTERNATIONAL
AND  INDIAN  STANDARD  DEFINITIONS
Isternitional  Indian
1. Short  staole  8elov  13/16'  (20.64  mm)  Belov  19  n
2. ledims  staple  13116'  to  1' (20.64  m  tO  25.4  oil  20  of to 21.5  ta
3. Iedium  long  staole  I  1  1/32'  to  13132'  (26.19  to to 27.78  is)  22  to to 24  nm
4. Long  staple  I 1/8' to 1  5/16'  (28.57  to to  33.34  so)  24.5  as  to 26  in
5.  Extra  long  staple  ISt Above  1  3/9' (34.92  at)  Above  27  is
Note:
t  In India  it  .s Superior  lediue  Staple
IS In India  it is Superior  Long  Stiple
i.  For  international  standards  - Cotton:  lorld  Statistics, Bulletin  of the  International
Cotton  Advisory  Committee,  April 1985,  Vol.  38,  No.  7 (MiV)
For  Indian  Standards  - Indian  Cotton  Annual,  1982-83,  East  India  Cotton  Association
Ltd.,  iombay  (p.157)Annenure  3.7: Sta;ievise  Production  and  Consumption  of Cotton,  1980-81  to 1984-85
..................... ..............................  ...................  _.  . ....  -_  ---..  -..  -------------------------
Staple  Lengtb  Staple  Length  YEARS
(mm)  1986-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  Averige
. . ...........  ..  ... _  .....  _... .....  ........  ....... _._._._.__...._._
1. Superior  Long  27  Im  &  above
Productioo  2.13  1.94  1.61  ..38  2.69  1.95
Consumotion  2.48  2.74  2.86  2.90  3.00  2.80
Excess  -0.35  -0.80  -1.25  -1.52  -0.31  -0.85
2. long  24.5  ie to 26  at
Production  0.50 1.11  1.24  1.26  1.38  110
Consumption  0.92  0.68  0.66  0.80 0.80  0.77
Excess  -0.42  0.43  0.5  0.46  0.58 0.33
3. Superior  ledium 22  as to 24  so
Production  3.14  3.40  3.36  2.66  3.13  3.14
Consumption  1.49  1.21  1.44 1.40  1.46 1.40
Excess  1.65  2.19  1.92  1.26  1.67  1.74
4. ledium  20  it  to 21.5  mI
Production  0.58 0.78  0.64 0.60  0.75  0.67
Consumption  2.47  2.16  2.34  2.60  2.40  2.39
Excess  -!.89  -!.38  -1.70  -2.0(  -1.6i  -1.72
5. Short  Delou  19  is
Production  0.66  0.65  0.70  0.49 0.51 0.60
Consumotion  0.30  0.33  0.26  0.39  0.40  0.34
Excess  0.36  0.54  O.44 0.10 0.11 u.2a
6. iotal
Production  7.01  7.88  7.55 6.39  6.46  7.46
Consumotiox  7.68  7.12  7.56  8.o0 8.86  7.66
Excess  -0.67  + 0.76  -0.01  -1.70  -0.40  -0.40
........................  .........................  ...  ---------------  ...  --------  - ------------------------
Source:  1. For  productioa,  Directorate  of  Economics  and  Statistics,  Ninistry  of
Acriculture.  GovernmeRt  oa  India.
2. For  corsumption  (provisional).  Directorate  of Cotton  Develoonent.o  . S  coC  S 
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Anneiure  3.9:  Karitise Freight  Rates  for Cotton
(USO/Quintal 
..........  ...............  ...  ..  ..  ...................
Years  US  Gulf  to
Janan  W.Europe  India
...  ...  ..  . ................................
1980-81  15.91  20.00  22.27
1961-82  10.71  17.23  19.19
1982-83  8.72  10.97  12.21
1983-84  8.86  11.14  12.40
1984-85  8.86  11.14  12.40
1985-86  8.8i  11.14  12.40
1986-87  7.48  9.41  10.47
Notes:
1.  Ue  have  the  actual  freiqht  rate  for cotton  bales  from  US  to  Japan  and  US
to  North  Europe  for  1983-84  (Borld  iank).  These  are  projected  for  other  years
on  the  basis  of freight  rate  indei  nuebers  compiled  froo  freight  rates  for wheat
(lf; Traie  Year  look). Freiqht  rate  froe  US  to  india  is  assumed  to  be  1.4  tiaes
tr.it from  US  to  Japan.  The  freight  rate  from  US  to  Jahan  is  also  assueed
u  ne  equal  to  that  froe  India  to  Jaoan.
:  e have  deliberately  avoided  the  use  of freight  rates  of Snipping
Scrporation  of India  because  (1)  they  are  vell known  to oe  aucn  higher
tnar  international  rates  and  (oi it would  distort  comparability  of  estimates
for  other  comoodities  (wheat  ind  rice)  where  ve have  used  international
rates  (of  FAD).-84-
Anneiure  3.10  :  tabiarashtra:  Processino.  ftarketinn  Costs  and  Trading  iargins  of Cotton  (11-4  4ariety)
..  ..............  .................  _,.................  ..  ...  .......  ...........  .............  ......................  .........................
Particular  Unit  1980-81 1981-8t 1 0E2-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87
1.  Ei-Bombay  priceia  of 8-4  lint  Rs/q  1552.  40b  1402.60b  1353.80c  1672.00c  1551.20t  1277.20c  1595.20c
(December-April)
2.  linus  Sale!  Tai  and  Ottroi  R:/Q  124.19  112.21  100.30  133.76  124.10  102.16  127.62
8  4Z  eicb
3.  Met  price  of h-4  lint  at  Rs/q  1428.21 1290.39 1245.50 1538.24 1427.10 1175.02 1467.58
Bombay  (1-2)
4.  Price  of Cotton-Seed  sold  by Rs/q  212.n4  219.31  212.61  278.98  223.42  204.84  288.0ve
8SCNFd
5.  Vaiee  of 100  kgs  of lint  and
190.3  kgs  of cotton-seed
(assuming  ginning  &  pressing
loss  of 1.3z)  (: 1.903  I
i.o 4 + R'ow  3)  Rs.  1832.86 1707.74 1650.10 2069.14 1852.27 1564.83 2015.64
6.  Final  price  of H-4  Kapas
(seed  cotton)  oaid  by  ISCIF  Rs/a  553.33  464.07  550.09  606.90  496.97o  592.00h 540.00h
7.  Pressino.  marketinq  costs  and
trading  mirqins  in converting
294  kqs  of kapas  into lint  and
Cottonseed  and  sellinq  at
6osbay  (Row  5  - Row  6: 2.94) Rs.  206.07  343.37  32.83  284.85  391.18 409.61i  428.04
Vote-
a.  Ez-  ombay  price  is  inclusive  of (i)  Central/State  sales  tar  and  (ii)  Octroi  payable  at Bombay  (see  Indian  Cottong  Annual,
19'  -86.  P.  56).
b. Reiate  to  h-4  of N,  is staple  length.
c. ieiaie to  i-4  of  27  staple  lenoth  oue  to  non-availability  of  prices  of the  same  staple  length  h-4  coItor.  for  the  entire
period.  excePt  in 1986-87  where  it  is of 28  i.
4.  ierived  or;ce  V'  dhvidinc  the  value  of cottonseed  by  the  ouantut  of cottonseeds  obtained  by  NSCIF  (Source  Indian  Cotton
e. Ptlates  tc Septepere  tc  tarck  (27tr.  Annuai  Report  and  Accounts,  All  India  Lottonseed  Crushers  Association.  p. JO).
f.  The  mmrinec  ratxs cT  5;.  is  taken  from  Incian  Cotton  Annual  1984-85,  pp. 186-189.  19.  195:  vwagsce  of 1.:"  is  cilculated
froo  the  oetaxiec  statements  of 1SCC6h,  averaced  over  1980-81  to 198i-84.  This  is inclusive  of  ttie  moisture  loss.
g. This  final Price  is  lower  than  Guiranteed  price  (Rs.  592/4).  but  still  taken  in this calculation  because  ohiective  is to
find oct  marletir.f  ciCr cther as  :mi:ed exoense:.  In  estimatino  F)PC.  novever.  we  shall take  ouaranteed  Drice  becaise  that
is wIat  the  tarmers  receive  in  case  ftnal  price  is lower  than  guaranteed  orice.
h. Guaranteed  price-  .e'  tc  lacOt  of  snortatior cr.  final  prices.
taken  tle iverace  of  f178;-3i  a 1?6^-57.-85-
Ammenure  3.11:  SOjarat:  Processinq,  farketinl  Costs  and  Tradirg  Narqias  of  Cottoe  (S-4/6  variety)
. ..... _.  _.....  .........  ...............  ,.............................................................  ..  ....
Particulars  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87
_--  ...........  ...................  ...  ..........  ........  . ........  o......  . ...  . ..  ....  . ........
1.  Ex-Rombay  price  of S-4  lint  Rs/q  1780.20  1569.00  1583.40  1841.20  1678.20  1519.40  1805.20
(Superior)  31 it  (Dec-April)
2.  Sales  tai and  Octrci  i  4Z each  Rs/q  142.42 125.52  1.6.67  147.30  134,.26 121.55  144.42
3. Met  price  of 8-4  lint  at  losbay  ks/q  1637.78  1413.48  1456.73  1693.90  1543.94  1397.85  1660.78
(1-2)
4. Price  of Cottonseed  in Bujarat  a  hs/q  212.64 219.31  212.61 279.98  223.42  204.84 288.00
5.  Value  of 100  /gs of lint  and  Rs  2042.43  1860.83  1861.33  2224.80  1969.11  1787.66 220e.84
190.3 [as  of cottonseed  (assuainq
ginning ratio of 34Z  and ginnino  &
pressinq  loss of 1.3%:
(:  1.903  i  Roo  4 , Roo  3)
6. Wbolesale  price of S-4  lanas  Rs/q  572.60  512.00 547.00 646.00  566.20 492.00  593.75
is  6ujarat  (Broach  market)
(lec-April)
7. Processioa.  sarketina costs and  Rs  358.99  355.55  253.15 325.56  304.48 341.18  46.22
tradi3q  marains  in covertinr
294 igs  of kapas into lint  and
cottonseed and  selling at
Bosbay  (Roo  S - kov o i  2.94)
hot  es:
a:  issused  to be the same  as  that in  Raharashtra,  due to absence  of relevant
noformation.  For  other relevant notes and references, see  Annezure
Sobr;-  Reports  of the  Comaission  for Agricultural  Costs &  Prices (CACP)
on Price Policv for [harif Crops  (different years),  CACP,  Ninistry
of  Aqriculture, 8evernment  of l-dia.-86-
Anneiure  3.1.: Punjac: Processing,  harketin; Costs  and  Trading  Marqins  of Cotton  (3-34  variety:
Particulars  Unit  1980-81  1981-02  1982-83  1983-84  1984-e5  1985-66  19Bo-07
1. E:-Combay  price  of J-34 lint  Rs!q  1153.75 3009.00  1044.50  1336.50  1441.75  1097.25  1059.5G
(RG)  (Noveaber-February)
2. Sales  tai and  Octroi f 4* eact  Rs/q  92.30  104.72  83.56  106.92 115.42  87.7B  84.76
3. Net price  of 7-34  lint  (RGi6  s/c  1061.45  1204.28 960.94  1229.58  1327.37  1009.47 974.74
(RoN  I - Rov  2)
4. Price  of cottonseed  in Punjab  a  Rs/q  190.38 221.16 246.14  241.08  284.95 314.75  314.4;
5. Value  of 100 Igs  of lint  and  1423.74  1625.15  1429.34  1688.35  1869.59  1608.44  1573.10
190.3  Iqs  of Cottonseed
(assominq  oinninq ratio of 34Z
and  ginninq  and  :ressinq loss  of
1.3r) (:  1.903; Rou  4 * Rov  3)
6.  Wbolesale  price  of J-34  kapas Rs/q  455.50  493.00 377.75  510.25  512.25 441.25  482.75
in Punjab  (Bbatinda  earketi
(Movesber-February)
7. Processinq,  earketino  costs  and  Rs  84.57  175.73 259.95  188.21  363.57 311.16  153.8!
tradina  uareins  in coavertino
291  Igs of kanai  intk:  and
Cottonseed,  and  sellinc
icabay  (Rov  S  - Row  6  2..74)
bO  tt5:
T  . hese  are calendar  rear  averaoes  (Source:  Statistical Abstract  of Punjaob
or other  relevant  notes  and  references.  see  Annexare-87-
Anneoure  3.13:  Andnra  Pradesh:  Processing.  harketino  Costs  and  Trading  Nirgins  of Cotton  (RCU-5  variety)
Particulars  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  984-85  1985-86  1966-87
..  -----------------------------------------------------------.......  ......  .........  ..  ..........
1. Ei-Bombay  Price of ICU-5  lint  Rsiq  1761.6 1546.4 1644.6  1844.2  1767.6  1638  .102.6
(February-Junel
2.  Sales  tax  aud  Octroi  t 4"  each  Rsiq  140.93  123.71  131.57  147.54  141.41  131.04  168.21
3L  Net  Price  of RCU-5  lint it  RsWC 1620.67  1422.69  1513.03  169S.66  1626.19  1506.96  1934.39
lombay  (1-2)
4.  Price  of Cottonseed  in Andhra  hs/q  212.64  219.31  212.61  278.98  223.42  204.84  288.00
Pradesh/a
S.  Value  of 100  kgs  of  lint  Rs.  202  .32 1840.04  1917.63  2227.56  2051.36  1896.77  2482.45
190.3  kgs  of Cottonseed  (assomina
ginning  ratio  of 34.  and  oinnina
and  pressing  loss  of 1.3t)
C-  1.903  S  Roo  4 + Rou  3)
6.  Iholesale  price  of  hCU-5  kaoas  Rs/a  630.20  590.00  645.00  695.75  635.00  608.00  890.00
(February  to  June)  (Triour  Narket)
-.  Processing,  marketing  costs  and  Rs.  172.53  105.44 t1.33 182.05  184.46  109.25  -134.15/c
trading  margins  in convertina
244  kgs  of kanas  into  lint and
Cottonseed,  and  sellini  it
eGmiay  (Rou  5  - Row  6 t 2.94)
Nctes:
Ia. t;osved  to  be  the  same  as  in hfbarashtra  oue  to lack  of relevant  inforsation.
/b. Ava;lable  price  quotation  of  ICU-5  variety  is that  of Trioar  sarket  (Tamil  Nadu)  and  is  assused  same  for ARndbra  Pradesh
/c. It  .dicates  that  in 1986-87  traders  have  incurred  losses.  For  other  relevant  note  and  references  see  Aineicre.-88-
Anneiure  3.14: Estimation  of  reference orices Icif)  of Cotton-seed  at boebav  (ImDortable  Hypothesis)
....  ,..  ................ ..............  .....  ..  . . . . . . . . . . . ............  .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Particulars  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87
1. Price  of Cottonseed  in US  domestic  I/ton  129.00  86.00  77.00  166.b0  100.00  70.00  67.00  e
earket
2.  Fob  elpenses t  3: of  Row  I  )  /ton  3.87  2.58  2.31  4.98  3.0  Q  2.10  2..01
3.  Ilaritime  qreiqht  trou US  qulf to  V/ton  61.94  53.36  ii.97  34.50  34.50 34.50  29.13
India
4. Cif price  of US  cotton-seed  at  M/ton  194.81 141.96  113.2B 205.48  137.50 106.60  98.14
lombay  (0+2t3)
5. Encbanoe  Rate  (Dec-April)  114Rs  8.15  9.22  9.90  10.70  12.52  12.25  12.91
6.  Reference  price (:cif  price) of  RS/Q  158.77 130.89 112.15 219.86  172.15  130.58  126.70
US  Cotton-seed  at  lotbay  (4  '  5/103
7.  hoeestic  price  of cotton-seed  in  Rs/Q  212.64 219.!  212.61 278.98  223.42 204.84 288.00
labarashtra  (NSCIF)
8.  NPCs  of cottonseeds  (Row  7 /  Row  6)  1.54  1.68  1.90  1.27  1.30  1.57  2.27
"Vxes.
. .;  is  calculated as 1.l5  tiues that of maritime  freight for wheat  (from
US  to lndia). FAO  series, becaase  (ai cotton-seed is  lighter and  more
voiominoos;  (bh  its shipments  are less frequent  and  (c) tnese  shipmenis  are
ir  smaller  ouantities.-89-
Annerure  3.15:  Estimation  ot Reference  Prices  (fob)  of  Cottonseed  at  lombay  (Enportable  Hypothesis)
......  ..........  . _.....  .................................................................  ............ I................................................................
Partliculars  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  i983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-t7
............  ...........................  .......  ........... _.  _.....  _....................
1. Price  of Cottonseed  in US  )/ton  129.00  86.00  77.00  166.00 100.00  70.00  67.0C
dosestic  market
2  Fob  eipensws  i 3  of Ron  I  tIton  3.87  2.58  2.31  ;.98  3.00  2.10  M.01
3.  Naritime  freight fros US  gulf to  S/ton  44.60 31.49  26.92  28.08  29.90  28.32  28.05
Japan  (!  1.15  tiees that  for neat
FAO  series)
4.  Insurance  # 1%  of  fob  price  I/ton  1.33  0.88  0.79 1.71  1.03  0.72  0.69
5. Cif price  of US  Cottonseed  in  W/ton  178.80  120.95  107.02 200.77 13 °3  101.  97.78
Japan  (1+2i3+4)
6. !inus freiqht  and  insurance  fron  l/ton  132.67  88.58  79.31  170.98 103.00  72.10  69.01
Jaian to  Inodia  (:  that from  Us  to
Japan  5-3-4) foo  price  of
cottonseed  at Bombay
7.  Eichanoe  kite (Dec-April)  I1SRs  8.15  9.2  9.90  10.70  12.52  12.25  12.91
C. Fob  price  of cottonseed  at Bombay  Rs/q  108.29  81.67  78.52  182.95  128.96  88.32  89.09
(Reference  price)
Sou!te:  Same  as  in Annexure  14-90-
Asnieore  3.16: labarashtra:  Estisatioc  of PKCs  of  Seed-cotton  (Kapas).  H-4  (lmportable  Hypothesis)
. ..............................................................................................................  ....................................................................................................... 
Particulars  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1384-85  1985-86  1986-87
.......................................................................................................................................
1. Price  of fteiican  Cotton  Lint (1-1
cif North  Europe  (December-Acril)  1/n  211.86  158.35 163.92 192.34  153.33 120.58  145.86
2. Iinus  freiobt from  US  to North  S/a  20.00  17.23  10.97  11.14  11.14  11.14  9.41
Europe
3. Plus  freight fros US  to India  S/a  22.27  19.19  12.21  12.40  12.40  12.4Q  10.47
4. Eoaals  cif price nn  Boabay  t/q  214.13  160.31 165.16 193.60  154.59 121.84  146.92
(lecenber-April)
5. Enchamee  Rate  (December-April)  Is-is  8.15  9.22  9.90  10.70  12.52  12.25  12.91
6. Cif Price  of  Mexican  cotton  lint
it  Bombay  (4:1)  (December-April)  Rsic  1745.16  1478.06  1635.08  2071.52  1935.47  1492.54  1896.74
7. Cif  price  of 190.3  kqs  of cotton-
seed  at lombay  (see  Aaneinre  14)  Rs/kqs  302.14  249.08 213.42 418.39  327.60 248.49 241.11
8. Cit price  of 100  kqs  of Nexican
lint and 190.3  kqs  of iaported
cottonseed  (6+7)  Rs  2047.30  1727.14  1848.50  2489.91  2263.07  1741.03  2137.85
°. Minus  Processino.  Narketing  costs
and  tradina  margins  for 294  kqs
of Xapas  in terms  of lint and  seed
(See  Annesure  10)  Rs/294kgs  206.07 343.37  32.83  284.85  391.18 409.61 428.04
1O.Eauals  value  of 294  kqs  of Hexican
.ias  in laharashtra  (8-9)  Rs/294kos  1841.23  1383.77  1815.67  2205.06  1871.89  1331.42  1709.81
;,ference  price)
II.Fin:l Price  paid  by  NSCIF  to farmers  Rs/q  153.33 464.07 550.09 606.9  592.00t  592t  540t
(496.971
12..UC  of H-4  seed-cotton  (kapas
io,  i  t  i  2.94/Roa  1!O  0.88  0.99  0.89 0.81  0.93  1.31  1.95
(0.78)
Hatt-: t 6uaranteed  Price, Fiqure  in paranthesis  is the  final price.  It may  be noted  that in cases  vmere  final price is lower  than
guaranteed  orice.  farmer  oets  ouaranteed  orice and  the loss is met  by  NSCIF.
Source:  1. Cotton  borld  Statistics. international  Cotton  Advisory  Committee.  lashington  (Various  issues' (for cif price o- Nenican  cotton).
.. FAO  and  orl' Bank  dat. for maritime  freight rates (Annenure  9).
3.  RBI  Bulletin  (llonthly)  for escbanqe  Rates.
4.  Indiar Cotton  Annual,  the East  India  Cotton  Association.  Bombay  (for vorking  out processino.  marketino  costs  and  traoin9  margins
see Annenure  10).-91-
Annenure  l.17:  Gujarat:  Eslisition  of NPCs  of Seed-Cotton  (KIaas),  Snankar-4  (Superior)  Variety  (lmoortable  hypothesis)
Particular  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  198c-8 7
............  ...................  . ..................  ................................  .....  .........  ........  ...........  . ........  .........  .......  .. .
1.  Price  of California  cotton  lint
(SR  I 1/8')  cif. North  Europe
(December-April)  Sic  226.30  170.0: 186.6q  21l.26  168.S2  133.'2 17:.8&
2.  Ilious  fresalt  froa  US  to North
Europe  l20.00  17.23  10.97  11.14  11.14  11.14  9.41
3.  Plus  freight  from  US  to India  )/v  22.27  19.19  12.21  12.40  12.40  12.40  10.47
4.  Equals  cif price  in bombay
(December-April)  i/c  228.57 171.98  187.93 213.52  169.78 134.6E 172.8°.
5.  Eichange  Rate  (December-April)  1IS  s  815  9.22  9.90  10.70  12.52  12.25  12.01
6.  Cif price.  of California  Cotton  lirt
im otA4y  (W45)  Rs/q  1862.84  1585.66  1860.51  2284.66  2125.65  1649.83  2231.88
7.  Cif price  of 190.3  kas  of Cottonseed
at lombay  (see  Anneiure  14)  Rs/190.3  302.14  249.08 213.42  418.39 327.60  248.49 2l41.11
-:qs
8.  Cif price  of 100  kos  of  California
Cotton  lint  and  190.3  kos  of
iAportei  cottonseed  (6+7)  Rs  2164.98  1834.74  2073.93  2703.05  2453.25  1898.32  2472.94
9.  finus  Processing.  Rarketing  Costs
and  Trading  Nargins  tor 294  kgs
of  lagps  in terms  of lint and  seed  Rs/294
tsee  Annexure  11)  kgs  358.99 355.55  253.15  325.56 304.48 341.18  463.22
10.  Ecuals  value  of 294  kgs  of
'aifornia  1apas  in 6ujarat  (8-9)  Rs/294
(1 ference  price)  kgs  1805.99  1479.19  1h20.78  2i77.49  2148.77  1557.14  2009.7,
1!. Wr!osale  price  of Shaekar-4  seed-  Rs/q  572.60 512.00  547.0Q  646.00  566.20  492.00  59."7
12.  NPCs  of Shankar-4  seee-cotton
'tapas)  itob  11i 2.94/kow  10)  ks/q  0.93  1.02  0.88  0.80  0.77 0.93  0.87
Socrte:  1. Sasc  a  ir Anneoure  16.
2. Reports  of the  CACP  on  the  Price  Policy  of  Kharif  Crops,  different  years,  CACP,  finistry of Agriculture,
Bovernoent  of India.-92-
Annenure  3.18:  Puniab  : Estisation  of  NPCs  of  Seec-Cotton  (kapas)  J-A4  variety  (Imoortable  Hypothesis)
......................  .......................  .........  ......  ...........  ............................................. Particulirs  U.1t  930-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87
1. Price  of Orleans/Teias  (W')  $iq  204.3 140.04 144.03  173.55 146.45 156.91 154.59
Cotton  lint,  cif  North  Europe
(November-Febroary)
2.  linus  freight  froe  US  to North  I/q  20  17.23  10.97  11.14  11.14  11.14  9.41
Europe
3. Plus  freight  froe  US  to India  2:.27  19.19  12.21  12.4  12.4  12.4  10.47
4.  Eqeals  cit  orice  in  Bombay  I/q  206.57  142 145.27 174.81 147.71  138.17 125.65
(November-February)
5. Eichanue  Rate  (November-February)  IScRs  8.01  9.14  9.6 10.56  12.52  12.16  13.04
6. Cif price  of Crleans/Teias  cotton  Rsiq  1654.62  1297.88  1845.99  1849.33  1680.15  1638.48
liat  it  lbobay  (4S5)  (Nov-FeIb)
7. Cif price  of  190.3  kqs  of cotton-  Rs/190.3  302.14  249.08  213.42 418.39 327.6 248.49 241.11
seed  at  lombay  (see  Anneiure  14)  Kqs
F, Cif price  of 100  kqs  of Orleans/  is  1956.76  1546.96  1637.07  2264.38  2176.93  1728.64  1879.59
Teiis  cotton  lint  and  190.3  kqs  of
isoorted  cottonseed  (6+7)
. Ninus  Processing,  Harketino  costs  Rsi294  84.57 175.73  259.95 188.21  i63.57 311.16 153.81
ajid  tradinq  margins  for 294  kgs  of  kqs
kipas  in terms  of lint and  seed
(See  Anneiure  12)
10.Eqc  s  reference  price  of 294  kqs Rs/294 1872.19  1371.23  1377.12  2076.17  1813.36  1617.48  1725.98
of Or.  ans/Teias  kapas  in Punjab  kgs
(8-9)  (-eference  price)
11.bbolescie  Price  of J-34  seed-cotton  IsRa  455.5  493 397.75  510.25 512.25  441.25 482  75
Woawa  in Bhatinaa  (Punjab)
(Moveeber-Feb  iary)
12.  N8t of Orlt._../TPas  seed-cotton  0.1  1.06  0.85  0.  l72  0.8i  i. 8  i.6
(kapapi  (Row  11  1  2.94/how  10)
Source:  Siae  as  in Anneiure  1.-93-
Annenure  3.19:  Andhra  Pridesh:  Estimation  of NPCs  of Seed-Cotton  (kapis)!  iCU'-5  variety  (Iloortable  Nyootnesis)
~...  ..  ......  .........  ^*.  ......................  ..................................
Particulars  Unit  1980-81  1961-82  1982-83  1963-84  1984-85  1985-86  1987-6i
......................................................................  ................................................................................................... 
1. Price  of  Gita  67/69/!1  cottor  lint
cit  North  Eurone  (Feoruary-Junej  I/v  304.52  239.00  246.63  304.21  296.97  245.75  247.53
2.  Plus  the  difference  ir.  freight
fron  North  Africa  to  U.  Eoroce
to India  (provisional)  V/q  '.59  3.09  1.97  2.0;  2.0  2.00  1.30
3.  Equals  cif  price  in boohiy  $tq  306.11 242.09  248.60 306.21 298.97  247.75 249.3i
4. Ecrbange  Rate  (February-Junei  1)  s  &.38  9.36  10.00  10.86  12.49  12.43  12.84
5. Cit  price  of  6ira  67/69/81  cotton
lint at  Rombay  (FeD-Junei  (314)  Rsq  25BI.96  2265.96  2186.00  3334.6i  i734.13  3079.53  3201.40
6. Cit price  of 6izn  67/69/81  cotton  Rs/190.3
at  Rotbay  (see  ARneiure  14)  kgs  302.14  249.08  213.42  418.39  327.60  248.49  241.11
7. Cit  price  of 100  kqs  of  61iZ
67/69/81  cotton  lint and  190.3  kgs
of ioported  cottonseed  (5.6)  Rs  2884.10  2515.04  2699.42  i7Si.02 4061.73  3328.02  3442.51
8. Rises  Processing.  Iarketing  costs  and
tradiaq  uargins  for 294  kqs  of lipas
in teres  of lint and  seed  (see  Rs/294
Annenore  13)  kgs  172.53  105.44  21.53 182.05  184.46  109.,5  -1i4.15
9. Eouals  value  of  294  kos  of 6iza
67/69/81  kapas  in Andhra  Pradesh  Rs/294
-8)  (Reference  price)  kas  630.20  590.00  645.00  695.75  635.00  608.0Q  890.00
10.  bi,'1esile  price  of  ICU-5  seed-cotton
(Kalsl  in Tripor  (TN),  (assumed
ts  te  tne  same  as  (APi.  (Feb-June) ks/o  63N.20  590.00  645.00 9'.75  6135.00  606.00  B0.00
11. KPCs  of RCU-5  seed-cotton  (kapas)
(Row  102.94/Row  91  0.68  0.?2  0.72  0._7  0.48  0.55 0.71
--.-  . - -.-  - - .-  - --  - --  - --  - -.--  - -.-  - -.-  - --  - - --  - . . - - --  --  - --  . --  - --  - -.--  - --  -.-  - -.-94-
Annenre  3.21:  habarasntra:  Estisution  of iCs  of Seed-Cotton  ('pMas)  H-4  Viriety  (Epoortable  Hypothesis)
.....  .................  .....  .........  .................  . . .............  ........................  ............  ......................  ....
Particulars  unit  1980-B1  1981-82  1982-63  196i-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-67
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  ......  .....  . ........  ..  ...  .......................  ........................................  ........  .............  ..  ...
1.  Price  of  lexicar.  cottor,  lint.  $Iq  211.66 158.3'  163.82  192.34  153.,3 120.58 145.86
cif  North  EuroOe  (Dec-Aeril)
N.  Ilinus  freiaht  trog US  to Ihrtr  WSQ  20.00  17.23  10.97  11.14  11.14  11.14  9.41
Europe
3. Plus  freiuht  fron  US  to Iaoan  $IC  15.91  13.71  8.72  8.8o 8.8i  8.86 7.48
4. Nines  freiaht  and  insurancm  fron  t'c  18.03  15.29  10.36  1Q.78 10.34  10.07 ,.94
Japan  to 6ombav.  t
5.  EQuals  fob  price  of hetican  cotton  1'n  189.74 139.5'  151.  1  179.28  140.66  108.2i 134.9c
lint it bombay
6.  Eichinqe  kate (DecenDer-Aprili  IS  Rs  8.15  9.22  9.90  I0.70  12.52  12  :5  12.9!
7.  ob  price  of teuican  cotton  lint  Rsiq  1546.36  1286.56  1497.97  1918.30  1761.06  1l25.82 1742.72
it Vosbay  (b;6)
e.  Fot  price  of Co&tonseed  (119.3  Igs' Fs/190.3 206.08 155.42  149.42  i48.15 245.41  168.07 169.54
-e  Annelure  15)  Sos
9. Fr price  of 100  lQs  of Neuican  Rs  1752.46  1441.98  1647.;9  2266.45  2006.47  1493.89  1912.26
ccvton  lint and  190.3  koS  of
cotionseef  (7+8)
I.  Nir.u  precessino,  iarretinq costs RsJ294  206.07  343.37 32.83  284.85  391.18  409.61 428.04
an:  rading  margins  for 294  Igs  of  kes
c-:ls in  teres  of lint and  seeds
Annezure  10!
11.  Eq.c:  reference  price  for  Rsuq  525.98  i73.68 549.17  674.01  549.42  368.80 504.84
exporcmble  seed-cotton  NA-4)  in
ftaharisntra  (Re-  9 - Rov  101/2.94
1L.  f  P,.  *rice  Da2i b'  fSCIF  to  ks;q  553.33  464.0  550.  5  oe0.9  9  5;.i  0t  5?,2.0Q  54  A  I
farmers  for H-4  variety  of kipas  (496.971
13.  WPO  of H-4  seed-cotton  (Ripas!  1.05  1.24  1.Q0 Q.90  1.Q8  1.60  l.Q7
(Row  12/Ro*  111  C
kotes:
1. Freioht  froL  Janao  to EO2D2r  is aSSUed  tO  be re  sale 2i frOc  UE  tD  EDn..
Insurance  is e;twte? 't 1; sf tns  c:f  North  Europe  price  Or  ct^tot  lipt.
I  Guaranteed  ;r:se.
Sorfce:  aieG  as  inf.  usnurf 1O.-95-
Anr,enre .2^: Gujarat:  Estimation  of KPCs  of Seed-Cotton  (Rapas).  Shinkar-4  (Superiorl  Variett (['oortable Hvoothesis)
ParticulIrs  Utit  1980-81 1981-8l 1982-53 198  3-84  1984-8S 1985e-6  1966-87
:.  Price  of  California  cnttor lIrt
(SR  I  I/8' c:f.  Nirtb EUrOoe
(Oecember-Anril'  110.02  186.69  ,1:  6 168.52  1;3.42  171.8.
2.  Iinus freioht from  US  to North
Europe  ;nIu fren9: fro$  US  to
Japar otnts  freiett  nnd  Insurance
from  Jimn to ioabav  Ii4  -22.12  -18.81  -12.61  -13.06  -12.67  -12.35  -10.8?
3.  Eouals fob orice  of California  cotton
lint at  Poobav  i/q  204.18  151.21  174.06  199.20  155.85  121.07 160.95
4.  E:change  kate iecestmer-Ar .$  Rs  8.15  9.22  9.90  10.70  1:.52  12.25  12.91
S.  Fob  once of Cnlifornie cotton
lint at losbay (3+4)  Ks/q  1664.07 1394.16 1723.39 2131.44  1951.24 1483.11 2077,86
6.  Fob  erice  of cottonseed  (190.3  kos)  Rs/190.3
(see  Anoeiure  15)  kis  206.08  155.42  149.42 :84.15  245.41 168.0?  1f0.54
Fob  price  of 100  kgs  of California
cotton  lint  and  190.3  kqs  of
cotton  seed  (0+6)  Rs  1870.15 1549.58 1872.81 2479.59 :196.65 1651.18 2247.40
N  Rmines  processino,  marketina  costs
anD  trading  margins  from  294 kos
of kaoas  in teres  of lint  and  Rs'294
seeds  isee  Anneiore  11  ios  358.9?  ;555.55  253.15  325.So  304.48  341.18  463.  2
9.  Es.uis  reference  crice for
el.  tabie seeo-cotton  (Shankar-4,
Super:or!  in 6u;arat
(RoN - Row  6)/.94  KW4  514.00 406.1l  550.90  732.66  64W.59 445.5E  60o.86
10.  V"il:niie  aiDce  of Sbankar-4
seed-cotton  Ikapas:  at kroaco
f64mratil  (Fecmber-Ainml)  st  .;o  Z.Oo  547.00  646.U0  56o.21  4C  .0O  ;i.7.
11. UPCm  of Shankar-:  SeO-Cotto.
(RaDas)  (Pow  10'ln  c . .e  t - Q.8e!  0.88  LF  ".96
kotes;  1. See  Annenure  21,  Footnote  1.
Source:  Siae  ais  i Aneoirer-96-
Annezure  3.23:  Funja::  Estimation  of NHrc  of Seed-Cotton  (kapas)  3J-3  variety  (Eoportabie  Hypothesis)
_._.  _._.  ._.  ...................  ....................................  ......................................  ......................................................  .......  ...
Particulars  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-8:  1983-84  IQS4-85  !98i-6s 1986-B7
1. Price  of  Orleans/Tenas  (1 !
cotton  lint,  tf,  North  Europe
(Noveaber-February)  $IQ  204.30 140.04  144.03 1?3.55  '46.45  1io.91  124.59
2.  linus  freight  fros Us  to Nortt
Europe  1/q  -22.12 -18.81 -12.61  -1l.06  -12.67 -12.53 -Iv87
Plus  freight  froo  US  to Janan
Minus  freight  and  insurance  fros
Japan  to Bombay/l
3.  Equals  lob price  of Orleans/lezas
cotton  lint at Boomar  /c  182.18  121i.2 131.42  160.49  1,;A78 124.5r 11.:
4.  Etchaule  Rate  (November-February)  ll:Rs  8.01  9.14  9.80  10.56  12.52  12.16  1i.04
5.  fob  price  of  Drelans/Texas  cotton
lint at loibay  (34)  6s/q  1459.26  1108.04  1287.92  1°94.77  1674.93  15;4.65  !4i  .9!
6.  fob  price  of  cottonseed  (190.3  kqs)  Rs/190.3
(see  Aneeure  151  kgs  206.08 155.42  149.42  348.15  245.41 168.07 169.54
7.  fob  price  of 100  kgs  of  Orleans/
Tenas  cotton  lint and  190.3  kqs
of cottonseed  (5-6)  Rs  1665.34  1263.46  1437.34  2042.92  1921.34  1682.  . oi2  q5
S.  C.us processing,  marketing  costs
trading  margins  for 294  kqs
o  kapas  in terms  of lint and  seed  Rs/294
(se Annerure  12)  kgs  84,57 175.73  259.95 18&.21  363.57  ;11.16  15i.81
9.  Eou. reference  once  of
emortaole  seec-cottorn  (-34)
ir -rVjai tkow  7  - Row  8)/2.94  Ps/4  537.68  369.98  40  '.:  6G.B.' 52'.51 466.5  5t37
I..  V'lesah onrce  cf 8-i4 seedcottor
i18us)  in Shatinda  (Punjab)
(bt!c. betar-;e~.u~ru  PRsi;  455.5( 493.00 357.7; 51i.2  5  2  441i.2 4-.75
1. Nhs  c; 0riearT/iera-  eec-cottot
(kagas  (Pow  10/kow?)  0.85  1.33 0. 9 G.8!  Q7  ?  .5 
.............  .....................  . ....  ...  ..  .....  .......  ...........  ..................  ....  .....  .....................
Notes:  1. See  Annerure  '1.  footnote  1.
Source:  Sale  *e if, Aaei;lure  IlC.-97-
Anneiure  3.24: Andhra  Praoesh:  Estimatior  oQ  W`Cs  of Seee-cetion  tvaoas,  CJ-5  variety  iEnnoriaole  6ynothesis,
Particuidrs  Uait  1080-81 !9BI-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-8'  1985-86 1986-87
1.  Price  of 6iia 67169/l cotton  lint
cif  Worth  Europe  (Fet-June)  ";C  304.52 239.00 246.60  304.11  296.97  24$.75 247.53
2.  Plus  the difference  in freiont rate
from  North  Africa to Japan  aid  fror
Worth  Africa to North  Europe
(Provisional)  I/q  14.i6  12.38  7.88  8.00  8.00  8.0  6.7i
3.  Hints freight and  insurance  fron
Japan  to bombay  I/q  18.95  16.10  III.  11.90 1I.83  1.3  9.9
4.  Equals  fob price  of Uiza  67/69/81
lint  at Bombay  (Feb-June)  )  I/  29?.93 235.26  24332 30.3i1  295.14  242.4.  244.3i
5.  Enchiaqe  Rate  (Feb-June)  I):Rs  8.38  9.36  10.00  10.89  12.49  i2.43  12.84
6.  fob price  of cottonseed  (190.3  kos)
lint  at Boebay  (4n51  ksiq  251  .41  2202.22  24i3.20 i270.38 3661.32  301i.40 3137.20
7.  fob  price  of  cotton  seed  (190.3  kqs)  Rs/190.i
(see  annenure  15)  kgs  206.08  155.42 149.42 348.15 2M5.15 168.07  169.54
8.  fob  Price  of 100  kos  of cotton  lint
and  190.3  kqs  of cottonseed  (6+7t  Ris  2719,49  2i57.64 2582.62  3618.53  3906.73  3181.47  3306.74
9.  Ninus  processing.  marketinq  costs
and  'radino  earoins  for 294  LWs  of
k,as  in terms  of lint  and  seeds  is/294
(se" Annenure  13)  kqs  172.53 105.44  21.33  182.46  184.46 109.25  134.15
10. Ecue' reference  orice for
e.ritable  seed-cottor  (ECU-5)  in
Ar;rs  Pradesh  IRow  8 - Rov  9)/2.94  Esio  666.31  7o6.05  871.19  1168.87  126.DS  1044.°-  i203-
11.  bh.esale orice Gf MC-5  Seeo-
cdtton (lacas  in  ITriour  (TN)
(s  uled to  be  the.iame  ir.  APi,
rnyuarv-Jnre!  EPsc  63J  .!  590.07  645.0(  695.75 e  .Qt  608.0  l  tt
12.  NPCs  of KCM-  seed-cotton  (Kapas)
(Pow  11/Row  10)  C.73  0  .7  0.7e  0.5  O.5t  t.S5c  c7
NJ  te  1.  See enencre  21,  foctnote  1.
Source:  iaie  - in Anrtiem  1S.-98-
Anseuure  3.25:'  INPUT  STRUCTURE  OF  INDIAN  COTTON  (Percentage)
.---  - - - - - -----  ----  - …--------  -.---  ----  -----  - - -
Cost  Item  Ntaharishtra  I  Gujarat  I Punjab  I  Andhra  Pridesh  I
Operational  Cost  60.0.  61.75  62.76
Husan  labour  25.-21C  14.72  21712.00
Bullock  labour  12.55  221.06  5.l?  3.01
Nachine  labour  0.04  0.02  7.1c.  0.98
Seed  4.12  2.66  1.73  3.14
Fertiliser  ?.24  11.195  7.19  11.66
JJ.7~~~~~~~~  ~171.40
Kiaure  4.55  5.85  ME4  5.74
Insecticides  A.7  A20.67  5.81  22.55
Irriqition  charoes  0.04  8.40  3.68  2.04
Interest  on  workieo  capitai  1.571  7.19  1.35  1.85
Fired  C',st  39.96  58.24  37.24
Rental  vilue  of  owned  land  2.5  21.2:.  23.21  31.70
Rent  paid  for  leased  in  land  - 3.43
Land  revenue,  cesses.  taxes,  etc.  1.013  0.48  0.66
Rep,  on  impliemets  &  fire  baildings  2.85  2.35  1.32
Interest  on  fiied  capital  6.113  8.47  3.56
Total  cost  100.0h 100.00 100.00  100.00
(Ru/hectire)  98.01 6569.00  3380.91  6104.93
Tield/hectare  (igs)  Nii  1139.00  706.00  1221.00
Total  cost  (Rsi/ectare)  estimated  1450.02  9196.60  3380.91  8286.03
for  triefinium  average  (1981-82'  to  83-84
Average  yield  (Ig5/bectare)  4321.1~  1274.72  706.00  2.265.00
for  triennium  (1981-82  to  83-84)
No-es:
1. The  cost  structure  of  H-4  in  Kanarisbira  relate!  to  as,  averaoe  of  tvo  years  - lq7o-77  and  1977-7i:
Shankar  4/5  in  Gujarit  relates  to  three  yearly  averaes  of  1974-75  to  1976-77:  c~ J-34/3210F  in  Furjio
three  Yearly  averace  of  1981-82  to  1983-84  and  ci  MCiI-~  io  Andhra  Pradesi  tio  tnree  yearly  averaoe  of  1975-7i  tn,  1077.7s.
2.  For  ftahirashtra  and  Andhra  Priame.  fertiliser  wn  manre  aooears  as  a  combinee  fioure.  Thev  are
separated  in  the  ratio  of  67:33,  vhich  prevails  for  fiujarat.
Tne  estimites  are  constructed  op.  thie  oasis  of  ircreases  is  the  relevar:  inPut  croce  onuics
For  Raharashftra  and  Andhra  Pradesh,  it  is  frot  !9 ~onvaros.  7he  new  cost  ectiaites  ire  l.  imeeo
the  old  ones.  For  Grciarat  it  is  trot  1975-76  onvaros  and  we  have  aultiolied  the  aig-sevenlies  total
cost  ef  Ps.656?  by  1.  times  to  Qet  total  COS!  TO!  19,81-:  to 1985-84.
4.  Yields  hiave  beer  prowete~  for  these  specific  voroeties  fo,  the  I189F  by  mpyvinc  the  statewise
rates  of  arowtt.  or.  toe  overall  Y~elc  Of  cctton  tef  all  varnetiesi  macr:rc  tite  Derio.  1150-6f  to
1985-86.  These  aronto.  rates  ire  Oucjarat  l.62'-  Aaurasr.tri  .o  ne Andhra  Praoest  1(.70,..
For  Pur;iai  it. is  tne  actud'l  ri4ei  for  cottom'  viu  Er  ii  crcns;tet for  ~--  V#r  Iet-99-
(contd.)
is  given  in cost  of cultivation  data.
5. It  is allocated  between  huuan.  bulloci  and  aachine  laoovr  in the  sate  ratio  vhict
eiists  for Naharashtra.
Soerce:  Directorate  of Economics  and  Statistics.  hoinxstry  of  Aoriculture.  ov:,.  of  India.-100-
Ameoure  3.26: NPCs  of Tradeable  Inputs  of  Seed-Cotton  (Kapas)
-_ - - - . ......................... _._.......  -. -----------  -. --  - --  - ----
State/uYer  Fire  Fertilisers  Seeds  Insecticides  All
Bachinery  (INP)  tradeable
(Tractors)  Inout.
Rabarashtra
1980-81  1.26  G  .77  1.3k  2.7  1.24
1981-82  1.26  Q.6"  1.68  2.7  1.3s
1982-83  I.2o  c,9?  1.90  2.'  1.50
1983-84  1.26  0.89  1.27  2.7  1.29
1984-85  1.26  0.72  1.30  ;.7  1.25
1985-86  1.26  0.65  1.57  2.7I
1986-87  1.26  t  .91  . .27  2.7  1.Si
Average  1.26  0.82  1.62  2.7  1.34
leiqhts (AV.
1981-82  to 83-84)  0.02  '.34  2.38  1.59  9.34
Bujarat
1980-81  1.26  77  1.34  .7  1.94
1981-8!  1.26  0.82  1.68  2.7  1.95
1982-83  1.26  0.97  1.90  2.7  2.05
1983-84  1.26  0.89  1.27  2.7  1.98
1984-85  1.26  0.72  1.30  2.7  1.92
1Y85-86  1.26  0.69  1.57  2.7  1.9
1986-87  1.26  4.91  2.27  . .. 706
Average  1.26  0.82  1.62  2.7  198
Weiebts  0.03  15.19  3.38  26.27  44.86
(Ar.  1981-82  to 83-84)
. h.-al  1.26  0.77  1.34  . .7  1.49
149:-82  1  0X  1.68  2.  7  1.54
1E-i3  v1.26  0.97  1.90  2.7  1.60
1.26  0.89  1.27  .7  1.5:
1984-01  1.26  0.72  I.v  .2.  1.47
1985-86  1.26  0.69  1.57  2.7  1.48
1986-87  1.26  0.91  2.27  2.7  1.61
Averie  1.26  0.82  1.62  2.7  1.5i
Weiehts  7.34  7.37  1.77  1.96  2 .4'
(Pv.  15!'^  to  83-84)
Andhra  Praiemp
1986-81  1.26  i.77  1.34  2.7  1.S6
1981-8.  1.26  C.82  1.6E  ..  2.0C
196.-6;  1.26  0.9,  1.9?  ;,?  1.07
1983-84  1.26  '  1.27  .7  l.9t
1984-85  1.26  0.72  1.30  2.7  1.94
1985-86  O.26  0.69  1.57  .. 7 1.95
198-87  1.26  I.°1  2.27  2.7  '.'
Averaeg  MU2  C.'OJI  .A0
Q!iehtf  10.56  . 1.79  12.72
(AV.  191!-82  to 83-864-101-
(contd.)
Fiur  Statts  Combined
1980-81  1.26  0.77  1X34  2.7  1.78
1981-82  1.26  0.82  1.62  2.  7  1.83
1982-83  .826  0.9,  1.90  2.7  1.90
1983-84  1.  26  0.89  1.27  2.7  1.81
1984-85  1.26  0.7.  1.30  2.7  1.75
1985-86  146  0.69  ;.57  2.7  1.77
1986-87  :.26  0.!  2.?7  2.7  1.91
Averaee  1.2o  0  . 9  '  1.a . ..  1.82
leiqhts  7.9S  i4.62  9.34  6.68  96.59
(Av.  1981-82  to 63-66)
..  - - -...  -....  . .....  -......  _.  ------  -----  -----  -----  -----  -----  -----  ----  - --  ..  --  - - --102-
Annezure  3.27: ESTIATION  OF  WEIGHTS  FOF  TRAGEABLE  INPUTS  (TRIENNIUk  AVERAGE  OF  19B1-82  TO
1983-84!
...............  . .................  . ..........  . ....  ._  .....  _  _ ..  . . . ..........  _._
Ilaharashtra 6ujarat  Punjac Andhra  Pradesh
1. Value  of fertiliser  used  (FRs/hectare)  '24.74  1098.99  243.09  967.67
2.  Value  of Seed  used  (Fs/hectare)  56.62  244.63  58.59  260.59
3. Value  of  fart iachinery  used  (Rs/hectare!  0.54  1.84  242.07  61.33
4. Value  of inseclticides  uses  'Rs/hectare)  37.13  1900.94  196.43  1854.63
5.  Value  of all  tradeable  inputs  used  218.03  3246.4  740.08  3164.10
(Row  I  to koa  4)  (Rsihectare)
6. Three  yearly average  vield oT the  reievan,  4.32  12.74  7.06  82.65
seed  cpttpa  (klaasi variety&  (q/bec)
7. Three  yearly average  price  of the  relevant  540.35  568.00  467.00  643.58
seed  cotton  (kanasi  varietyS (Rs/q)
8. Value  veiohts  for fertilisers  (Rov  I/Row  o) Z  5.34  15.19  7.37  6.64
Rov  7
9. Value  veiahts  for seees  Row  2/Row  v 6!  2.38  3.38  1.77  17'
kow  7
10.  Value  veiohis for Tara  wachinery  iRow  ;/iow 6)  Z  0.02  0.03  7.34  0.56
Rov  7
11. Vlus weights  for insecticides  (iow  4/Rov  bi  !.59  20.;7  5.96  12.72
Row  7
12. Value  v.iotts  fo! all  traceabie  inputs (Row  Sikow  i  i  9.34  44.86  22  .4  21.71
Row  7
Notes:  I  See  Artnezure  25.
t:  See  Annuaur?s  t  itG 1t.*-103-
Anneoure  3.L:  Projecteo Variety  Specific Yields of Seed-Cottor  (kapas)  ir  India. Selected States
..  ........  .............  ................................  .....................................................  ....  .........  ...  ...................
States  VariW  IEAiS
1980-81 1981-62 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-B6  1986-87
1.  Iaharashtra  sktrid-4  17.95  42.9i  43.11  439.:6  446.74  454.425 461.66
..  Gujarat  Shankar-4i6  1234.29  12  i.29  1274.61 1295.26 1316.24 1337.56  1359.23
3.  Punjab  J-34/3LoF  908.82  929.41 841.1  544.1:  1314.71 1255.88  1491.16
4.  Andhra  Pradesh  ItCU-I  1839.0  2437.00 2257.0t .54G.00 2769.00  3067.50 i398.16
. ...  ...  ...  ...  .......  ...........  ..........  ...................  .................
Notes:
These  are projected  yielos.  For Maharashtra,  projection is  maoe  Dy  apoolvin
1.68%  rate of grovth (coaoound)  to the yield level of  91 ks'nec.  in 1976-77
is  reported in cost data.  For  6ujarat base year yield is  113; kos/hec. in 1975-76
and the rate of  orowth  is 1.62: o.a.  For Punjab.  yeid  levels are taken
from Estimates  of Area and  Production  of Principal Crops  in  India, Directorate
of Ecomoeics  and  Statistics.  linistry of Agriculture,  Governeent  of ladia.
Since J-34/320F  is the  predominant  cotton variety in Punjab,  use of  cotton
yields (pertaining to all  varieties)  in Punjab  vould not affect our results
sionificantly.  For  Andhra  Pradesh,  base year yield for  1976-77  is  1221
Kgs/hec.  and the rate  of orouth is  10.78%  o.a.  The  rates of grovth are the
ones vbich  prevailed in  different states (for all  varieties  of cotton coabined)
during 1967-68  to 1985-86.- 104 .
CHAPTER  4
INDIA: EFFECTIVE  INCENTIVES  FOR  AGRICULTURE
THE  CASE  OF GROUNDNUT
Introduction
4.01  Oilseeds  production  represents  about  7.5  per  cent  of the  total
value  of crop  output  in  India. Increasing  demand  for  edible  oils,  growing
at the  rate  of about  3.5  to  4 per  cent  per  annum  coupled  with eratic
supply  of oilseeds,  has  resulted  in  mounting  imports. More  than  one-third
of edible  oil  consumption  is  being  imported  with  the  import  bill touching
Rs.  10  billion  in the  drought  year  1987-88. The  widening  demand-supply
imbalance  in  edible  oils  has  evoked  a growing  concern  in  the  Government
regardomg  the  oilseeds  economy. Consequently,  the  National  Oilseeds
Development  Project  (NODP)  was initiated  in 1984-85;  the  National
Agricultural  Cooperative  Marketing  Federation  (NAFED)  was  designated  as
the  nodal  agency  for  undertaking  price  support  operations  in  respect  of
oilseeds  for  a period  of five  years  beginning  1985-86  season;  the
Technology  Missioy  on Oilseeds  comprising  of four  micro-missions  was
launched  in  1986.  In  1989  a buffer  stock/price  support  scheme  was
undertaken,  using  the  National  Dairy  Development  Board  as the  executing
agency.
4.02  Against  this  background  it  is important  to  explore  the  structure
of  effective  incentives  as it  has  prevailed  in  the  oilseeds  economy  of
india  during  1980s,  and  the  shape  it is  likely  to take  with increasing
Govsrnment  intervention  in this  sector. Groundnut  - the  predominant  crop
of Indian  oilseeds  crop-complex  --  is  selected  for  this  purpose. Trends
in  the  groundnut  economy  are  often  transmitted  to other  oilseed  crops.
Exploring  the  structure  of effective  incentives  in the  groundnut  economy
is,  therefore,  indicative  of the  structure  of entire  oilseeds  economy.
Incentives  to groundnut  cultivators  are  measured  by following  the  standard
methodology  desctibed  in  chapter  1  and  estimating  the  standard  set  of
Nominal  Protection  Coefficients  (NPCs),  Effective  Projection  Coefficients
(EPCs)  and  Effective  Subsidy  Coefficients  (ESCs). 2
1 The  Technology  Mission  on  Oils&eds  seeks  to achieve  self-reliance  in
edible  oils  by 1990  by raising  oilseeds  production  to  18  million  tonnes  by
1989-90  and  26  million  tonnes  by 2000  AD.  The  strategy  to  achieve  this
ambitious  target  involves  four  micro  missions  (i)  crop  technology,  for
developing  new  seeds/varieties  that  are  better  in  terms  of yield,  pest
resistence,  aflatoxin,  etc.  Included  here  is the  objective  of
substitution  of groundnut  by sunflower,  especially  in  Gujarat.  (ii)  post
harvest  technology  to  modernise  processing  and  storage  so that  oil
recovery  can  be increased;  (iii)  farmers'  support  system  for  propagation
of new  interventions/innovations  through  extension  services;  (iv)  price,
storage,  processing,  and  marketing,  which  would  aim  at providing
remunerative  prices  to farmers  (see  Technology  Mission  on Oilseeds,
Department  of Agricultural  Research  and  Education,  Ministry  of
Agriculture,  Government  of India,  January  1987  and  the  associated  Reports
?n the  four  micro-missions.
See  also  Garry  Pursell  and  Neil  Roger:  and  Pasquale  L. Scandizzo  and
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4.03  The  results  suggest  that  groundnut  cultivators  in India  have  been
highly  protected  oti  balance. For  example,  calculations  including
subsidies  (ESCs)  suggest  that  on average  in  the  1980s  domestic  resources
received  in  groundnut  protection  received  71%  protection  (ESC-1.71).  This
compares  with  an estimate  of  40%  average  effective  protection  for
manufacturing  (World  Bank,  1987)  and  disprotection  for  cotton,  rice,
wheat. Given  short-term  and  long-term  projections  of  world  prices  of
groundnut  (oil  and  meals),  which  are  likely  to remain  depressed  at around
1986  levels,  it appears  that  the  degree  of "protection"  will remain  very
high for  Indian  groundnut  cultivators  (the  ESC  is likely  to remain  greater
than  2) in the  coming  years. Even  if one  adjusts  for  a  premium  of 25%  on
foreign  exchange  and  estim.tes  "adjusted"  ECs,  which  would  be very  close
to cost  benefit  indicators  such  as Domestic  Resource  Cost (DRC),  the
result  is similar. This  result  when  viewed  from  either  the  standpoint  of
earning  and  saving  foreign  exchange  or from  the  standpoint  of  comparative
advantage,  indicates  that  groundnut  is  neither  an  efficient  import
substitute  nor  an efficient  exportable  commodity. It  also  suggests  that
programs  to  expand  production  of groundnut  are  likely  to  yield  low
economic  rates  of return. This  is  particularly  true  in  areas  where
groundnuts  compete  for  resources  with  cotton,  rice  and  wheat,  such  as
Gujarat. All  of these  commodities  are  efficient  import  substitutes,  or
even  exports. Hence,  substitution  of groundnuts  for  these  crops  could
even  result  in a  net loss  of foreign  exchange.
4.04  Section  I  of this  Chapter  provides  a  brief  sketch  of the
groundnut  economy. Section  II  estimates  NPCs  of groundnut  while  Section
III  calculates  NPCs  of tradeable  inputs  and  the  corresponding  EPCs  Section
IV is  devoted  to the  estimation  of ESCs  of groundnut. Finally,  Section  V
contains  some  concluding  observations  based  on the  results  derived  in
preceding  sections.
A.  The  Groundnut  Economy: A Brief  Sketch
4.05  India  is  by far  the  largest  producer  of groundnuSs  in  the  world
(33.57%),  followed  by China  (22.27%)  and  the  USA (8.73%).  West  Africa,
which  was  traditionally  an important  groundnut  producing  region,  witnessed
significant  cut-backs  in  output,  primarily  because  of repeated  droughts
and  diseases,  as well  as other  factors  including  domestic  price  policits
that  did  not  allow  farmers  to  obtain  the  full  benefit  of world  prices.
4.06  Groundnut  is  mainly  traded  internationally  in the  form  of  oil  and
meal,  with  a  very  small  proportion  taking  the  form  of  groundnut.kernels.
The  major  market  for  groundnut  (oil)  remains  Europe,  particularly  France,
3  Average  of 1982  to 1984,  FAO  Production  Year  Book,  1984.
4 Price  ProsRects  for  Maior  Primary  Commodities,  Vol.  II,  World  Bank,
1984  (p.  219).- 106  -
Italy,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Belgium,  Netherlands  and  the  United
Kingdom,  which  tg  gether  account  for  about  90  per  cent  of  world  imports  of
groundnut  (oil).
4.07  In the  1970s  India  was  an  exporter  of  handpicked,  select  (HPS)
groundnuts  to European  countries  and  the  USSR.  (See  Annexure  1 for
figures  on  HPS  groundnut  exports  during  1974-75  to 1985-86.) Exports  of
HPS  groundnut  were canalized  in  November  1974  through  an  agency  of  private
traders  - The  Indian  Oil  and  Produce  Exporters  Association  (IOPEA).
During  the  mid-1970s,  groundnut  exports  reached  as  much  as 113  thousand
tonnes  in 1975-76  and  123  thousand  tonnes  in 1976-77. About  80  per  cent
of these  exports  were to  hard  currency  areas  and  only  20  per  cent  to  rupee
payment  countries  of  eastern  Europe  and  the  USSR.  In 1977-78,  however,
the  Government  of India  banned  the  exports  of  HPS  groundnuts  and  from
1978-79  (w.e.f.  December  29,  1978)  onwards,  its  exports  were  canalized
through  an  apex  cooperative  marketing  agency  - National  Agricultural
Cooperative  Marketing  Federation  of India  Limited  (NAFED). Exports  were
to take  place  in accordance  with  the  export-quota  released  by Government
(Ministry  of  Commerce)  from  time  to time. This  measure  began  a regime  of
much  greater  regulatior,  of HPS  groundnut  exports. Also,  during  the  next
few  years  exports  fell  sharply  and  became  heavily  skewed  in favour  of the
rupee  payment  area.  For  example,  in 1981-82,  the  entire  export  of  HPS
groundnut  went to  the  USSR.
4.08  In  an effort  to  revive  HPS  Groundnut  exports  to the  hard currency
area,  and  perhaps  also  to  give  an opportunity  to  privgte  traders,  who  held
NAFED  solely  responsible  for  this  dismal  performance,  the  Government
allowed  private  trade  and  cooperatives  to  participate  in  exports  from
1982-83  onwards. But  nothing  substantial  came  out  of this  change  of
policy,  primarily  due  to  unfavourable  price  ratios  at  home  and in  the
international  market. During  1983-84  and  1984-85  the  export-quotas  fixed
for  different  agencies  were  as follows:  NAFED  - 27,500  tonnes;  Grofed:
10,000  tonnes  and  private  trade:  72,500  tonnnes. It  should,  however,  be
noted  that  private  traders  were  allowed  to export  only  as  associate
shippers  on first-cum-first  served  basis  against  contracts  backed  b! 100
per  cent  irrevocable  letters  of  credit  to  be registered  with  NAFED.
4.09  The  emergence  of such  a relatively  restrictive  export  policy
regime  was in fact  one  response  to  a growing  deficit  of  edible  oils  at
home.  Since  the  Government  limited  edible  oil  imports,  this  gradually
pushed  the  domestic  price  of groundnut  upward. At the  same  time,  exports
of groundnut  began  to fall  much  below  even  the  export  targets  (quota).
For  example,  during  1980-81  to 1984-85,  on average,  the  actual  exports  of
HPS  groundnut  from  India  (mostly  to  the  rupee  trading  area)  were  only
32,000,  tonnes  as against  an export  target  (quota)  of about  85,000  tonnes.
D  OR.  cit.  p. 220.
6 For  greater  details  of this  dispute,  see  S.  Ganguly  (1982-83):  "The
NAFED-IPPEA  Confrontation",  Business  World,  December  20,  1982  to  January
2, 1983.
7 NAFED  (1986):  Grou:&dnut,  Commodity  Bulletin,  p. 35.- 107 -
4.10  Other  factors  also  played  a role  in the  substantial  fall  in
exports  compared  to  mid-1970s. China  emerged  as an aggressive  seller  in
the  world  market  of HPS  groundnuts  after  1980-81,  making  it  hardet  for
India  to compete  on the  price  front. Another  important  factor  in the
sudden  decline  in India's  8exports  of HPS  groundnut  was the  presence  of
high  degree  of  aflatoxin.  Importing  countries  such  as the  UK,  Germany,
Japan,  Yugoslavia,  Netherlands,  Switzerland  etc.  insisted  on aflatoxin  -
free  delivery  of HPS  groundnut. India  was  not  able  to fulfil  this
requirement  as  aflatoxin  could  develop  in its  exports  at various  stages,
including  the  sea  voyage. In consequence,  India's  share  in  world
groundnut  exports  slid  from  12.8  per  cent  during  the  mid-1970s  (average  of
1975  and  1976)  to  4.15  per  cent (average  of 1984  and  1985)  within  a
decade,  despite  its  being  the  largest  producer  of groundnut  in  the  world.
USA  and  China  control  about  57  per  cent  of world  exports  of groundnut
(average  of 1984  and  1985).
4.11  From  1986-87  onwards,  the  Government  of India  decanalized  the
exports  of  HPS  groundnuts,  hoping  for  their  revival. Exports  of groundnut
are  now  allowed  under  OGL-3  against  contracts  registered  with  Agi.icultural
Products  Exports  Development  Authority  (APEDA),  and  a  public  notice  (dated
27th  January  1987)  was issued  to this  effect. But  this  had  little  impact
because  of low  international  prices  and  the  aflatoxin  problem. One
suggestion  to  boost  groundnut  has  been  to  give  the  exporters  Replenishment
(REP)  licences  for  imports  of oilseeds. The  REP  scheme  is  considered
better  than  the  Cash  Compensatory  Scheme  (CCS)  as  REP is  self-compensatory
in  the  sense  that  if  the  local  prices  go  up,  then  the  REP  val  e  would  also
go  up, and  the  exporter  will  automatically  stand  compensated.
4.12  On domestic  production  front,  groundnut  is India's  second  most
important  cash  crop (next  to  cotton),  accounting  for  4.1  per  cent  of the
gross  cropped  area  1982-83. Of the  nine  major  oilseeds,  groundnut
predominates,  accounting  for  as  much  as 53  per  cent  of oilseeds  production
8  Aflatoxin  is  a form  of fungus  produced  by secondary  metabolies  of the
moulds  - Asperaillus  Flavus  Toxin. It is  highly  toxic  and  may  cause  death
of animals  and  human  beings. High  moisture  content  is  the  prime  factor  in
its  growth. In  case  of groundnuts,  if  moisture  content  exceeds  8 to 9  per
cent  and  in  case  of groundnut  cake if  it  exceeds  12  per  cent,  aflatoxin  is
likely  to  grow.  It can  also  occur  during  long  voyages,  if  packing  is  not
done  with  due  care.  In 1978-79,  the  UK's  Ministry  of  Agriculture,
Fisheries  and  Food  discovered  a high  degree  of aflatoxin  in  groundnut  and
cottonseed  extractions  used  as  cattle  feed  formulations  and  banned  the
imports  of these  commodities.  This  ban  was  imposed  by other  importers,
which  demanded  aflatoxin  free  delivery  of these  goods  at their  ports. The
Groundnut  Extraction  Export  Development  Association  (GEEDA)  assured  the
importing  countries  in 1983-84  that  a satisfactory  solution  to  aflatoxin
problems  would  be found  in  near future. At present  the  maximum  acceptable
limit  of aflatoxin  is  0.005  parts  per  million. See  NAFED  (1986):
Groundnut,  Commodity  Bulletin,  pp.  36-36.
9 See  Suresh  Shah (1987):  "Huge  Potential  for  exports  of HPS
groundnuts",  The  Economic  Times,  September  12,  1987. A similar  suggestion
was  put forward  by P.  K. Nagar  in  1982-83,  See  G. Ganguly  (1982-83);  and
Kaku  Tanna  (1984),  "Propping  up Peanut  Exports",  22nd  All  India  Convention
of Oilseeds  and  Oils  Trade  and  Industry,  Delhi  Vegetable  Oil  Traders'
Association,  November  30,  1984.- 108  -
and  40  per cent  of area. 10 During  1967-68  to 1984-85,  groundnut
production  increased  by 1.29  per  cent  per  annum. The  Seventh  Plan  aims  at
boosting  groundnut  production  from  the  assumed  base  level  of 7.30  million
tonnes  in 1984-85  to 9.37  million  tonnes  by 1989-90,  implying  a growth
rate  of 5.11  per  cent  per  annum. In  order  to  achieve  tiis  ambitious
target,  the  Government  initiated  NODP  in 1984-85  by reorienting  and
integrating  the  existing  Centrally  Sponsored  Scheme  and  two  Special
Projects  on groundnut  and  soyabean. Under  NODP,  groundnut  production  is
to  receive  intensive  treatment  in  Gujarat,  Andhra  Pradesh,  Tamil  Nadu,
Orissa  and  Maharashtra.  The  main focus  is  to increase  the,troundnut  area
during  the  rabi  season,  which  provides  much  higher  yields.  However,
groundnut  cultivation  is  still  largely  a kharif  crop  on  unirrigated  land
(85%  of the  area  is  unirrigated).  Thus  it  remains  a gamble  on rainfall.
As a consequenc 2it experiences  wide  gyrations  in  yields,  production  and
thereby  prices,  affecting  adversely  farmers'  incentives  to  apply
modern  inputs. The  Government  appointed  NAFED  as  a procuring  agency  for
groundnuts,  responsible  for  providing  an  effective  floor/support  price  +
the  cultivators  on an  ad-hoc  basis  since  1976-77. In 1985/86  NAFED  Wvs
appointed  as  a nodal  agency  for  price  support  operations  for  the  Severcn
Five  Year Plan  (1985-86  to  1989-90). In 1989  this  system  was  changed
again,  as part  of a  buffer  stock  scheme  for  oilseeds. The  National  Dairy
Development  board  was  appointed  the  executing  agency.
4.13  India  produces  a large  number  of groundnut  varieites,  of  which
about  29 improved  varieties  are  grown  on  a large  scale. These  varieties
are  normally  categorised  into  three  groups:  (a)  Bunch  (SpanLsh/Valencia),
(b)  Semi-Spreading  (Virginia  Bunch)  and  (c)  Spreading  (Virginia  Runner).
Gujarat,  which  is  the  most  dominant  groundnut  producing  state,  bAsically
grows  spreading  varieties  (like  Punjab-l  which  is  Spreading  Spanish  and
M-13,  GAUG-10  both  of  which  are  Virginia  Runners). Tamil  Nadu  grows
mainly  Bunch  varieties  (TVM-2,  6, 8, 9, 11,  12  and  POL-1,  POL-2),  while
Andhra  Pradesh  grows  a  mixture  of all  these. For  export  purposes,
however,  Indian  groundnuts  are  all  classified  primarily  into  two  groups:
(a)  HPS  kernels,  bold  and (b)  HPS  kernels  lawa  type. In  the  bold  variety,
usually  the  count  is  55-60  kernels  per  ounce  while  in  jawa  variety  it  is
between  75-80  kernels  per  ounce.
10  Average  of 1982-83  to  1984-85  Directorate  of Economics  and
Statistics,  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Government  of India. Then  nine  major
oilseeds  are  - Groundnut  (53.41%),  Rapeseed  and  Mustard  (21.92%),  Soyabean
(5.70%),  Sesamum  (4.57%),  Safflower  (3.81%),  Castorseed  (3.41%),  Linseed
(3.37%),  Sunflower  (2.50%)  and  Nigerseed  (1.23%).
11  Annual  ReDort.  1984-85,  Department  of  Agriculture  and  Cooperation,
Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development,  Government  of India,  pp.
77-78.
12 For  greater  details  on the  price  instability  of groundnut,  see
Purkayastha  and  Subramanian  (1986).- 109  -
4.14  Amongst  the  different  states  in  India,  Gujarat,  Andhra  Pradesh
and  Tamil  Nadu  are  the  major  producers  of groundnut,  accounting  for  more
than  62 per  cent  of production  as  well  as  area. Within  these  states,
groundnut  cultivation  is  heavily  concentrated  in  a few  districts. In
fact,  seven  districts  in the  country  together  account  for  about  31  per
cent  of total  groundnut  area  (Four  of these  districts  are  in  Gujarat,  two
in  Andhra  Pradesh  and  one  in  Tamil  Nadu). As noted  above,  groundnu!t  is
cultivated  in  both  during  kharif  and  rabi  seasons,  but the  share  of kharif
crop in  total  production  remains  predominant,  with 73  per  cent  at the
all-India  level  and  varies  between  66  per  cent  in  Tamil  Nadu  to  83 per
cent in  Gujarat  (Annexure  2).  Statewise  growth  performance  of groundnut
(area,  production  and  yield)  for  the  pre  and  post  Green  Revolution  period
is  shown  in  Annexure  3.
4.15  The  pattern  of  market  arrivals  of groundnut  differs  from  state  to
state. In  Gujarat,  where  the  share  of  kharif  groundnut  is overwhelming,
arrivals  are  heaviest  in the  first  quarter  of post-harvest  period
(October-December),  while  in  Andhra  Pradesh  and  particularly  Tamil  Nadu,
the  flow  of market  arrivals  is  more  evenly  spread  out  over  the  entire
year.
4.16  Groundnuts  are  marketed  through  various  trade  channels:  village
traders,  outside  traders  operating  in  the  village  during  post-harvest
season,  commission  agents  in regulated  markets,  oil  millers  and
cooperatives  agencies. Not  much information  is available  about  the  share
of different  trade  channels  in total  purchases  of groundnut  from  the
farmers. The  scattered  evidence  shows  that  private  trade  continues  to  be
the  dominant  channel  and the  main  link  between  farmers-and  oil  millers
(Modak,  1986). Recently,  efforts  have  been  made to  provide  alternative
marketing  channels  in the  form  of cooperative  societies  especially  meant
for  oilseeds. The  initiation  of the  National  Oilseeds  Project  under  the
National  Dairy  Development  Board  (NDDB)  in  1979  was  a  major  step in  this
direction. Under  this  project  state  level  cooperative  federations  of
oilseed  growers  have  been  set  up in seven  states,  viz.,  Gujarat,  Andhra
Pradesh,  Tamil  Nadu,  Maharashtra,  Karnataka,  Orissa  and  Madhya  Pradesh.
These  state  level  federations  have  further  set  up village  level
cooperatives  of oilseeds  growers. Nonetheless,  their  role  as  procuring
agency  was  quite  limited  up to  1988. This  was  because  (a)  the  market
prices  normally  were  above  the  official  support  prices  and (b)  the
purchases  of oilseeds  by cooperative  federations  are  limited  to their
requirements  for  the  oil  processing  plants  owned  by them. However,  the
role  of the  NDDB,  and  the  cooperatives,  is likely  to increase  under  the
price  support/buffer  stock  scheme  announced  in  early  1989.
4.17  Futures  trading  in  groundnuts  has  been  banned  since  1965,  but  it
still  continu  es illegally  in  Rajkot,  though  at a reduced  scale  and  with
greater  risk.
13  See  Tushar  Shah  and  Shrikant  Modak  (1986).- 110  -
B.  Nominal  Protection  Coefficients  (NPCs)  of Groundnut
4.18  The  NPC  of groundnut  (with  shell)  is  defir.ed  as a ratio  of
domestic  price  of groundnuts  to the  international  reference  price  (see
chapter  1).  The  NPC  has  been  estimated  under  the  importable  and
exportable  hypotheses  for  three  different  states  - Gujarat,  Andhra  Pradesh
and  Tamil  Nadu --  which  together  account  for  more  than  60 per  cent  of
all-India  groundnut  production.  The  point  of competition  between  domestic
production  and  imports  of groundnut  kernels  (from  the  USA) taken  for  the
importable  hypothesis  is  a  port  city  in  the  West (Kandla)  or in  the  south
(Madras). The  international  reference  price  under  this  hypothesis  thus
would  be calculated  by adjusting  the  fob  price  of groundnuts  at the  US
port  by adding  insurance  and  maritime  freight  from  USA to  the  relevant
Indian  port,  and  then  deducting  domestic  transport  costs,  marketing  and
trad&ng  margins  from  the  Indian  port to  the  specific  region. The
resulting  international  reference  price  is  compared  with  the  domestic
price,  to  derive  the  NPCs  of groundnut.  The  domestic  prices  were
approximated  by month  end  wholesale  prices  in the  major  markets  of
relevant  states,  averages  over  those  months  that  account  for  bulk  of
market  arrivals  in the  relevant  state  (see  Annexures  6 to 8).
4.19  The  resulting  weighted  average  NPCs for  groundnut  fluctuated
between  1.06  in  1980-81  to 2.05  in 1986-87  with  an  average  of  50  for  the
seven  year  period,  1980-81  to  1986-87  (Table  4.1). There  seems  to  have
been a sharp  increase  in  NPCs  during  1981-82,  1982-83  and  again  in
1986-87,  primarily  due  to the  sharp  fall  in international  prices  during
these  years. The  NPCs  across  states  did  not  vary  significantly;  the
lowest  NPC  was for  Gujarat  (1.47),  and  highest  for  Tamil  Nadu (1.53)  with
Andhra  Pradesh  falling  in  between  (1.50). In  other  words,  domestic  prices
of groundnuts  averaged  about  50%  more  than  imports,  implying  that
groundnuts  receive  a significant  degree  of  nominal  protection  from  the
existing  policies.
4.20  Under  the  exportable  hypothesis,  the  presumption  is  that  Indian
groundnut  would  compete  with  US groundnut  in  Europe  (Rotterdam),  which  is
world's  biggest  market  for  groundnuts.  Since  competition  is  assumed  to
take  place  in Europe,  estimation  of the  international  reference  price
entails  deducting  shipping  cost,  domestic  marketing  costs  and  trading
margins  etc.  from  the  cif  price  at Rotterdam  (see  Annexures  11 to 13).
The  resulting  set  of  NPCs (Table  1)  also  indicates  a  high  level  of
protection  with  a  weighted  average  NPC  being  1.91  for  the  period  1980-81
to 1986-87,  although  it fluctuated  between  1.25  in  1980-81  to 2.87  in
1986-87. The level  of incentives,  thus,  was  significantly  higher  under
exportable  hypothesis  than  that  estimated  under  importable  hypothesis,
primarily  due  to  differences  in the  treatment  accorded  to  transport  and
other  associated  costs  in  calculating  reference  prices. Since  these  costs
form  a significant  proportion  of reference  prices,  the  method  of their
treatment  has  a noticeable  impact  on final  estimates  of NPCs. As with  the
importable  hypothesis,  there  was  little  variance  between  the  states  in
terms  of  protection,  with  Tamil  Nadu  at to.  (NPC  - 1.95),  followed  by
Andhra  Pradesh  (NPC  - 1.91)  and  Gujarat  (NPC  - 1.87)  (see  Table  4.1). Not
surprisingly,  given  these  estimates  and the  aflatoxin  problem,  Indian
exports  of groundnuts  to  hard  currency  areas  have  been limited  in the
1980s.- ill  -
Table  4.1s  Ncwinal  Proteotsion  CoQglg.ents  of  Oroundnut  (with  shell)
Hypoth.slr/States  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Average
Importable  Hypothesis
Gujarat  1.09  1.39  1.63  1.56  1.40  1.55  1.69  1.47
(0.49)  40.^6)  (0.40)  (0.38)  (0-41)  (0.  lS)  (0-3S;  t(0ss8)
Axndtra !radash  1.o2  1.36  1.64  1.31  1.4C  1.52  2.23  1.50
(0.28)  (0.29)  (0.34)  (0-39)  (0.33)  0s.43)  (0.36)  (0.35)
Tanil  K.adu  1.05  1.35  1.74  1.41  1.40  1.$2  2.25  1.53
(0.23)  (0.25)  (0.26)  (0.22)  (0.26)  (0.40)  (0.29)  (0.27)
Weighted  Average  1.06  1.37  1.66  1.41  1.40  1.53  2.05  1.50
Exportable  Hypothesis
Gujarat  1.31  1.73  1.99  1.86  1.76  2.05  2.37  1.87
(0.48)  (0.46)  (0.39)  (0.38)  (0.41)  (0.15)  (0.35)  (0.37)
Andhra  Pradesh  1.18  1.72  2.00  1.54  1.76  2.02  3.12  1.91
(0.29)  (0.29)  (0.35)  (0.39)  (0.32)  (0.45)  (0.36)  (0.35)
Tsmil Nadu  1.21  1.70  2.11  1.67  1.77  2.02  3.15  1.95
(0.23)  (0.25)  (0.26)  (0.23)  (0.27)  (0.40)  (0.29)  (0.28)
WeLghted Average  1.25  1.72  2.03  1.69  1.76  2.03  2.87  1.91
Notes:
1.  Flgures  in  parentheses  are  value  weights  derived  by  working  out  relative  share  of  each  state  in
total  groundmut  production  valued  at  internatluonal  (reference)  prices.
2.  For  details  on  estimation  of  NPCs and  value  weights,  see  Annexures  6  to  13.- 112
C.  Effective  Protection  Coefficients  (EPCs)  of Groundnut
4.21  The  effective  protection  coefficient,  (EPC)  is  defined  as ratio
of value  added  at domestic  prices  to  value  added  at reference  prices,
where  value  added  is  calculated  as the  differenco  between  gross  value  of
output  and  tradeable  inputs  (See  Equation  (2)  oiL  Chapter  1).
4.22  The  EPCs  for  groundnut  were  estimated  on the  basis  of Equation
(2)  of Chapter  1,  using  the  NIPCs  estimated  in  section  B and  the  input
structure  and  NPCs  of tradeable  inputs. Annexure  14  presents  the  input
structures  for  Gujarat,  Anchra  Pradesh  and  Tamil  Nadu. They  'have  been
averaged  over  three  years  (1981.-V2  to 1983-84)  to  bring  about  stability  in
input-output  relations.  The input  structures  reveal  that  the  major
tradeable  inputs  of groundnut  are  seeds,  fertilisers  and  machinery. While
the  NPCs  of seeds  can  be approximated  by NPCs  of  groundnut  itself  (due  to
lack  of any  information  an international  prices  of groundnut  seeds),  the
NPCs  of fertilizers  (N,  P  and  K) and  machinery  are  estimated  at national
levels  using  the  results  of Chapter  2.  The  NPCs  of tradeable  inputs  so
obtained  and  approximated  at state  levels  have  been  averaged  by using
their  value  weights,  which  yields  weighted  average  NPCs  of all  tradeable
inputs  that  go to  produce  one  unit  of output  (annexure  15). These  NPCs
and  the  NPCs  of groundnut  derived  in  Table  4.1,  are  plugged  in  equation
(2)  of chapter  1, to  calculate  the  EPCs  of groundnut  under  the  importable
and exportable  hypotheses --  See Table 4.2.
4.23  The  EPCs  of groundnut,  on  an average,  turn  out  to  be higher  than
their  corresponding  NPGs. This  is  because  protection  of the  tradeable
inputs  generally  was  below  protection  of groundnut  (as  measured  by NPCs).
The  weighted  average  EPCs  of groundnut  fluctuated  between  1.09  in  1980-81
and  2.13  in  1986-87,  with  an average  at 1.56,  under  the  importable
hypothesis.
4.24  The  temporal  and  spatial  variation  of  effective  protection  is
dominated  by the  nominal  protection  coefficients,  as inputs  are  relatively
small  and  have  only  slightly  less  nominal  protection  than  groundnuts.
Hence,  average  effective  protection  increased  sharply  in 1981/82,  1982/83
and  1986/87  and  across  states  the  differences  in  EPCs  were  not  very large.
D.  Effective  Subsidy  Coefficients  (ESCs)  of  Groundnut
4.25  The  ESCs  of groundnut  are  obtained  by adding  subsidies  on
non-tradeable  inputs  like  irrigation  (canal),  electricity  and  credit  on a
per  quintal  (of  groundnut)  basis  into  the  numerator  of equation  (2). As
was done  in  the  earlier  chapters,  irrigation  and  electricity  subsidies  are
basically  defined  as the  difference  between  their  respective  resource
costs  (including  interest  and  depreciation  on capital  invested)  and
revenue  receipts,  while  the  credit  subsidy  is  the  sum  of the  interest
subsidy  and  default  subsidy. The interest  subsidy  is  estimated  as the
difference  in rates  of interest  being  charged  by financial  institutions  on
agriculture  and  retail  trade  (4.5%),  and  the  default  subsidy  as 40  per. 113  -
Table  4.2: Effective  Protection  Coefficients  of  Groundnut  (with  shell
Hypothesis/Ststes  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Average
Importable Hypothests
Oujarat  1.14  1.51  1.78  1.67  1.52  1.70  1.84  1.59
Az-.dhxa Prsdash  1.04  1.40  1.69  1.34  1.65  1.57  2  29  1.56
Tamil Nadu  1.06  1.36  1.75  1.42  1.42  1.5S  2.28  1.55
Weighted Average  1.09  1.44  1.74  1.47  1.47  1.58  2.13  1.56
Exportable  Hypothesis
Gujarat  1.61  2.27  2.59  2.21  2.24  2.76  3.37  2.48
Andhra Pradesh  1.28  1.99  2.25  1.67  1.98  2.34  3.54  2.15
tamil  Nadu  1.27  1.86  2.45  1.76  1.91  2.22  3.43  2.13
Weighted  Average  1.44  2.09  2.44  1.90  2.07  2.36  3.45  2.26
Note:  Weights  are  the  same  as In  Table  1.
cent  olf4those  loans  which  have  a  default  history  of  more  than  three
years.
4.26  Briefly,  the  subsidies  are  calculated  as  follows:  In  case  of
irrigation,  resource  cost  includes  a  10  per  cent  charge  on  capital
invested  on  major  and  medium  irrigation  schemes  (8.44%  as  interest  cost
and  1.56%  as  depreciation)  and  the  subsidy  is  allocated  across  different
crops  on  the  basis  of  their  relative  irrigation  water  requirements.  The
electric  subsidy  is  based  on  electricity  consumption  specific  to  each
crop,  which  in  turn  is  primarily  based  on  their  relative  water
requirements.  The  credit  subsidy  reflects  an  interest  subsidy  (4.5%  p.a.)
and  a  defalut  subsidy,  which  is  allocated  across  different  crops  on  the
basis  of  their  value  productivity  i.e.,  a  high  value  crop  will  have
relatively  more  credit  subsidy  (on  per  quintal  basis)  than  a  low  value
crop.  The  underlying  assumption  is  that  credit  subsidy  is  same  for  all
crops  on  per  unit  of  value  added  basis  i.e.,  on  every  rupee  originating
through  crop  output.
For  greater  details  on  definitional  concepts  and  methodologies
followed  in  estimating  these  subsidies  at  state  levels  and  then  allocating
them  across  different  crops,  see  Gulati,  1988a  and  Gulati,  1988b.- 114 -
4.27  These  subsidies  on  non-tradeable  inputs,  so  derived,  for  the
selected  states  over  seven  years  (1980-81  to 1986-87)  are  presented  in
Table  4.3. These  subsidies  on  a per  quintal  of groundnut  basis  turn  out
to  be  highest  in  Tamil  Nadu.  Subsidies  are  much  lower  in  Gujarat,  where
groundnut  is  largely  unirrigated.  The  high  subsidy  in 1985-86  in  Gujarat
stems  from  extremely  low  yields  of  groundnut  due  to crop  failure  in  that
year.
4.28  By adding  these  subsidies  into  the  numerator  of equation  (2)  in
chapter  1,  one  obtains  ESCs  on state  and  year-wise  basis,  under  the
importable  and  exportabie  hypotheses  (Table  4.4).  ESCs  are  obviously
higher  than  their  corresponding  EPCs. Under  the  importable  hypothesis,
e.g.  the  weighted  average  ESC  is  1.71;  it  has increased  from  1.20  in
1980-81  to  2.32  in 1986-87. There  are  hardly  any inter-state  differences
in  the  ESCs,  the  lowest  being  Gujarat's  average  of 1.70  and  the  highest
Tamil  Nadu's  1.73. Under  the  exportable  hypothesis  there  is  a greater
difference  and  the  ranking  of the  states  reverses  with  Gujarat  at the  top
(ESC  - 2.60),  followed  by  Andhra  Pradesh  (ESC  - 2.42)  and  Tamil  Nadu (ESC
- 2.38). This  difference  between  the  results  under  the  two  hypotheses
reflects  the  differences  in  the  treatment  of transportation  costs  and
associated  expenses. Finally,  it  should  be noted  that  estimated  subsidies
amount  to  about  13%  of value  added.
E.  Concluding  Remarks  and  Future  Outlook
4.29  What  do the  estimated  results  NPCs,  EPCs  and  ESCs  for  groundnuts
reveal  and  what implications  do they  have  for  agricultural  price  and/or
trade  policy? The  estimated  NPCs,  EPCs  and  ESCs  for  groundnuts  were  above
unity  in  all the  years  under  consideration  and  for  all  relevant  states
analysed  in this  study. For  example,  the  weighted  ESCs,  that  is  the
effective  protection,  adjusted  for  subsidies,  exceeded  one  in  all  years
and  has gone  up from  1.20  in  1980-81  to  2.32  in 1986-87,  with  an average
at 1.71. This strongly  suggests  that  groundnut  cultivators  in  India  have,
on balance,  received  growing  protection,  that  has  become  substantial.
This,  largely  reflects  falling  world  prices  of groundnut,  oil  and  meals
which  were  not  offset  by exchange  rate  increaments.
4.30  It  may  be noted  that  during  1986-87  there  was  a sudden  upward
jump in  the  protection  coefficient,  primarily  due  to  a sharp  decline  in
international  prices  of  groundnut  oil  and  meals,  which  affect  the  price  of
groundnut  kernels. The  world  price  of groundnut  oil  at 1985  constant  US
dollars,  for  example,  dropped  from  $905/Mr  in 1985  to  $481/MT  in  1986  and
further  $382/MT  in  1987  (Table  4.5). The  year  1987-88  was  one  of severe
drought  in  India  and  groundnut  was  one  of the  crops  most  affected,  which
resulted  in  a sharp  increase  of its  domestic  price. This  implies  that  ESC
in 1987-88  would  be even  higher  than  what  prevailed  in  1986-87.
4.31  The short-term  projections  (up  to  1990)  of world  price  of
groundnut  oil  indicate  that  the  prices  will  remain  depressed  between  1986
and 1)87  levels. And  even  the  long-term  projections  (up  to 2000  AD)
indicate  that  world  prices  of groundnut  oil  are  not likely  to  return  to
their  1985  levels. Given  this  future  scenario,  it is  very  likely  that
Indian  groundnut  cultivators  will  remain  protected  in the  coming  years.
The  degree  of  net  protection  is  likely  to increase  given  an increasing- 115 -
emphasis  on oilseeds  at  home  under  Technology  Mission  on Oilseeds,  which
seeks  to extend  more  incentives  of cultivators  of  oilseeds,  including
groundnut.
4.32  This  situation  of net  protection  would  remain  in  existence  even
if  one  adjusts  the  estimated  protection  coefficients  by attaching  a
Table 4.3:  Subsidies on Non-tradeable Inputs  of Groundnut (Rs/a)
Scat.  Input  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87
Gujarat  IS  5.19  4.40  7.49  6.18  7.43  24.68  9.49
ES  0.16  0.06  0.19  0.15  0.25  0.92  0.29
CS  5.87  6.34  8.16  8.50  8.25  16.04  15.45
TS  11.22  10.80  15.84  14.83  15.93  41.64  25.23
Andhra Pradesh  IS  34.70  23.32  30.90  22.75  31.49  30.01  28.08
ES  0.38  0.34  0.61  0.60  0.84  0.79  0.88
CS  7.28  6.63  8.03  8.37  11.00  12.59  16.50
TS  42.36  30.29  39.54  31.72  43.33  43.39  45.46
Tamil Nadu  IS  27.46  19.53  25.69  23.61  23.81  19.54  23.63
ES  1.01  1.01  1.98  2.05  1.79  1.79  2.15
CS  10.48  9.85  22.13  17.75  20.35  20.94  27.67
TS  38.95  30.39  49.80  43.41  .45.95  42.27  53.45
Note:  A very high ISD in  Gujarat  during  1985-86  .esuLts  due  to  an  abnormally  sharp  decline  fin
groundnut yield  ln Gujarat.
IS - Irrigation Subsidyl  Es - Electricity  Subsidy
CS  - Credit  Subsidy:  TS  - Total Subsidy
premium  on foreign  exchange  (shadow  pricing). The  adjusted  ESCs,  so
derived  after  using  a shadow  exchange  rate  (about  25  per  cent  higher  than
official  exchange  rate),  still  indicate  that  groundnut  is  neither  an
efficient  exportable  commodity  nor  an  efficient  import  substitute.  It
also  implies  that  investment  programs  to  expand  production  of  groundnuts
in  India,  would  provide  low  economic  rate  of return. Unless  an implicit
and  very  high  weight  is  attached  to the  objective  of self-sufficiency  in
groundnut  (or  the  oilseeds  crop  complex)  within  an  overall  framework  of
Social  Benefit-Cost  analysis,  the  Benefit-Cost  ratio  is  not likely  to  be
favourable.  Even  if self-sufficiency  has to  be achieved  in  oilseeds
crop-complex,  it  should  be attained  through  the  least-domestic  resource
cost (DRC)  combination.  This  implies  that  ESCs  of  other  oilseeds  should
be computed  and  compared  so that  a least-cost  cropping  pattern  for
oilseeds  can  be developed.116  -
Table  4.4s  Effective  Subsidy Coefficients  of  Groundnut  (with  shell)
Hypothesis/State  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Average
Importable  Hypothesis
Gujarat  1.20  1.57  1.89  1.74  1.59  1.91  1.98  1.70
Andhra  Pradesh  1.20  1.56  1.92  1.47  1.62  1.76  2.50  1.72
TamLl  Nadu  1.19  1.51  2.02  1.58  1.53  1.71  2.51  1.73
Weighted  Average  1.20  1.55  1.93  1.58  1.60  1.76  2.32  1.71
Exportable  Hypothesis
Gujarat  1.69  2.36  2.75  2.30  2.35  3.10  3.64  2.60
Andhra  Pradesh  . 1.47  2.20  2.55  1.83  2.40  2.62  3.86  2.42
Tamil Nadu  1.43  2.06  2.81  1.96  2.15  2.47  3.78  2.38
Weighted  Average  1.57  2.24  2.69  2.04  2.31  2.63  3.76  2.47
Note:  Weights  are the  same  as in  Table  1.
4.33  In  this  context  it  is  sometimes  argued  that  the  estimates  of  ESCs
(and  DRCs) are  static  in  nature  and  therefore  do  not  provide  any  guidance
for  future  policy  options.  This  argument  is  often  raised  in  Indian
context  where  the  Technology  Mission  on  Oilseeds  is  aiming  at
restructuring  the  oilseeds  economy  by  upgrading  technology  in  oilseeds
from  the  crop  itself  (seeds)  to  the  processing  and  storage  stage.  One
question  of  course  is  whether  this  can  be  achieved  at  a  reasonable
investment.  In  Indian  case  where  about  85.per  cent  of  area  under  oilseeds
is  unirrigated,  prospects  of  making  groundnut  as  economically  efficient
crop  seem  poor,  unless  a  'miracle"  seed  is  invented  for  dry  farming
areas.  Moreover,  under-current  arrangements,  there  is  only  a  tenous  link
between  higher  prices  and  development  of  such  a  seed  by  the
research-extension  complex.  Hence,  there  is  little  basis  for  an  "infant
industry'  argument  for  protection  to  promote  a  technological
breakthrough.  The  situation  is  very  different  from  the  Green  Revolution
in  wheat  and  rice,  where  such  'miracle'  seeds  already  existed  and
reasonable  support  prices  contributed  to  their  adoption.  Once  such  a  seed
is  developed  for  groundnuts,  then  price  policy  would  be  another  matter.
There  is  also  substantial  room  for  upgrading  processing  and  storage  in  the
oilseeds  industry  - the  issues  are  whether  this  is  stimulated  by  higher
oilseeds  prices,  or  whether  such  efforts  at  improving  the  downstream- 117  -
Table  4.5  TeSmporal  Behaviour  of  Proetction  Coefficients  (uiaghted  Averasg)  and  International  Procoss
------------------------------------------------------- __-----------------_-___--------------------_----_--------------
1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87
-- _----------------------------------------------------------__--------------__------------__--_-___-___-------___-----
Importable  Hypothesis
NPCs  1.06  1.37  1.66  1.41  1.40  1.53  2.05
EPWs  1.09  1.44  1.74  1.47  1.47  1.58  2.13
ESCa  1.20  1.55  1.93  1.58  1.60  1.76  2.32
Exportable  Hypotlwsis
NPCs  1.25  1.72  2.03  1.69  1.76  2.03  2.87
EPCS  1.44  2.09  2.44  1.90  2.07  2.36  3.45
ESCJ  1.57  2.24  2.69  2.04  2.31  2.63  3.76
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  *.988  1989  1990  1995
International  Price  of
Grountnut  Oil*  824  995  566  706  1027  905  481  382  390  425  430  589
Groundnut  Mb-l*
(*at 1985  contant S/MT.  230  227  183  199  189  143  139  124  132  137  137  144
Rotterdam)
Source:  Half  Year  Revision  of  Commodity  Price  Forecats  - January 1988, International  Commodity  Markets  Division,
International  Economics  Department,  The  World  Bank  (for  international  prices  of groundnut  oil  and meals).
facilities  might  not  better  be  focussed  elsewhere.  The  whole  point  of  the
foregoing  analysis  is  to  illustrate  that  what  appears  to  be  an  obvious
case  of  import  substitution  may well  be  inefficient  when  compared  with  the
alternatives,  such  as  increased  exports  of  cotton.  Attempts  to  use  price
policy  to  increase  production  of  groundnuts  (or  for  that  matter  other
oilseeds)  may  well  result  in  the  substitution  of  oilseeds  for  other  crops
that  are  relatively  more  efficient  in  terms  of  foreign  exchange  earning
capacity  (such  as  cotton,  rice  or  wheat).  Thus  the  price  stimulus  to
oilseeds  may  not  only  run  counter  to  the  principal  of  comparative
advantage,  it  may  end  up  reducing  net  foreign  exchange  earnings.- 118 -
Table 4.6:  Regional Dispersion of Effective Incentives for Groundnut
Cultivators
(Average  1980-81 to 1986-87)
Hypothesis/Protection  Andhra  Tamil  Weighted
Coefficient  Gujarat  Pradesh  Nadu  Average
Importable  Hypothesis
NPCs  1.47  1.50  1.53  1.50
EPCs  1.59  1.54  1.55  1.56
ESCs  1.70  1.72  1.73  1.71
Index of ESCs (Weighted
AV - 100)  99.41  100.58  101.17  100.00
Exportable Hypothesis
NPCs  1.87  1.91  1.95  1.91
EPCs  2.48  2.15  2.13  2.26
ESCs  2.60  2.42  2.38  2.47
Index of ESCs (Weighted
AV - 100)  105.26  97.97  96.36  100.00
.--  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Annexure  1:  Exports of  I [PS  Groundnuts from  India  (1974-75 to  1985-86)
0
Financial  Quantity  Value  Unit  Export  Quota  Remarks
Year  ('000  tonnes)  (Rs.mililon)  Value  ('000  tonnes)
(Rs/tonnes)
1974-75  55.72  255.64  4588  1974-75  to  1977-78,  period  of  canalisation
1975-76  112.80  498.37  4418  through IOPEA
1976-77  122.81  594.00  4837
1977-78  4.76  8.10  1702
1978-79  4.45  28.84  -6473  25  1978-79  to  1981-82, period  of  canalisation
1979-80  23.12  135.78  5873  50  through NAFED
1980-81  58.29  531.02  9110  50
1981-82  16.56  181.58  10965  55  J
1982-83  32.62  309.41  9485  100  1982-83  to  1985-86, period  of  canalisation
(13.74)  (136.91)  (9964)  through NAFED,  but  private  trade  also
/18.88/  /172.50/  /9137/  allowed  to  export  as  associate  shippers.
1983-84  '24.71  221.15  8950  110
(5.60)  (50.78)  (9068)
/19.11/  /170.37/  /8915f
1984-85  27.80  236.93  8523  110
(5.36)  (45.01)  (8397)
/22.44/  /191.92/  /8553/
1985-86  9.97  83.80  8405
(2.65)  (22.30)  (8115)
/7.32/  /61.50/  /8402/
1986-87  1986-87  exports  decanallsed
Notes:  1. Figures  in  parentheses relate  to  those of  NAFED  and within  slashes of  Assoclate  shippers.
1'ANNEXURE  .:  REGIONAL  DIMENSIONS OF  GROUNDNUT  PRODUCTION  IN  INDIA
Average  1982-83  to  1984-85
Production  Area  Yield  Share  of  Kharlf  Irrigated  area
(%  sha.e)  (%  share)  (Kgs/ha)  g'nut  production  under  g'nut  as
weighted  In  total  g'nut  % of  total  area
average  production  of  under g'nut
________________________________  the  states  (%)  (1982-83)
Gujarat  r  24.56  27.85  749  10.7
K  28.00  30.31  674  82.94
R/S  15.39  14.24  1630
Andhra  Pradesh  T  21.83  21.61  858  19.2
K  20.10  20.49  716  67.00
IR/S  26.45  27.78  1430
Tamil  Nadu  T  16.14  13.41  1022.  24.9
K  14.58  1  1.74  YlW  65.76
R/S  20.29  22.66  1348
Maharashtra  T  11.57  10.44  941  11.2
K  10.91  9.75  818  68.66
C14  R/S  13.31  14.24  1406
Karnataka  T  10.70  11.42  796  14.1
-K  9.99  11.65  626  67.89
R/S  12.62  10.16  1867
Others  T  15.20  15.27  845
K  16.41  16.07  746  78.62
R/S  11.94  10.92  1642
All  India  T  100(6371)  100(7502)  849  14.7
K  100(4636)  100(6350)  730  72.77
R/S  100(1735)  100(1152)  1506
Notes:
1.  T  - Total  K  = Kharif  R/S  Rabi/Summer
2.  Figures  In  parantheses  against  production  are  in  '000  tonnes  and  against  area  are  in  '000  hectares.
Sources:
1.  Estinmates  of  Area  and  Production  of  Principal  Crops  In  India,  Mfnistry  of  Agriculture,  Govt.  of  India  (different
years)
2.  Agricultural  Statistics  at  a  Glance,  Directorate  of  Economics  and  Statistics,  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Govt.  of
India,  April,  1986.-121-
Annexure 3:  Growth  Performance  of  Groundnut in  India, Selected States
Growth  Rat  (per  cent pe
States  1ja  L-a  1o  Lu  [  -UvLu-
- . 1983-84  1964-65  1983-84
1.  Gujarat  P  2.93*  10.89*  3.42***
A  1.18*  8.53*  1.39*
Y  1.89*  3.21 ns  2.05 ns
2.  Andhra Pradesh  P  1.31**  -5.28**  1.38*
A  1.14*  -3.30**  0.29 ns
Y  0.08 ns  -1.564**  0.97 ns
3.  Tarnil  Nadu  P  0.33 ns  2.36**  0.38 ns
A  0.86*  2.60*  0.03 ns
Y  -0.59**  -0.19  ns  0.44 ns
4.  Maharashtra  P  -0.98**  1.39**  0.86 ns
A  -1.50*  1.14**  - I.15*
Y  0.63 ns  0.47 ns  2.10**
5.  Karnataka  P  0.23 ns  -0.83  ns  0.96 ns
A  -0.27*  0.14 ns  0.13 ns
Y  0.50 ns  -0.96 ns  0.89 ns
6.  All  India  p  1.27*  3.17*  1.25***
A  0.70*  3.22*  0.04 ns
Y  0.53**  -0.07  ns  1.18***
Notes:
1.  Growth  rates  are  linear  trends  with  seope expressed as  per cent  at  respective  means.
2.  *,  **,  ***  imply  significant  at  1, 5  and  10 per  cent  level  of  significance,  respectivet
ns- not  significant  even at  10 per cent  level  of  significance.
3.  P - production,  A  - Area  and Y  - Yield.
Source:  K.N.  Ninan  (1987): "Edible  Oilseeds - Growth  and  Area  Responses", Economic  and
Political  Weekly  (Review  of  Agriculture),  September 26, 1987.-122
Annexure  4: Maritime  Freight  Rates  for  Groundnut  Kernels
(S/Prr)
Year  US  gulf  to  US  gulf  to  Rotterdam  to
Rotterdam  India  India
1980-81  29.6.  86.18  29.63
198r-82  20.16  74.27  20.16
1982--83  17.07  47,26  17.07
1983-84  18.80  48.00  18.80
1984-85  20.19  48.00  20.19
1985-86  17.54  48.00  17.54
1986-87  18.50  40.53  18.50
Notes:  1.  These  are approximate  freight  rates  estimated  on the basis  of wheat
freight  rates  published  by  FAO.
2.  Freight  rates  for groundnut  Kernels  arr taken  as 1.6  times  the  wheat
freight  rates  between  US  gulf  to  Rotterdamu,  and  US  gulf  to  India,  because
(a)  groundnut  Kernels  are  relatively  more voluminous  (b)  their  trading
and  transportation  is relatively  less  frequent  and  (c)  these  are trans-
ported  in  smaller  quantities.
3. Freight  rates  from Rotterdam  to India  are treated  as equal  to those
between  US  gulf  to  Rotterdam.-123-
Ai_nexure  S:  Mlarketing  Custs  and  Associated  Exuenses  in  Groundnut  Tradinc  in  Cujarat
(Average  of  1980-81  to  1986-87)
Particulars
1.  Purchase  Tax  41%  of  pod  value
2.  Surcharge  1%  on  purchase  tax
3.  Arat  (Commission)  15,  of pod  value
4.  Mandi  tax  1A  of  pod  value
5.  hiandling  expenses  (weightring,  2%  of  pod  value
filling,  stitching,  transportation
sutli,  wasking,  stacking  and
destacking).
6.  Domestic  insurance  0.1%  of  pod  value
7.  Interest  for  one  month  e  18%  1.5%  of  pod  value
p.a.  on  pod  value
8.  Gunny  bags,  storage  charges  and  Rs.  16/quintal  of  pode.i.
decortication  expenses
9.  Port  expenses  (transportation  to  Rs.  lO/quintal  of  Kernels
port,  fob  expenses  and  survey  (  Rs.  7/quintal  of  pods)
charges)
Total  marketing  costs  and  associated  6.1%  of pod  value  plus
expenses  (excluding  purchase  tax  and  Rs.  23/q  of  pod  weight
surcharoe  on  that)  (i.e.  Row  3  which  is  equivalent  to  1
to  Row  9)  0.7
(0.061  P  +  23) per  quintal  of Kernels
p
Notes:
1.  These  are  approximate  marketing  costs  and expenses  as explained  by NAFED,  an
agenc;  responsible  for undertaking  support  operations  in case of oilseeds.
2.  rne  conversion  ratio  of  pods  to  kernels  is  1:0.7,  which  is  also  the  one  normally
taken  by  NAFED.
3.  The  relevant  reference  price  for  groundnut  pods  (P'p)  under  importable  hypothesis
thus,  can be  estimated  as
1  (  P.  + 0.061  Pp  +  23)  - P
07  a  (P  - 32.86)/1.52
Mp  K
Where  Pp is the maximum  possible  price  of groundnut  podsj  PK is the landed
cost  of  imported  groundnut  i'ernels  at  Kandla  (Gujarat).
4.  Purchase  tax and surcharge  are  excluded  as they  are not  deemed  to represent
marketing  costs  while  mandi  tax  and  Arat  are  included  as they  are  representing
transaction  costs  in  the  market.Annexure  6:  Cularat  :  Eatttion  of  NPCs  of  Groundnut  (with  shell)  (Imnortable  Hypothesis)
Particulars  u3nit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  t985-86  1986-87  Averatte
1.  Cif price  of  Sroundaut  (Xerlaan)  US  6/MT  608.00  445.83  365.671  438.00  380.83  355.00  293.00
at  Rotterdam  (Oct-March)
2.  Minus  freight  from  US gslf  to  S$/T  29.63  20.16  17.07  18.80  20.19  17.54  18.50
Rotterdam
3.  Minus  freight  from  US gulf  to  StHM  86.18  74.27  47.26  48.00  48.00  48.00  40.53
India
4.  Equals  cif price  at land:.  S/rn  664.55  499.94  395.86  467.20  408.64  385.46  315.03
(Cujarat)
5.  Exchange  Rate (Oct-March)  1$-Rs.  7.99  9.17  9.82  10.53  12.41  12.17  13.00
6.  Equals  cit price at Kandl.  Rs/q  530.97  458.44  388.73  491.96  507.12  469.10  409.54
(Rov  4  x Vow 5)/10
7.  Plus apgrox.  port clearance  RsJq  5.00,  6.99  7.44  10.18  18.44  25.00e  30.00
c  ,es
8.  Equals  landed  cost of gronnd-  Rs/q  535.97  465.43  396.17  502.14  525.56  494.10  439.54
nut kernels  at Eandla(;*7
9.  Reference  pcice  of  ground-  Rs/q  330.99  284.30  239.02  308.74  324.14  303.45  267.55
nut  pods  r  - (P 1-32  .86)/1.52  (of  pods)
(see  Anex-5)
10  Wholesale  price 5of  aroundr,t  RsIq  360.33  394.00  390.6.  463.25  453.33  470.67  453.33
pods  in  Cujarat  (Rajkot)
(October-March)
11  NPCs  of  gr3undnut  (vith  1.09  1.39  1.63  1.56  1.40  1.55  1.69  1.47
shell)  (Row  10/Row  9)
Notes:
1.  From January to  March (due  to  uep in  ViO price series)
2.  See Annexure  4.
3.  Assumed  to  be  the  same  as that  tor  wheat  (e  - estimated)
4.  See  Annexure  5.  footnote  3.
5.  These  are  month-end  wholesale  prices  (October-March)  prevailing  in  Rajkot  market.
Sources:
1.  FAO  Monthly Bulletin  of Statistict  (.earious  issues)  (for  cif price  data).
2.  RBI Bulletin  (varioua  t.suea)  (for Lschange  Rate5.
3.  Directorate  of Economics  and Statistics (Ministry  of Agriculture)  for domestic  price  date.
4.  USDA for  cif price date for later  yearsAnnexure  7:  Andhra  Pradesh  :  Estimation  of  NPCs of  Groundnut  (with  shell)  (Tmportable  Hypothesis)
Particulars  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Average
1. Cif  price  of  groundnut  S/IM  663.86  428.44  367.831  461.00  377.78  348.00  296.00
Kernels  at  Rotterdam  (Occ-June)
2.  H1nus fre2ght  from  US gulf  to  S/KT  29.63  20.16  17.07  18.80  20.19  17.54  18.50
Rottardam
3. Plus  freight  from  US gulf  to  S/MT  86.18  74.27  47.26  48.00  48.00  48.00  40.53
India
4. Equals  Cif  price  at  .Madras  S/Mr  720.41  482.55  398.02  490.20  405.59  378.46  318.03
5. Exchange  Rate  (Oct-June)  1S/Rs.  8.16  9.24  9.88  10.70  12.42  12.29  12.92
6. Equals  cif  price  at  Madras  R./q  587.85  445.88  393.24  524.51  503.74  465.13  410.89
(Row  4  x  Row  5)/l0
7. Plus  (agprox)  port  clearance  Rs/q  00e  6.99  7.44  10.18  18.44  25.00o  30 .00C
charges
8.  Equals  landed  cost  of  roundnut  Rs/q  592.85  452.87  400.68  534.69  522.18  490.13  440.89
kernels  at  Madras(.-P7).
9. Refelenca  price  of groundnut  Rs/q  368.41  276.32  241.99  330.15  321.92  300.83  268.44
pods  *P  - (Pr-32.86)/1.52
(see  aaexure  5)
10.  Wholesal.  price  of  groundnut  Rs/q  377.44  376.78  3°7.78  431.56  449.11  458.12  600.00
pods in  Andhra Pradesh
(Nadyal)  (Oct-June)
11 NPCs  of  groundnut  pods  1.02  1.36  1.64  1.31  1.40  1.52  2.23  1.50
(kow  10  /  Row  9)
Notts  end  References:  Same  as in  Annexure  6.Annexure  8:  Tamil  Nadu  Eatteation  of  NPCs  of  Groundaut  (with  shell)  (Importable  Hypothesis)
Particulare  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Average
1. Reference price  of  groundnut  Rs/q  368.41  276.32  241.99  330.15  321.92  300.83  268.44
pods (sans  s that  for  Andhra
Pradesh)
2.  Uholesale  price  of  groundnut  Rs/q  385.58  373.22  420.00  465.97  451.42  458.27  604.80
pods  in  Tamil  Nadu  (Mbdras)
(derived  by  multiplying  shelled
peanuc  prices  by  a  factor  of  0.7)
3.  NPCa of  groundnut  pods  1.05  1.33  1.74  1.41  1.40  1.52  2.25  1.53
(Row 2  /  Row  1)
-4  For  Notes  and  References see  Annexure  6.Annexura  9: Esttmation  of  Regional  (value)  Wetahts  for  Groundnut  (vith  shell)  (Importable  ltyvothests)
State  Particulars  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84 1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Averate
Gujerat  Croundnut  Produc.  *.t.  1.64  2.20  1.31  1.81  1.57  0.45  1.29
Reference  Price  Rs/q  330.99  284.30  239.02  308.74  324.14  303.45  267.55
Value  Rs 10  ..  542.82  625.46  313.12  558.82  508.?O  136.55  345.14
Value  veight  0.49  0.46  0.40  0.38  0.41  0.15  0.35  0.38
Andhra  Groundnut  Produc.  *.t.  0.86  1.44  1.13  1.72  1.26  1.32  1.35
Pradesh  Reference  Price  Rs./q  368.41  276.32  241.99 330.15  321.92  300.83  268.44
Value  Rs.  10  a.  316.83  397.90  273.45  567.86  405.62  397.10  362.39
Value  weight  0.28  0.29  0.34  0.39  0.33  0.45  0.36  0.35
Teill  Nadu  Croundnut  Produc.  *.t.  0.68  1.24  0.85  0.98  0.99  1.18  1.08
Referenc-  Price  Rs/q  368.41  276.32  241.99  330.15  321.92  300.83  268.44
Value  Rs.  10  a.  250.52  342.64  205.69 323.55  318.70  354.98  289.91
Value  Weight  0.23  0.25  0.26  0.22  0.26  0.40  0.29  0.27
Total  value  Rs.  10  a. 1110.17 1366.00  792.26  140.23  1233.22  888.63  997.44
Aggregate  value
weight  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.0D  1..0  1.00  1.00
Notes:  1.  Value  is  groundnut  production  multiplied  by  its  refeence  price.
2.  For  reference  prices.  see  Annexures  6  to  S.Annexure 10:  Estmntion  of ReaLonal  (Value)  WeLthts for  Groundu-t  tvtth  shell) (Exzcrtable  Hypothesis)
State  Particulars  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Average
Cujarat  Groundaut  Produc.  m.t.  1.64  2.20  1.31  1.81  1.57  0.45  1.29
Reference price  Rs/q  275.92  227.89  196.34  259.06  257.58  229.28  190.91
Value  Rs. 10 a.  452.51  501.36  257.21  468.90  404.40  103.:8  246.27
Value  weight  0.48  0.46  0.39  0.38  0.41  0.15  0.35  0.37
Aadhre  Groundaut Produc.  a.t.  0.86  1.44  .1.13  1.72  1.26  1.32  1.35
Pradesh  Reference price  Ra/q  318.59  219.37  199.10  279.72  255.35  226.31  192.00
Value  Rs. 10 s.  273.99  315.89  224.98  481.12  321.74  298.73  259.20
Value weight  0.29  0.29  W  035  0.39  0.32  0.45  0.36  0.35
tlall Nadu  Groundaut Produc. *.t.  0.68  1.24  .5  0.98  o.9  1.18  1.08
Reference price  Rs/q  318.59  219.37  199.10  279.72  255.35  226.31  192.00
oo  Value  Rs.10  a.  216.64  272.02  169.24  274.13  252.80  267.05  207.36
Value weldht  0.23  0.25  0.26  0.23  0.27  0.40  0.29  0.28
Total  value  Rs.  10  E.  943.14  1089.27  651.43  1224.15  978.94  668.96  712.83
Aggreete  Value  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00
weight
Notes:  1.  Value Is groundnut production  multiplied by Its reference price.
2.  For reference prices.  see Annexures  11 to  13.Annexure  11: Guiarat  :  Estimation  of  RPCs  of  Groundnut  (uith  shell)  (Exportable  hlypothests)
Perticulars  Unit  1980-81 1981-82  1982-83  1983-84 1984-85  1985-86 1
986-87  Average
1.  Ctf  price  of  groundnut  Kernels  S/MT  608.00  445.83  365.671 438.00  380.83  355.00  293.00
at  Rotterdas  (Oct-March)
2.  tinua  insurance  and  2freight  from  $/KT  35.71  24.62  20.73  23.18  24.00  21.0'  21.43
Rotterdam to  Kandla
3.  Equals fob  price  at  Kandla ('ujaret)  s/tr  572.29  421.21  344.94  414.82  356.83  333.91  271.57
4.  Exchange  Rate  (Oct-Hatch)  1$-Ra.  7.99  9.17  9.82  10.53  12.41  12.17  L3.00
5.  Equals  Lob price  at  Kandla - Rs/q  457.26  386.25  338.73  436.81  442.83  406.37  353.04
(Row 3 x  Row  4)/10
6.  Minus approximate  port  charges
3 Rs/4 5.00  6.99  7.44  10.18  18.44  25. 00e  30.06e
o'  7.  Equals price  of  exportable  ground-  Rs/q  452.26  379.26  331.29  426.63  426.39  381.37  323.04
('3  nut  Kernels  at  Kandla  port(S-0)
8.  Refefence price  of  groundnut  pods  Rs/q  275.92  227.89  196.34  259.06  257.58  229.28  190.91
4  _  - (P  - 32.d6)/1.52  (see
Annerure  55
9.  Wholesale  grice  of  groundnut  pods  Re.q  360.33  394.00  390.67  483.25  453.33  470.67  453.33
in  Gujaret  (Oct-March)
10  NPCs  of  groundnut  (with  shell)  1.31  1.73  1.99  1.86  1.76  2.05  2.37  1.87
(Row 9 /  Row  8)
Notes:  1.  3.  4.  5  aee  Annexure  b.
2.  Inaurance  ia  calculated  at  1S  of  cif  price  at  Rotterdam  while  freight  Is  the  same  as  that  for  US gulf  to
Rotterdam  (See  Annexure  4)Annesure 12t  An4hra Prddebh  Estiation  of  NPCs  of  Groundnut  (with  shell)  (Exportable  Rupothesis)
Particular.  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Awerea.e
1.  Cif  price  of  groundaut  kernels  at  S$/KT  663.86  428.44  367.83'  461.00  377.78  348.00  296.00
othardas  (Oct-June)
2.  Hinue  Insurance  aod 2freight  from  t/\tT  36.27  24.4  20.74  23.41  23.97  21.02  21.46
*ottardas  to  Madras
3.  Equals  fob  price  at  Madras  $/Kr  627.59  404.00  347.09  437.59  353.81  326.98  274.54
4. Exchange Rate  (Oct-Jun.)  1S-RS.  B.16  9.24  9.88  10.70  12.42  12.29  12.92
S. Equale  fob  ptlce  at  Madras  RI/q  512.11  373.30  342.92  468.22  439.43  401.86  354.71
(October-June)
6.  Minus  port  cbargas  R3/q  5.00  6.99  7.44  10.18  18.44  '5.00'  30.00
7. Equals  price  of  exportable  ground-  Ros/q  517.11  366.31  335.48  458.04  420.99  376.86  324.71
nut  Kernels  et  Kandla  Port(s-4)
4
.-4  8.  Rlfe&ence price  of  groundnut  pods  R./q  318.59  219.37  199.10  279.72  255.35  226.31  192.00
I  *  P;  (P1 - 32.86)t1.52  (see  Annex.5)
9.  Wholesle  price  of  groundnut  pods  Rs/q  377.44 376.78  397.78  431.56  449.11  458.12  600.00
(Oct-June)  la  Nadyal  (Andhra Pradesh)
10.  NPCo  of  groundaut  pods  1.18  1.72  2.C  1.54  1.76  2.02  3.12  1.91
(Row  9 /  Row  8)
For  Notes  1.  3.  4  me  Annexure 6.
Note  2  a..  Annexure 11.
RIferece.  ea"  as  In  Annexure 6.lAnexure  13:  Taml  Nadu  Estlzation  oF NPCa of Groundnut (wtth shell)  I  (Exortable  Hypothesis)
Particulars  Unit  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  Averaie
1.  leforenca  price  of  grourdout  poda  Rs/q  318.59  219.37  1"9.10  279.72  255.35  226.31  192.00
(same  as  that for  Andhra  Pradeah)
2.  Ubolesale  price  of  groundaut  pods  Rs/q  385.58  373.22  420.00  465.97  451.42  458.27  604.80
La  Tall  Nadu (Madras)  (derived)
by multiplying  *halled  peanut
prices  by a  factor  of 0.7)
3.  NPC. of  groundaut  pods  1.21  1.70  2.11  1.67  1.77  2.02  3.15  1.95
(ovw  2  R  Nov  1)
l.
_.-132-
Annexure  14:  Input  Structure  of  Croundnut  (Selected  States)
(Average  of  1961-5Z  to  1983-84)
(Percentaite)
Cost  item  Guiarat  Andhra  Pradesht  Tamil  Nadu
1. Human  labour  19.85  21.90  19.63
2. Bullock  labour  11.79  10.43  6e72
3. Machine  labour  3.11  0.19  0.74
4.  Seed  19.65  20.02  23.10
5.  Fertiliser  8.30  5.26  2.56
6. Manure  4.81  3.78  1.21
7.  Insecticide  1.59  0.20  0.29
8.  Irrigation  3.52  1.59  6.57
9.  Interest  on  working  capital  2.15  1.82  1.76
10  Rental  value  of  owned  land  17.60  29.36  25.42
11 -Rent  paid  for  leased  in  land  1.00  - 1.01
12 Land  revenue  and  taxes  0.27  0.23  0.25
13  Depreciation  on  implements  0.93  1.35  0.91
and  farm  buildings
14.  Interest  on  fixed  capital  5.42  3.86  9.83
15.  Total  Cost  100.00  100.00  100.00
(Rs)  (3317.04)  (2619.81)  (3530.29)
16.  Total  value  of  output  3665.07  2583.38  3884.90
(main  plus  by  product,  Ps)
17.  Yiel.  (Q/ha)  7.22  6.72  11.21
Source:  Ccaprehensive  Study  for  the  Cost  of  Cultivation  of  Principal  Crops  in  India
L  rectorate  of  Economics  and  Statistics,  Hlinistry  of  Airiculture.-133-
Annexurc  15t NPCs  of  Trsdeable  Insuts  of  Groundnut




1980-81  1.09  0.77  1.26  1.02
1981-82  1.39  0.82  1.26  1.22
1982-83  1.63  0.97  1.26  1.42
1983-84  1.56  0.89  1.26  1.35
1984-85  1.40  0.72  1.26  1.20
1985-86  1.55  0.69  1.26  1.29
1986-87  1.69  0.91  1.26  1.44
Weights  (Averege  of
1981-82  to  1983-84)  17.78  7.51  2.81  2S.10
Andhra  Pradesh
1980-81  1.02  0.77  1.26  0.97
1981-82  1.36  0.82  1.26  1.25
1982-83  1.64  0.97  1.26  1.50
1983-84  1.31  0.89  1.26  1.22
1984-85  1.40  0.72  1.26  1.26
1985-86  1.52  0.69  1.26  1.35
1986-87  2.23  0.91  1.26  1.95
WVightes  (average
of 1981-82  to  1983-84)  20.30  5.33  0.19  25.82
Teail  Nadu
1980-81  1.05  0.77  1.26  1.03
1981-82  1.35  0.82  1.26  1.30
1982-83  1.74  0.97  1.26  1.65
1983-44  1.41  0.89  1.26  1.35
1984-85  1.40  0.72  1.26  1.33
1985-86  1.52  0.69  1.26  1.43
1986-87  2.25  0.91  1.26  2.09
Weights  (average  of
1981  't.l  tO  1983-84)  20.99  2.33  0.67  23.99
Three  States  Combined
1980-81  1.05  0.77  1.26  1.00
1981-82  1.36  0.82  1.26  1.25
ln82-83  1.67  0.97  1.26  1.51
1983-84  1.42  0.89  1.26  1.31
1984-85  1.40  0.72  1.26  1.26
1985-86  1.53  0.69  1.26  1.35
1986-87  2.07  0.91  1.26  1.81
Weights  (sum  of  three
States)  59.07  15.17  3.67  77.91
Note:  Value  weights  have  been  estimated  as  percentage  shares  of  these  inputs  in
the  total  value  of  the  output  (main  plus  byproduct).- 134 -
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